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 1  Introduction 
 
 1.1 Background
In many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, the majority of landholdings are based 
on customary forms of tenure that are either unwritten or, at best, only in-
formally recorded. Landholders’ rights depend on agreements that are em-
bedded in local communities and that derive from their social relations with 
families, clans, lineages and communities (Berry, 1993). Access to land is gen-
erally based on negotiability of rules and relationships (Juul and Lund, 2002). 
These informal arrangements account for access to land in most rural, peri-
urban and urban areas. In these areas, chiefs, family heads and elders con-
tinue to be the de facto land managers, allocating plots and running ‘custom-
ary courts’ for the settlement of land and other disputes, even where statuto-
ry systems do exist (Crook, 2009: p. 131). They administer virtually all land in 
these areas, even in those areas in which demand for land transactions and 
more formal property rights is rapidly increasing (Deininger, 2003). 
Since the process of modernising rural agriculture began, several attempts 
have been made to replace or modernise customary tenure in Africa, on the 
grounds that it is a recipe for underdevelopment and thus a major cause of 
the region’s high levels of rural poverty (Dorner, 1972). In many Sub-Saharan 
African countries, a number of efforts have been made to administer custom-
ary land, in the form of institutions and statutes. However, the effectiveness 
of regulatory institutions and laws as a means of managing customary ten-
ure has yet to be realised. In many of these countries, both statutory and cus-
tomary mechanisms for accessing land and administering tenure have been 
afflicted by many problems. Lying at the heart of these problems are: (1) land 
ownership conflicts and disputes over land boundaries that impede these 
countries’development; (2) haphazard and unregulated land development, as 
a result of a change in land use from agricultural to residential use; (3) illegal 
and informal land transactions; and (4) illegal land occupations and the pro-
liferation of informal settlements. For example, in Ghana, it is estimated that, 
as of the year 2002, cases involving disputes over land constitute 50% of total 
cases filed in the courts nationally (Crook, 2005) (recent accurate figures are 
unavailable). All of the above-mentioned problems result in tenure insecurity. 
Although some of these problems occur in rural and urban areas, they are 
more pronounced in peri-urban areas. In these latter areas, customary ten-
ure has undergone several changes in response to high levels of land devel-
opment and changes in land use. In these areas, overlapping and multi-
ple rights, consisting of several interlocking systems of individual and com-
munal rights (Pottier, 2005), often evolve as customary tenure systems try to 
adapt to changing demands. Some of these rights are bound by customary 
law, and others by statutory law (Larbi, 2006). There is high uncertainty sur-
rounding titles and tenure in such areas. In particular, poor people and dis-
advantaged groups in these areas live in fear of losing their land. Both the 
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customary and the statutory systems for securing rights and administer-
ing land have proved to be ineffective in peri-urban areas. While the statuto-
ry land laws imposed under colonialism had little to do with customary law 
and practice, at the same time, a number of problems relating to inequali-
ty, landlessness and eviction prevail in most customary systems, especial-
ly where the mechanisms that hold indigenous institutions to account have 
been weakened (Alden Wily and Hammond, 2001; IIED, 2006; Amanor, 2008; 
Ubink, 2008b; Toulmin, 2009). 
In acknowledgement of its importance, the issue of customary tenure and 
its associated problems has been receiving increasing attention in policy and 
scholarly circles over recent decades. This growing interest has been reflect-
ed in a number of land reform initiatives that have been launched across Sub-
Saharan Africa, and a stream of academic debates on the subject. Internation-
al organisations such as the World Bank, UN-HABITAT and the FAO have been 
the most prominent actors in these policy and research initiatives.1
 In most of these academic debates and policy reform initiatives, the need 
for alternative land administration systems (LASs) for Sub-Saharan Africa to 
deal with problems associated with customary tenure, has been stressed. The 
debates have addressed which principles, approaches to and mechanisms of 
land tenure reform and administration would be best suited to African con-
ditions, and which would deliver tenure security in customary areas. They 
emphasise the importance of recognising customary tenure and building on 
customary tenure systems in order to achieve equitable land management, in 
the context of poverty reduction (Toulmin and Quan, 2000; Deininger, 2003; 
UN-HABITAT, 2004; World Bank, 2005; UN-HABITAT, 2006). The historical evo-
lution and complexity of customary tenure have been addressed, as has the 
need to strengthen customary tenure institutions (CTIs) to carry out land 
administration (LA) activities at the local level. These are no longer seen as 
obstacles to growth and tenure security in customary areas, but rather as ele-
ments to be taken seriously in ‘institutional tinkering and engineering’ (Lund, 
2009: p. 1). It has been widely recognised that incorporating indigenous inter-
ests and securing rights for groups and individuals are necessary precondi-
tions for the eradication of poverty and achieving the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals. 
Although recent land policies in many Sub-Saharan African countries rec-
ognise customary tenure, many existing LASs are still based on ‘a relatively 
narrow land administration paradigm’ (Bogaerts et al., 2002: p. 38): rigid land 
registration, cadastral surveying and mapping rules and standards. A new 
1 Since 2000, a number of workshops and publications by the World Bank and UN-HABITAT have supported the 
need for alternative LASs in Africa. These include the UN-HABITAT Global Campaign for Secure Land Tenure, 
launched in December 2002; the World Bank Regional Workshop on land issues in Africa (Kampala, Uganda); and 
the World Bank Land Policy Research document (2001).
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paradigm is thus required. This study explores new ways to recognise cus-
tomary rights by adapting LA to the institutional framework of customary 
tenure.
 1.2 Land administration systems
‘Land administration’ can be defined in several ways, depending on how the 
term ‘administration’ is understood and used (Van der Molen, 2002). Although 
other definitions are used (Dale and McLaughlin, 1999; Lindsay, 2002), the no-
tion of LA as ‘the process of determining, recording and disseminating infor-
mation about the ownership, value and use of land, when implementing land 
management policies’ (UN-ECE, 1996: p. 6) has been a key guiding principle in 
many policy documents and research studies. This definition has been chal-
lenged, however, for promoting a ‘western’ perspective and for failing to cov-
er certain issues that are pertinent to the context of African LA (Fourie et al., 
2002). In the African context, where the majority of land is held under cus-
tomary and informal tenure, LA falls outside the conventional cadastre/land 
registration sphere. The definition of LA therefore needs to encompass a 
range of key issues, such as governance, institutions, non-formal and infor-
mal land administration systems, ownership and occupancy rights, pro-poor 
issues and the decentralisation of LA (Fourie et al., 2002; Österberg, 2002). Gov-
ernance and institutional issues are critical to LA in Africa, where institution-
al restructuring and decentralisation are often undertaken due to the weak-
ness of the state and the importance of improving good governance (Fourie, 
2002). Nevertheless, the UN Economic Commission for Europe’s (UN-ECE’s) 
definition of LA still holds, especially when concepts of ownership, value and 
use are interpreted broadly (Van der Molen, 2006b). 
Conventional LASs, whether they are established for fiscal, legal or multi-
ple purposes, have four main components, namely: land registration, cadas-
tral surveying and mapping, land valuation and land-use planning (Dale and 
McLaughlin, 1999). These components feature in many LASs worldwide. A 
country’s LAS can be organised in many ways, and can take the form of a cen-
tralised, decentralised or integrated land administration system (ILAS). Cen-
tralised systems use a centralised bureaucracy to carry out LA tasks, there-
by relying on a single, closed (top-down) approach. Most countries’ LASs 
are centralised systems that are controlled by central government agen-
cies. In decentralised LASs, different LA functions are diversified and shared 
among different agencies. In most cases, LA functions are delegated to cen-
tral governments, provinces or districts; or they may be split between differ-
ent departments at the central and local government levels. Decentralised LA 
ensures accessibility for end-users, and also ensures that the state’s respon-
sibility for guaranteeing all citizens equal access to institutions, services and 
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land information is upheld (Bogaerts and Zevenbergen, 2001). In some coun-
tries, ILASs are used. In an ILAS, the four basic LA functions are integrated in 
an approach that runs counter to the traditional separation of responsibilities 
of institutions (Dale and McLaughlin, 1999). ILASs are essential for achieving 
sustainability objectives and a more efficient property development process 
(Bennett et al., 2005). The integration of LA functions features prominently in 
a new theoretical framework for LASs (Williamson et al., 2010). This new the-
oretical framework contains ten LA principles that show how LASs should be 
designed and integrated, so as to ensure that people dealing with land-relat-
ed questions can identify the best tools and options for administering land. 
Good governance, efficiency and effectiveness feature prominently in this 
new theoretical framework as a means to ensure sustainable land adminis-
tration, and this thesis builds on these three fundamental principles. 
Throughout this study, LA is used as a tool to record information about ten-
ure, value and the use of land. LASs include systems, processes, organisations 
and operational functions for the management of land. The term organisation 
is used to refer to the statutory, customary and informal institutions that are 
involved in allocating land, protecting interests, solving disputes, planning, 
and managing the resourceful use of land. Land is understood as the surface 
of the earth, the matter beneath the surface, the air above the surface and 
everything attached to the surface, to the extent that the rights to these are 
established and protected via the tenure regime (Van der Molen, 2006a). The 
concept of ownership should be understood as a relationship between the peo-
ple and the land within any jurisdiction. It is concerned with the mode in 
which rights to land are held, and which are therefore grounded in statuto-
ry law, common law or customary law and traditions. Value should be under-
stood as all values that can be assigned to land, including economic assets, 
social and historic or cultural values. Use refers to the use to which land can 
be put and land cover according to the defined classification system. 
 1.3 Building land administration systems on 
customary tenure systems 
Historically, two schools of thought have shaped the formalisation and legal 
recognition of customary land rights and the design of LASs in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. The first, the economic school, is embedded in neo-classical econom-
ic theories of property rights, and emphasises the role played by economic 
and land market objectives. Formalisation is therefore seen as a fundamen-
tal requirement for the economic development of areas characterised by in-
formal and/or customary land tenure (McLaughlin and Palmer, 1996). In the 
economic property school, the flexibility and fluidity of customary tenure ar-
rangements are considered tantamount to tenure insecurity and market in-
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efficiency (Dorner, 1972; World Bank, 1974). Agricultural productivity, the pro-
motion of land markets and creation of security of tenure feature prominent-
ly in this formalisation strategy. These concepts have functioned as a form of 
legitimisation for privatising land, which has been promoted as the only effi-
cient and secure institutional arrangement available. This school of thought 
influenced many land reform programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa during the 
twentieth century. Assisted by the World Bank, many governments, includ-
ing that of Ghana, extended classical titling programmes as a means of secur-
ing tenure, particularly in the wake of De Soto’s publication of The Mystery of 
Capital (De Soto, 2000; De Soto and Cheneval, 2006). These objectives included 
changes to existing customary landholding patterns and the establishment of 
new institutional arrangements to provide security of tenure. LASs shaped by 
these objectives are usually centralised, with top-down administration pro-
cesses. Even when they are decentralised, they are still built on state-led in-
stitutions (see Chapter 2). 
In many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa where culture and tradition are strong, 
these formalisation techniques have failed to deliver their overriding objec-
tives to the majority of beneficiaries (Dalrymple, 2005). In many areas where 
land titling registration has been pursued, it has proved to be ‘slow, expensive, 
difficult to keep up-to-date, and difficult for poor people to access’ (Cotula, 
2007: p. 6); it has had little or no impact on investment behaviour and income, 
and has not always been necessary or sufficient for achieving a high level of 
tenure security for land development (Zevenbergen, 1998; Deininger, 2003); 
and has only benefited a small number of high-income groups (Fourie, 2002). 
Since the 2000s, a new paradigm has emerged for the formalisation of cus-
tomary tenure and LASs. This new formalisation strategy has been driven by 
the need to promote customary rights and laws in LA reform initiatives, and 
represents the views of the second school referred to above. International 
researchers (Alden Wily and Hammond, 2001; Durand-Lasserve, 2006; Alden 
Wily, 2008; Benjaminsen et al., 2009; Toulmin, 2009) have shown that although 
formalisation may be necessary, it should be implemented in an incremental 
manner and should address the social aspects of tenure. Community partici-
pation in land governance, and the development of local institutional capac-
ity by decentralising LASs from national, state-led agencies into community-
based institutions, play major roles in these policies and formalisation strate-
gies (Amanor, 2008). Several experiments with land reform policies and local-
ly-based systems across Sub-Saharan Africa have been based on these objec-
tives (Durand-Lasserve, 2006; IIED, 2006; Benjaminsen et al., 2009). In Ghana, 
the multi-donor Land Administration Project (LAP), which strengthens the 
customary administration of land and establishes Customary Land Secretar-
iats (CLS) under the aegis of chiefs, reflects how dominant this strategy has 
become. 
This view has been echoed by many international policy and research ini-
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tiatives that emphasise the importance of building on customary tenure sys-
tems in order to achieve equitable land management (Deininger and Bin-
swanger, 1999; Toulmin and Quan, 2000; Deininger, 2003; UN-HABITAT, 2003; 
Delville, 2006; Toulmin, 2009). As such, this study also contributes to this new 
area of research and policy development. 
 1.4 Land administration in peri-urban customa-
ry areas in Ghana
In examining how customary tenure systems have evolved in response to ur-
banisation and legislative influence, this study will focus on peri-urban are-
as. Peri-urban areas tend to be tenure hotspots, where property relations are 
subject to intense contestation and where access to wealth and authority is 
undergoing rapid change (Ubink, 2008a). Generally, the term ‘peri-urban ar-
ea’ is used to describe transitional zones between urban and rural areas that 
are undergoing urbanisation, and which are therefore progressively assum-
ing many of the characteristics of urban areas (FAO, 1999; Nkwae, 2006). When 
judging whether a village can be classified as peri-urban, it is important to 
consider whether there is a continual presence of bush/fallow agricultural 
land, in combination with competition for land for non-agricultural uses (Hol-
land et al., 1996). Peri-urban areas are often characterised by diverse popula-
tions, growth and expansion, heterogeneity of land uses, morphological con-
ditions and densities of built-up areas, demographic changes, and complex 
functional relations and social structures (FAO, 1999). 
In peri-urban Ghana, there are two basic categories of landownership: state 
and private. Where landownership is vested in the state, land is managed by 
state-led agencies. In contrast, private land in most parts of the country is 
under communal landownership, held in trust for communities or groups in 
the form of stools, skins or families (see Chapter 3).2 Land held under private/
communal ownership accounts for about 80% of the land in Ghana, whereas 
the state owns about 20% (Antwi and Adams, 2003). 
Land administration in peri-urban Ghana operates within a plural environ-
ment, with statutes and customary laws, public and indigenous institutions, 
traditional values and corporate norms operating side by side. The admin-
istration of customary land is governed by customary and statutory institu-
2 In Ghana, land is traditionally vested in chiefs or families (see Section 3.3.1). In the South, the symbol of a 
chief’s authority and land ownership is a carved stool, whereas in the North, the symbol is that of a skin of a cow 
or a sheep. Where land is vested in chiefs, it is called ‘stool land’ among the tribes of southern Ghana, whereas 
it is known as ‘skin land’ among the tribes of northern Ghana. A number of traditional groups are also scattered 
throughout Ghana, however, which do not recognise stools or skins as symbols of private communal land owner-
ship. In such cases, the traditional arrangement is normally that of the vesting of land ownership in the clan, 
family or individual (National Land Policy, 1999).
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tional arrangements that run parallel to one another. In these areas, access 
to customary land can only be obtained through customary institutional 
arrangements. These, in turn, are governed by rules – customary laws – that 
determine who can use the land and under what conditions. These rules are 
implemented by the authorities, or institutions that owe their legitimacy to 
traditional practices. These institutions may exist as autonomous bodies or as 
organised bodies in hierarchical structures, headed by ’paramount chiefs’ and 
manned by different levels of sub-chiefs and committees, depending on the 
tenure arrangements of the area (Cotula, 2007). In the context of this study, 
the term customary tenure institution is used to describe a system of indigenous 
authority that is in charge of managing customary land. Such institutions are 
made up of chiefs, councils of elders, indigenous courts and steering commit-
tees, who are responsible for regulating access to land, managing conflicts, 
ensuring the security of community members, regulating settlements and 
maintaining land records (see Section 5.3).
In statutory systems, a number of laws regulate the administration of land 
through land registration, surveying and mapping and land-use planning, and 
improve the overall management of customary land. In colonial times, sev-
eral attempts were made to improve land management in these areas. Some 
of these attempts were intended to resolve the contradictions in land tenure 
in favour of state interests (Aryeetey, Ayee et al., 2007), and to improve tenure 
security and economic development in customary land. Post-colonial govern-
ments continued the tradition of land reform by enacting a flurry of legisla-
tion to control customary land. 
Customary land delivery in peri-urban Ghana has come under considerable 
strain due to increasing demand for land for housing, as a result of the move-
ment of tenants from inner-city areas to more established settlements on 
the periphery, so as to escape overcrowded conditions and high urban rents 
(Gough and Yankson, 2000). The superimposition of state land management 
institutions onto customary areas has also affected indigenous institutions, 
making them operate less effectively in peri-urban areas than in rural areas. 
Consequently, customary systems have not been able to evolve to the extent 
that they can cope with the speed, volume, diversity and complexity of con-
temporary land management issues, as shown, for example, by some areas in 
Ghana (Kasanga and Kotey, 2001). The increasing monetisation and individu-
alisation of customary land rights, and the changing land values these create, 
have resulted in several attempts to redefine land ownership and tenure (Ary-
eetey, Ayee et al., 2007). This, in turn, has resulted in the contestation of rights 
to land by community members and traditional authorities (Aryeetey, Ayee et 
al., 2007; Ubink, 2008b). The situation can be explained by the fact that dur-
ing rural-urban transformation, customary land becomes an economic good 
rather than a collective resource (Mends and De Meijere, 2006). Some chiefs 
take advantage of increasing land values by selling land without first gain-
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ing the approval of community members, and by interpreting customary laws 
to their advantage (Ubink, 2007). Accountability and transparency are particu-
larly affected as a result, because chiefs try to make land transactions as pri-
vate as possible (Berry, 2002; Aryeetey, Ayee et al., 2007; Ubink and Quan, 2008; 
Toulmin, 2009). Land is increasingly being lost due to the rapid conversion of 
farmland into residential land. Some farmers who lose their land are com-
pensated with the crops they have lost, or a plot of land for a single house 
unit (Alden Wily and Hammond, 2001). New migrants find it difficult to access 
land and must sometimes do so under severe conditions. Even tenants who 
have acquired land from community members have found the terms of their 
tenancies increasingly unstable and expensive (Alden Wily and Hammond, 
2001). These developments have caused considerable unrest and distress in 
Ghana’s peri-urban communities. 
Despite the national ad hoc land management and administration policies 
that have been adopted, effective and efficient land management has not yet 
been achieved in Ghana. The existence of numerous litigation cases – 30,000 
disputed titles were brought to court in the year 2000 (Kasanga and Kotey, 
2001) – attests to this. Current approaches towards modernising and improv-
ing LA in peri-urban areas focus on improving operational processes, but have 
failed to address the factors underlying tenure insecurity and other tenuri-
al problems. The approaches taken follow economic property models and the 
trend towards replacing customary tenure, rather than adaptation to existing 
customary practices. State management institutions form the main instru-
ment for pursuing formalisation. The dialogue between these competing and 
overlapping concerns means that alternative LASs are needed to support the 
dynamic humankind-to-land relationship that one finds in customary tenure 
systems. The aim of this study is to address this research and knowledge gap. 
 1.5 Problem definition 
The research that has resulted from current debates on securing tenure in 
customary areas shows that there has been a paradigm shift from formalisa-
tion strategies based on replacement or market-based models, to the integra-
tion of informal and customary rights into LA. Even though the importance of 
securing all rights in customary tenure and decentralising LAS activities to lo-
cal communities is widely acknowledged, and the urgency of the issue is rec-
ognised in Sub-Saharan Africa, this has not led to consensus on how it should 
be realised. This study focuses on three prominent issues that act as signif-
icant scientific and practical constraints on this ‘new’ approach towards the 
recognition of customary rights and the local administration of land. In doing 
so, the study attempts to demonstrate the need to adapt LA to local institu-
tional frameworks of customary tenure.
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The first issue concerns the question of how LASs can manage the dynam-
ics of tenure in ways that allow the diverse needs of various stakeholders in 
peri-urban customary areas to be met. This question has not yet been ade-
quately addressed; only a few studies (Arko-Adjei, 2001; Daley and Hobley, 
2005; Nkwae, 2006) have attempted to analyse and conceptualise LASs in rela-
tion to the dynamics of customary tenure systems in peri-urban areas. Cus-
tomary land structures are characterised by several interlocking individual 
and communal rights associated with the ownership, control and use of land 
(Toulmin and Quan, 2000; Pottier, 2005; Larbi, 2006). As discussed in Section 
1.1, such conglomerates of rights can be very complex, particularly in peri-
urban areas in developing countries, where customary tenure can under-
go several transformations in response to high levels of land development 
and changes in land use. The complexity of tenure is related to the changing 
needs of various stakeholders in customary land areas. The needs of stake-
holders can vary over time, depending on the values attached to customary 
land. While land may be needed as a communal resource, both in terms of 
its socio-cultural significance and for group subsistence, group members need 
individual rights to plots for farming or building, which can be used as eco-
nomic incentives. At the same time, land may be needed for public and social 
amenities, and other such uses that are of overall benefit to society. Recording 
these multiple rights and designing LASs that are flexible enough to provide 
a broad set of solutions to the specific needs of different stakeholders at dif-
ferent times, especially in rapidly growing peri-urban areas, has proved com-
plex, and has become a thorny issue among LA experts. The diversity of needs 
demands a diverse range of responses. In other words, as the various catego-
ries of stakeholders in peri-urban customary areas differ, so do their needs 
regarding tenure options. As customary tenure systems evolve, can we iden-
tify an effective way of securing individual and group rights? The answer to 
this question will require a critical analysis of the customary tenure dynam-
ics in peri-urban areas. 
In customary tenure systems, there are internal mechanisms that ensure 
good governance by the standards of traditional society. These mechanisms 
ensure community participation in decision-making, equitable distribution of 
community resources and accountability. A second issue, however, relates to 
whether CTIs can meet good land governance requirements in LASs. As dis-
cussed above, several reports from peri-urban areas indicate that when cus-
tomary land transactions become increasingly monetised, land delivery activ-
ities are often affected by significant governance problems. These are often 
related to: (1) abuses of power by chiefs and custodians; (2) lack of trans-
parency in land transactions; (3) lack of stewardship; (4) inequity in access 
to land and the delivery of justice; (5) tenure insecurity as a result of forced 
evictions and land-grabbing; and (6) land contestations between traditional 
authorities and indigenous members of landowning groups (Alden Wily and 
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Hammond, 2001; Ikejiofor, 2006; Ubink, 2007; Amanor, 2009; Toulmin, 2009). 
Since an effective LAS is linked to good governance, these studies raise ques-
tions about the ability of CTIs to provide effective and efficient systems that 
can improve tenure security for peri-urban dwellers, while also meeting land 
governance objectives in LA. It is crucial to critically assess land governance 
in CTIs. Extending governance assessment in CTIs would allow for the holis-
tic diagnosis of measures to improve LASs, the lack of which could hinder the 
objective of decentralising LA to the local level. Yet, governance assessment in 
LASs has always been limited to formal institutions and legislation. 
Conventional methods of recording land information and administering 
rights put an emphasis on technical tools, specifications and standards, all of 
which require specialised knowledge and skills that are lacking in local com-
munities. In view of these stringent LAS requirements, the third issue regard-
ing the implementation of LASs at the local level is that of how local com-
munities can meet these specifications and develop the capacity to adminis-
ter land effectively. This relates to specific capacity-related issues, including 
the building of knowledge, skills and resources. The use of participatory geo-
graphic information systems (PGISs) in appraising indigenous knowledge (IK) 
for LA will be examined.
This study will address these three fundamental questions, all of which 
have less been treated in the literature on formalisation and the design of 
LASs in customary areas. This has led to misguided and questionable policy 
assumptions concerning the administration of customary land. The results of 
the research described in this thesis are therefore not only intended to con-
tribute to the development of theory and the academic study of customary 
tenure systems in LASs and related peri-urban issues, but are also intend-
ed to provide input into the development of policy relating to the design and 
implementation of LASs for peri-urban customary areas. 
 1.6 Research questions
The central research question to be answered in the study is:
How can land administration systems in peri-urban areas be adapted to the tenure 
and institutional framework of customary tenure systems?
This research question, which covers the wide range of issues outlined in the 
section on problem definition above, has been broken down into five objec-
tives and sub-questions.
 
Objective 1: To analyse land administration objectives and requirements for 
peri-urban customary areas (Step 2 in Figure 1.1). 
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1. What lessons can be learnt from the analysis of the formalisation theories, and to 
what extent can these be applied to the design of LASs in peri-urban areas?
2. What is the nature of the existing legal framework for administering land in Gha-
na, and to what extent does the framework support the administration of custom-
ary land at the local level? 
Objective 2: To develop a framework for LAS requirements for peri-urban cus-
tomary areas (Step 3 of Figure 1.1).
3. What are the requirements for the design of LASs in peri-urban customary areas? 
4. What are the requirements for assessing good land governance in customary ten-
ure institutions?
Objective 3: To analyse how customary tenure systems in Ghana are chang-
ing in response to internal or external pressures resulting from demograph-
ic change, urbanisation, high levels of land development, and legislative influ-
ence (Step 5 (a) of Figure 1.1).
5.Which aspects of Ghana’s customary tenure systems are dynamic?
6.How do the customary tenure institutional arrangements adapt to the dynamics of 
tenure? 
Objective 4: To assess the institutional capacity of customary areas in Ghana 
for LA (Steps 5 (b) and (c) of Figure 1.1).
7. To what extent do the customary tenure institutions in peri-urban Ghana meet 
good governance objectives in LA?
8. To what extent can a PGIS approach enhance indigenous knowledge and local ca-
pacity for LA? 
9. To what extent do customary tenure institutions in Ghana meet the LAS require-
ments for peri-urban areas?
Objective 5: To institutionalise LASs for peri-urban customary areas in Ghana 
(Step 6 in Figure 1.1) 
10. What strategies are needed to design and effectively implement LASs in custom-
ary areas?
11. What are the challenges for adapting LASs to the institutional framework of cus-
tomary tenure?
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 1.7 Research design, methodology and study 
areas
 1.7.1 Research methodology
The study of the securing of tenure and the administration of customary land 
covers a wide range of issues that are related to specific social, political, cul-
tural, technical and historical-geographic contexts, and which cut across sev-
eral disciplines. An interdisciplinary, process-oriented and institution-fo-
cused approach was thus needed for this study, which uses concepts from an-
thropology, political science and public administration. The multi-dimension-
al and multi-disciplinary nature of the issue means that it cannot be analysed 
and discussed adequately from a single methodological perspective. There-
fore, in this study, a variety of research methods from different disciplines 
were used to address the questions outlined above. 
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This study uses a research methodology based on the systematic use of 
case studies to develop a strategy for designing and implementing LASs 
that can be adapted to the institutional framework of customary tenure. The 
research methodology is divided into two stages: first, an analysis of the lit-
erature, and second, a research design based on multiple case studies. The 
phases of the research design in relation to the chapters of the thesis are con-
ceptualised in seven steps, as shown in Figure 1.1. These steps are followed 
throughout the thesis. 
The first part of the study, at the most general level, consists of a multi-lev-
el literature analysis. The purpose of the literature analysis is to define the 
research problem and formulate the research questions (Step, 1), and to for-
mulate the ‘new’ requirements and the framework for designing LASs that 
can be adapted to the institutional framework of customary tenure (Step 2). 
In the literature analysis, international academic and policy debates on cus-
tomary tenure, formalisation strategies, LA theory and good governance con-
cepts are analysed in the light of the available evidence, prior to setting out 
the framework used in the study. At this stage, the literature analysis goes 
beyond Ghana, as the issue of securing tenure and administering customary 
land extends to other Sub-Saharan African countries and other parts of the 
world. 
The results of the literature analysis are directly applied in Chapters 2 and 
3. Chapter 2 explores and analyses the links between strategies for formalis-
ing customary tenure, good governance principles, customary tenure dynam-
ics and peri-urban conditions. Lessons are drawn from a number of cases in 
which unconventional or innovative tools have been used to secure land ten-
ure in Sub-Saharan Africa and other parts of the world. Drawing on these 
examples and experiences from other countries allows us to better under-
stand the case of Ghana, and also helps to justify the need for an alterna-
tive framework for administering land in customary areas. In Chapter 3, the 
framework for administering land in Ghana is analysed with a view to better 
understanding the extent to which Ghana has adapted to formalisation strat-
egies, and also how Ghana’s LA framework supports the administration of 
customary land at the local level. Next, a set of research questions and meth-
ods used for the case study were constructed (Step 3).
The second part of the study constitutes a field study. The aim is to 
appraise the LA framework defined in Step 2 by way of a case study of peri-
urban customary areas in Ghana. A research methodology based on case 
studies was deemed appropriate, on the grounds that such methodologies are 
well suited to the investigation of interactions between phenomena in real-
life contexts. The use of case studies is also appropriate for descriptive stud-
ies in which the goal is to describe the features, context and processes of a 
particular phenomenon (Yin, 2003). The case study research uses an explan-
atory case study technique (Yin, 2003). Explanatory case studies are suited 
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to causal investigations, where the aim is to examine and explain ‘how and 
why’ certain phenomena occur, and for testing hypotheses, (Tellis, 1997) all 
of which feature in this study. The research takes the form of a multiple-case 
study that involves three peri-urban areas (see Section 1.7.2). In each case-
study area, the tenure and tenure institutions form distinct units of analysis. 
The field study analysis is divided into two parts: a land tenure diagnosis 
and a local institutional capacity analysis (Step 5). The tenure diagnosis (Step 
5a) consists of two levels of investigation and analysis. The first aim is to ana-
lyse the dynamics of tenure and to explain why these dynamics occur. The 
second part of the tenure diagnosis involves an analysis of how customary 
tenure institutions are adapting to the dynamics of tenure and the changing 
needs of peri-urban dwellers. Having clear insights into the internal opera-
tions of customary systems can heighten our understanding of the ways in 
which local actors select what should be accepted or rejected. This can help 
us to formulate appropriate mechanisms for securing land rights and admin-
istering land in customary areas. 
The local institutional capacity analysis is a supply analysis that aims to 
investigate the institutional capabilities of customary communities involved 
in LA. The local institutional capacity analysis is also conducted at two levels. 
First, CTIs in the three study areas in Ghana – Japekrom, Tamale and Gbawe – 
are assessed with respect to the extent to which they meet good governance 
objectives in LA (Step 5b, described in Chapter 7). The assessment is based on 
indicators relating to five governance dimensions: participation, equity, trans-
parency, accountability, and efficiency and effectiveness (Step 4, described in 
Chapter 5). In the second institutional analysis (Step 5c), a PGIS is employed 
as a means of mitigating inadequacies in human and financial LA resources 
in local communities (Chapter 8). It is often assumed that PGISs can empower 
local people and promote participation (Kyem, 2004; McCall and Minang, 2005). 
For this reason, I examine the potential of PGIS to uncover IK for identifying 
rights to customary land and to support LA. The study uses a range of PGIS 
tools (see Chapter 8). 
In Step 6, a cross-case analysis of the three issues investigated in the case 
study is undertaken, in order to appraise the theoretical framework and deter-
mine whether the customary tenure systems in peri-urban Ghana meet LAS 
requirements. Based on this analysis, strategies for designing and implement-
ing LASs based on customary tenure frameworks are articulated. These strate-
gies address how LASs in customary areas can cope with the dynamics of ten-
ure and can be adapted to local institutional frameworks of customary tenure. 
 1.7.2 The case study areas 
Three customary areas in Ghana were selected as case study areas, to provide 
empirical evidence to highlight the issues being investigated in this study. 
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These are Japekrom stool, Tamale skin and Gbawe-Kwatei family (Figure 1.2). 
The diversity in tenure, customary institutional structures, land-use actors 
and changes in tenure due to rapid urbanisation were the main criteria used 
to select these areas. In addition, they were chosen in order to achieve a fair 
representation of the three land-owning groups in Ghana, and to determine 
whether the situation in these particular areas also reflects a growing nation-
al problem. Although statutory tenure arrangements do exist in these areas, 
most land users access land through customary institutional arrangements. 
Japekrom stool, which represents the central area of the country and agri-
cultural regions, belongs to the Akan3 ethnic group, where allodial ownership 
is vested in stools. Tamale skin belongs to the Dagbon ethnic group, where 
allodial ownership is vested in skin; this area represents the North. Tamale 
is one of the fastest-growing cities in Ghana (Ghana Statistical Service, 2005). 
Gbawe family belongs to the Ga ethnic group in the south of the country, 
3 The Akan people constitute the largest ethnic group in Ghana, making up about 42% of the population. The 
group is composed of several sub-ethnic groups, divided into over a dozen different kingdoms, or states; these 
include the Asante, Bono, and Fante groups. The Akans occupy southern half of Ghana-south and west of the 
Black Volta. The Akans also live in the neighbouring countries of Ivory Coast, Togo, and Benin.
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where allodial ownership is vested in families. Detailed descriptions of the 
land tenure systems, the customary tenure institutional structures and the 
land development activities of the case study areas are given in Chapter 5.
 1.8 Scope of the study
This study aims to investigate how LASs in peri-urban areas can be adapt-
ed to the tenure forms and institutional frameworks of customary systems. 
The study focuses on tenure security, even though LASs have three core func-
tions; namely, tenure, valuation and use (Dale and McLaughlin, 1999). Fur-
thermore, the study examines how we could design a LAS strategy that focus-
es on the integration of the dynamics of tenure into LA, in order to secure a 
continuum of rights in customary land. The study focuses on the institution-
al aspects of the strategy, while paying less attention to the financial, techni-
cal and legal aspects. 
The study addresses knowledge gaps in LA in three areas. First, it provides 
new insights into the formalisation of customary rights and new ways to deal 
with the dynamics of tenure. Since customary tenure systems have inter-
nal mechanisms for managing tenure dynamics, analysing the dynamics of 
tenure provides insights into which types of tenure can be secured at which 
moment in time, and also into which institutional processes are required to 
secure tenure in customary areas. Adapting LASs to the institutional frame-
work of customary land delivery will help LA to evolve to deal with tenure 
dynamics, particularly if tenure institutions are supported in the right way. 
Second, good land governance discourse and research into LA has been lim-
ited to statutory institutions and regulations. This study contributes to land 
governance by looking beyond formal institutions. Analysing how the princi-
ples of good land governance can be applied or introduced in customary ten-
ure institutions – an issue that has received little attention from scholars and 
policymakers in LA reform – will enhance our ability to address governance 
problems holistically. Third, while PGISs have been used as tools for enhanc-
ing indigenous knowledge in the areas of forestry, natural resource manage-
ment and land-use planning in many developing countries, little is known 
about PGISs in the context of LA. This study thus provides insights into the 
potential of PGISs for eliciting IK for use in LA.
 1.9 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis seeks to develop a LAS strategy that can be adapted to the dynam-
ics of tenure and institutional frameworks of customary tenure, by means of 
a multi-level analysis of the literature and a case study on peri-urban Ghana. 
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The thesis has therefore been divided into three parts, which make the links 
between the theoretical and empirical chapters explicit. Ten chapters address 
a range of issues at various levels. Each chapter presents a unique perspective 
that corresponds to each stage of analysing the main research problem and 
answering the research questions. 
Chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4 constitute Part I of the thesis, which describes the 
theoretical framework of the study. Chapter 1 introduces the study and 
presents the problem statement, the research objectives and questions, the 
methodology used and the structure of the thesis. Chapter 2 provides the the-
oretical basis of the study and an overview of current trends in LAS develop-
ment. Chapter 2 offers an overview of concepts of customary tenure and the 
theories that shaped the formalisation of customary tenure and land reform 
approaches in Sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, the chapter highlights some 
innovative tools that can provide legal recognition of customary rights and 
rights in informal settlements. It also discusses key issues related to weak 
governance in customary tenure systems in peri-urban areas, and concepts of 
good governance in relation to land administration. The lessons learnt from 
these concepts feed into the analysis of the requirements and options for 
administering land in peri-urban customary areas (Chapter 4). 
Chapter 3 discusses the legal framework for administering land in Gha-
na. The chapter first discusses customary landholding in Ghana. It further 
describes the government’s influence on customary land management, high-
lighting the historical developments. The chapter discusses the extent to 
which, how, and with which objectives government policies have sought to 
regulate customary land management, and the consequences of these regu-
lations. The functioning of government institutions, the Land Sector Agencies 
(LSAs) and current institutional reform activities undertaken in the LAP are 
analysed. These descriptions aim to highlight the extent to which the institu-
tional framework supports customary LA at the local level. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the conceptual approaches that lie at the heart of the 
study. The chapter explores the links between underlying theories of custom-
ary tenure systems, LA systems, good land governance, and the realities of 
the framework for administering land in Ghana, in order to conceptualise the 
framework for the study. It discusses the key requirements and the frame-
work for designing alternative LASs for peri-urban customary areas. Further-
more, the chapter generates the requirements for assessing land governance in 
customary tenure institutions. This land governance assessment framework is 
used in Chapter 7 to assess CTIs of three peri-urban customary areas in Ghana. 
Part II of the thesis (Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8) is concerned with the design 
and description of the case studies. Chapter 5 focuses on the field study 
design, explaining the methodology used to carry out the field study. It dis-
cusses in detail the methods used to collect and analyse the field data, in 
order to investigate the issues at stake and answer the research questions. 
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The field design is described in terms of the research objectives. Furthermore, 
the chapter provides a detailed description of the study areas, including loca-
tions, tenure systems, customary tenure institutional structures and land 
development activities.
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 present the results of the field studies, and describe the 
various issues that were researched. Chapter 6 discusses trends in customary 
tenure practices in three peri-urban areas of Ghana: namely, Japekrom, Tam-
ale and Gbawe. The chapter provides a detailed analysis of the changes that 
have occurred in customary land practices in these areas. The analysis covers 
changes in land ownership, land-use rights, modes of transferring interest in 
land, tenure security, social settings and tenure rules, land use, and changes 
in the institutional framework for customary land tenure. The chapter elabo-
rates upon the factors underpinning the changes in tenure and the implica-
tions of these for LAS design. 
Chapters 7 and 8 analyse the capacity of CTIs for LA. Chapter 7 presents 
the results of the investigation into the extent to which customary tenure 
institutions in peri-urban Ghana meet good governance objectives in LA. The 
assessment is based on indicators developed in Chapter 4, which cover five 
governance dimensions – participation, equity, transparency, accountability, 
and efficiency and effectiveness. The assessment focuses on customary ten-
ure institutions in the three study areas: Japekrom, Tamale and Gbawe. Chap-
ter 8 completes the empirical research and the institutional capacity assess-
ment by examining the potential of PGIS and IK for LA. The chapter presents 
a case study of two peri-urban communities in Tamale, in which a PGIS tech-
nique was employed to assess the usability of the tool to elicit IK and empow-
er the local community. 
Based on the requirements from the literature and the conclusions drawn 
from the fieldwork, Part III of the thesis (Chapters 9 and 10) looks towards 
how solutions might be found to the research problems outlined in the study. 
Chapter 9 discusses the key research findings and the development of the 
framework for adapting LAS to the institutional framework of customary ten-
ure, by means of cross-case analysis. The chapter further develops the strat-
egies that are needed to design and implement LASs that can meet land 
administration requirements in peri-urban customary areas. Specifically, the 
chapter discusses a potential approach to dealing with the dynamics of ten-
ure and adapting LA to the institutional framework of customary tenure. The 
types of tenure that could be recorded and secured at the different phases of 
tenure evolution are discussed. 
The final chapter, Chapter 10, presents a summary of the findings and con-
clusions that has been derived from the results of the methodology applied 
and the analysis performed, in accordance with the study’s five objectives. 
The chapter also addresses the study’s contribution to science and to the lit-
erature, and makes recommendations for future research. 
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 2 Customary tenure, forma-
lisation and concepts of 
good governance 
 2.1 Introduction
Chapter 1 provided an overview of the issues related to tenure insecurity and 
the ineffectiveness of land administration systems (LASs) in peri-urban areas, 
and explained the need for a new paradigm for the formalisation and admin-
istration of customary rights. This chapter discusses the theories on custom-
ary tenure systems and formalisation strategies that have been adopted to se-
cure land rights and administer customary land. Section 2.2 describes con-
cepts of customary tenure, how customary tenure is changing and the drivers 
for change. Section 2.3 analyses the concepts that lie behind the formalisa-
tion strategies or models that have been adopted to secure rights in custom-
ary land. The section also highlights the various debates that relate to these 
formalisation models. Developing a deeper understanding of these formali-
sation strategies and debates will help us to better comprehend the conse-
quences of these strategies, and to identify which issues should be consid-
ered when designing LASs that are based on existing systems in customary 
areas. Furthermore, it will help us to evaluate and compare these strategies, 
and as such, will provide valuable information for policymakers who face the 
challenge of building new LASs or reforming existing ones. The section al-
so highlights some examples of successful, innovative tenure tools and ap-
proaches that have been adopted to secure customary and informal rights in 
Africa. Section 2.4 discusses concepts of good governance and approaches to 
assessing good governance in LASs. These concepts, debates and examples 
will be linked to the need for an alternative approach to LA, and form the ba-
sis for the design of the framework for administering land in peri-urban cus-
tomary areas that will be introduced in Chapter 4. 
 2.2 Concepts of customary tenure systems
The term ‘customary’ is very ambiguous. As a concept, ‘customary tenure’ has 
been used in several ways in different contexts. In many contexts, the terms 
‘traditional’, ‘communal’ and ‘indigenous’ have been used interchangeably 
to describe all indigenous tenure systems in Africa. Some scholars (Noronha, 
1985; Migot-Adholla and Bruce, 1994; Nkwae, 2006) have contested such gen-
eralisations. These scholars argue that describing all forms of indigenous ten-
ure as ‘customary’ or ‘communal’ reveals misconceptions about the different 
forms of indigenous tenure systems in Africa. For example, Nkwae (2006) ar-
gues that using the term ’communal’ to describe all indigenous tenure sys-
tems in Africa implies group management, ownership, exploitation, control 
and use of land. He argues that such a description is misleading in that it pre-
supposes that individual members of the group do not have exclusive land 
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rights. Nkwae’s argument is supported by Ostrom (2000), who asserts that 
findings from many studies on common property-rights systems consistently 
indicate that such systems do not exist in isolation of, but usually in conjunc-
tion with individual rights. In a similar argument, Noronha (1985) notes that 
the use of the term ‘communal’ to describe customary tenure systems over-
simplifies a complex tenure relation in the customary systems, and therefore 
should be avoided.
In this study, the term ‘customary’ is used to describe a ‘system of author-
ity that is based on anteriority and alliance, in which access to resourc-
es depends on social belonging, and in which rights are allocated under the 
auspices of land management institutions’ (Cotula, 2007: p. 35). In this study, 
‘customary tenure’ therefore refers to: 
1. ‘indigenous’ tenure systems that have evolved locally; 
2. land that is held on the basis of group and individual rights; and 
3. the mechanisms for obtaining, using, distributing and disseminating these 
rights, which arise as a result of accepted practices based on the customs 
and traditions of a group (Kalabamu, 2000; Cotula, 2007). 
These traditional societies or groups have developed various ways of con-
trolling land rights in different situations. These cover how land is managed 
in relation to members of communities; how land rights can be transferred 
within the group; and how land rights can be transferred to other persons 
outside the group (Österberg, 2002). The major difference between customary 
tenure systems and other common property regimes is that the former usu-
ally includes both use rights allocated to households or individuals, and also 
common use rights. Common property regimes, however, describe joint use 
and access by community members of common pool resources (Otsuka and 
Place, 2001: p. 12). Given the remarkable diversity in the composition of the 
groups, their structure, culture and the physical environment, it is not sur-
prising that customary tenure systems exhibit a wide range of different ten-
ure relations.
 2.2.1 Essential features of customary tenure systems 
Despite the diversity in tenure relations, a review of literature indicates that, 
customary tenure systems are governed by several common principles. The 
right of disposition of customary land lies in the hands of kinship or politi-
cal groups (Kalabamu, 2000; Nkwae, 2006). These political groups, which can 
take the form of homesteads, families, villages, chiefdoms, ethnic societies or 
other groups or networks, exercise control over land use. The groups regard 
themselves as stewards of the land for future generations, rather than own-
ers, on the grounds that the land has been given to them by their ancestors 
and by land gods (Pottier, 2005, Ollenu, 1962). This traditional system guides 
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people’s way of life and forms the very essence of their land tenure practic-
es. The use of land concerns with the living and the dead. Man’s role is one of 
stewardship, and therefore is required to preserve land for future generations 
(Ollenu, 1962). Land is therefore mostly conceived as an unbounded resource 
to be used, not as a commodity to be measured, plotted, sub-divided, leased, 
pawned or sold (Pottier, 2005). These religious, political and social conceptions 
of land are intertwined with land-use practices, making it difficult to separate 
tenure from people’s culture. 
Theoretically, customary tenure systems are grounded in two basic princi-
ples (Pottier, 2005). First, every indigene, by virtue of his or her membership 
of the group, has access to land. This principle, which Biesele et al. (1991) refer 
to as the right of avail, is a key feature of the various kinds of customary ten-
ure system. Right of avail, which is also referred to as ‘general rights based on 
citizenship’, is uniformly applied to all and automatically shared by all peo-
ple belonging to a particular community, tribe or clan. All rights – individual 
or common – are deduced from the right of avail. The second principle, which 
is described as ‘probably equally ancient’ (Pottier, 2005: p. 58), is the recogni-
tion of an individual’s right to anything that he or she has created in land, 
whether this is a homestead or field. Such a right can be inherited according 
to the regular rules governing the inheritance of private property. These rights 
in improved land can thus become the particular rights of an individual and 
can be transferred to another in the lifetime of the right-holder. 
In general, families enjoy fairly well-defined spatial and temporal rights of 
use over parcels of cultivated land, which are then transmitted to succeed-
ing generations in accordance with the prevailing rules of succession, usual-
ly through inheritance (Migot-Adholla and Bruce, 1994). In a similar way, eve-
ry member of the group has a right to a piece of land for his own use. These 
use rights, often referred to as usufructuary rights (Meek, 1968), are lifelong 
rights for group members. Such rights are transferable through inheritance, 
but not through sale. Non-indigenous members, such as migrants, may also 
be allocated a piece of land, provided that vacant land is available and that 
the recipient respects the community’s traditions and customs. 
Rights in customary land exist as complex, interlocking tenurial rights con-
sisting of individual and collective rights (Pottier, 2005), usually referred to as 
a ’bundle of rights’. These overlapping, multiple land rights include ‘opera-
tional rights’ (the right to access land, to cultivate it, to withdraw produce, 
and so forth) and ‘management rights’ (the right to allocate and transfer land) 
(Cotula, 2007: p. 66). Thus, for a given piece of land, customary tenure may 
allow for multiple resource use, including farming, fishing, hunting, grazing, 
mushroom collecting, building, and so forth. These use rights may exist con-
currently or may succeed one another over different seasons, according to 
agreements. Logically, these rights cannot be recognised unless one simulta-
neously recognises the existence of the customary regimes that sustain them 
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(Alden Wily, 2008). Therefore, whether they are individual or shared, custom-
ary interests and/or rights gain their existence and legitimacy from group or 
community support (Agbosu, 2000).
Customary law
In customary tenure systems, the control of land is based on customary law. 
Customary law is a body of what are usually unwritten rules, with a legiti-
macy that is grounded in ’tradition’ (Cotula, 2007). These rules are based on 
social constructs, developed over time to accommodate a particular group of 
people’s way of life and interpretation of their physical environment (Kala-
bamu, 2000). Generally, customary law defines how rights to land are to be al-
located within societies; how access is granted to rights to use, control, and 
transfer land, as well as associated responsibilities and restraints. These rules 
also regulate issues such as marriage, divorce, inheritance and the member-
ship of kinship groups and lineages (Joireman, 2008). Being traditional and so-
cially constructed, the essential elements of customary rules are passed on 
orally, by way of example or in the form of practice from generation to gen-
eration (Kalabamu, 2000). The content of customary law is extremely diverse, 
and varies between communities. In addition, customary rules are not stat-
ic, but evolve continually in response to diverse factors, including cultural in-
teraction, population pressure, socio-economic change and political process-
es (Cotula, 2007). 
Customary tenure institutions
The rules governing access to and the use of customary land are implement-
ed and regulated by customary authorities or institutions, whose legitima-
cy derives from ‘both anteriority of presence (the founders, or those who de-
fine themselves as such) and recognition of the “magico-religious alliance” 
that they have formed with the local genies on the one hand and with po-
litical forces on the other’ (Cotula, 2007: p. 36). These institutions are usual-
ly composed of a chieftain or priests who serve land and earth deities. These 
land priests, tribal chiefs or heads of clans exercise trusteeship over the land 
on behalf of the group. They are therefore entrusted with managing the land 
within their territory and making decisions regarding the land allocated to 
community members. Customary tenure institutions regulate access to land 
and resources, and thus manage the tension ‘between land security as indi-
vidual good’ and ‘land security as a common good’ (Cotula, 2007: p. 37). They 
grant access to resources to certain stakeholders, and may protect resources 
by banning certain land-use practices. Like all formally-recognised commu-
nal systems, the governing system of customary tenure is usually nested in 
a series of governance units, which complement the organisational skills and 
knowledge of those involved in making decisions in the smaller units (John-
son, 1972). These indigenous governing institutions may exist as autonomous 
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bodies or as organised bodies in a hierarchical structure that is headed by 
‘paramount chiefs’ and manned by different levels of sub-chiefs and commit-
tees, depending on the tenure arrangements in the area in question (Cotula, 
2007). 
Strengths and weaknesses of customary tenure systems
A stable customary tenure system is a source of social security and continu-
ity. In general, in well-defined and socially cohesive groups, individual land 
rights have proven to be secure, long-lasting, and in most cases, inherita-
ble and transferrable (Deininger, 2003). At least when land is plentiful, farm-
ers have no need to ‘own’ land, in the western sense. The continuous, un-
challenged use of land by individuals and the recognition of individuals’ land 
rights by the group mean that indigenous people in such systems do not face 
the problem of insecurity of tenure. Likewise, access to land and security is 
potentially guaranteed to those who do not belong to the group. Security of 
tenure not only relates to land use, but also to the transfer of and investment 
in land (Kasanga, 1999). Farmers have long been prepared to invest in peren-
nial crops, such as coffee, in the knowledge that their investments were se-
cure. This security is guaranteed both to those who inherit and to those who 
buy land. Members of the group can invest in the land or arrange contracts 
with non-members. Such forms of flexible tenure arrangements bring the ad-
vantage of helping people who do not have the means to invest in land to 
benefit from the land indirectly. 
Nevertheless, in the wake of many colonial-era policies that discriminated 
against customary tenure,4 particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, a large part of 
the population that depends on customary tenure systems faces the conse-
quences of falling outside the scope of formal land transactions and access 
to credit (Deininger, 2003). Landholders are finding it difficult to access credit 
from lending or financial institutions, because they are required to show valid 
documents to prove their rights to occupy land (Durand-Lasserve, 2006). This, 
in turn, discourages people from making the necessary investments for devel-
opment in agricultural areas. Furthermore, in areas where patrilineal inher-
itance is practised, women have not gained access to holding land in their 
own right (Dowuona-Hammond, 2003; Kotey and Yeboah, 2003; Obioha, 2008), 
a phenomenon which prevents legitimate members of the group from access-
ing land. 
In the pre-colonial era, customary tenure systems were based on continu-
ous observation and practices. In such systems, the boundaries of land par-
cels were usually identified with non-permanent landmarks such as streams, 
shrubs and trees. Furthermore, transactions in customary land were not 
4 This might not be true for countries that have legal recognition of customary tenure.
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recorded in writing, but were instead legitimated and publicly endorsed at 
public ceremonial gatherings (Agbosu, 2000). The use of these non-perma-
nent boundary indicators, some of which are difficult to trace with time, and 
the absence of basic data concerning transactions, however, has led to many 
land-related problems, including land disputes and litigation (Kasanga, 1999; 
Deininger, 2003). In many customary areas, customary land conflict resolu-
tion has proved to be an effective response to these problems (Kasanga and 
Kotey, 2001). Customary land conflict resolution is usually based on consen-
sus-building, mediation and arbitration. Having a flexible, informal, confiden-
tial environment is essential for maintaining peace within customary com-
munities (Paterson, 2001), scaling down or avoiding litigation, and reducing 
costs. On the whole, decisions relating to conflicts resolved using customary 
procedures bind the parties, although such decisions can be appealed in high-
er customary courts. 
 2.2.2 Development and changes in customary tenure sy-
stems 
  
It has been observed that customary tenure systems can adapt to chang-
es that take place over time (Noronha, 1985; Bruce, 1988). One might explain 
such evolution on the grounds that customary tenure systems are adap-
tive arrangements that are fluid, open and negotiated by the various actors 
who use their social networks to redefine and renegotiate customary rela-
tions (Berry, 1993). The evolution of customary tenure systems occurs as land 
is transmitted from generation to generation, with modifications and chang-
es occurring in response to internal or external pressures (Boydell and Holz-
knecht, 2003). In the course of transmission over time, as well as through ex-
perimentation, some key, workable elements of a tenure system are retained, 
while others are dropped (Kalabamu, 2000; Törhönen, 2004; Cotula, 2007). The 
ways in which customary systems respond to such changes vary substantial-
ly, due to the great diversity of local contexts (Deininger, 2003; Cotula, 2007). 
Examples from West Africa indicate that while in some cases, customary sys-
tems have maintained or even consolidated their power and effectiveness, 
others have been undermined by profound changes and/or have lost their le-
gitimacy (Cotula, 2007). A synthesis of the literature on customary tenure sys-
tems in Africa indicates that several changes have occurred in tenure rela-
tions. Most studies (Kasanga and Kotey, 2001; Kombe, 2005; Pottier, 2005; Ab-
dulai and Ndekugri, 2007; Cotula, 2007; Obioha, 2008) report major changes in 
the mystical and social value of land, intra-family land relations, land man-
agement institutions and land transfer mechanisms, particularly in peri-ur-
ban areas. 
One important observation concerns the concept of property rights, show-
ing a transition from more diffuse and collective rights to more specif-
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ic, exclusionary individual rights (Migot-Adholla and Bruce, 1994). This pro-
cess of individualisation suggests the privatisation of rights to specific par-
cels of land, along with a loss of control by the community as a whole (Simp-
son, 1976). These changes reflect the basic principle of the ‘evolutionary theo-
ry of land rights’, which claims that demographic growth tends to push soci-
eties towards greater levels of individualisation and the commercialisation of 
land rights (Boserup and Abernethy, 2005; Fitzpatrick, 2005). 
The individualisation of customary tenure has affected social and intra-
family land relations. Studies on how land rights have been distributed and 
managed by lineages and extended families indicate changes in intra-fami-
ly land relations. Cotula and Chauveau (2007) have documented changes in 
intra-family land relations in West Africa. Their study finds that: 
The significance of the wider family as a source of land, and the degree of negotiability of 
land claims via extended kinship relations appear to be diminishing. Consequently, the 
content and scope of individuals’ rights varies according to status within the family group 
(determined by age, gender and proximity to family heads or founding lineage members), 
with lower status members having limited rights. Family heads and higher status individ-
uals with land management rights and responsibilities have regard for various considera-
tions in allocating and restricting land rights (Cotula, 2007).
As suggested above, colonialism also had a major impact on customary ten-
ure systems across Africa (Pottier, 2005; Cotula, 2007). Colonial administra-
tions manipulated customary law in many respects. The interpretation of 
customary law by the colonial courts, usually achieved by filtering the law 
through western or European legal concepts (Berry, 1993; Pottier, 2005), re-
sulted in an over-simplification of complex tenure relations and rules. Dec-
ades of colonial and post-independence legislative interventions by govern-
ments, such as nationalisation, centralised resource management, land reg-
istration programmes and the devolution of land management responsibili-
ties to local government bodies, have also affected customary tenure rela-
tions (Cotula, 2007). According to Pottier (2005: p. 57), the contested meanings 
of customary tenure relations that can be observed today stem from concepts 
that arose from colonial encounters, which ‘promoted politically expedient 
appropriation’ of land. The codification of customary rules and law was un-
dertaken to benefit colonial administrations and to complement modern eco-
nomic systems (Pottier, 2005). Colonial institutions gave customary authori-
ties more power over their subjects. In some areas, the fiduciary relation-
ship between the customary authorities and other members of the landhold-
ing groups has broken down. The relationship has sometimes been reduced 
to one of ‘landlord’ and ‘tenant’ in the absence of any defined obligations (Ko-
tey and Yeboah, 2003; Ubink, 2008a). In some areas, consultations that had 
been required by customary law, involving the customary authorities and oth-
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er members of the group, have broken down. 
Urbanisation, population growth and capitalist aspirations have diluted the 
socio-spiritual values attached to customary land, giving way to ‘a more util-
itarian approach whereby land value is derived from its economic returns as 
a primary asset, as a factor of production and as a source of wealth’ (Boydell 
and Holzknecht, 2003: p. 204). In pre-colonial Africa, customary land was tra-
ditionally conceived as a sacred, social and religious entity. However, these 
perceptions changed under colonialism, when customary land assumed eco-
nomic importance (Obioha, 2008). The introduction and encouragement of 
economic development in customary land diverted some land to new uses; 
cash cropping replaced subsistence farming, for example. Consequently, over 
time, land became a commodity.
The changing value of customary land also affected land transferral mech-
anisms. The nature of pre-colonial customary land transfer was such that 
agreements could be made based on the assumption that the subsistence and 
security of the granting group would not be affected (Pottier, 2005). A large 
body of research from many parts of West Africa suggests, however, that the 
emergence of new forms of land transaction, such as sales and rentals, are 
replacing customary mortgages, leases, gifts and tenancies (Mathieu et al., 
2003; Cotula and Toulmin, 2004). These new forms of land transaction devel-
oped between settlers and indigenes, and then between settlers, but not – or 
only marginally – between indigenes from the same landholding group (Cot-
ula and Toulmin, 2004). Settlers are also entering into short- and long-term 
leasehold/tenancy agreements with land-owning groups (Mathieu et al., 2003). 
These changes have brought about new practices, including written contracts, 
which have replaced oral transactions (Cotula, 2007). 
Trends in customary tenure also reveal changes in land management insti-
tutions. These changes are strongly related to the ‘power over people’, ‘pow-
er over resources’ and socio-political structures of the institutions (Cotula, 
2007: p. 36). Although in some cases, for example in Ghana, CTIs have man-
aged to maintain or strengthen their ability to control land, in other parts of 
Sub-Saharan Africa, CTIs are being eroded by legislation. In some cases, cus-
tomary institutions compete with central or local government institutions to 
control land. These institutional changes are undermining the effective mobi-
lisation and utilisation of indigenous principles in the management of con-
flicts (Fred-Mensah, 1999). 
The developments described above suggest that changes in customary ten-
ure systems are being influenced by demographic change, commercialisa-
tion, urbanisation and land development, and by social and economic change. 
Furthermore, wars, conquests, religious conversions, state policies, and tech-
nological changes have historically tended to influence such changes. Cotu-
la (2007) noted that conflict and the HIV/AIDS epidemic have affected many 
forms of tenure relationship in Africa. According to Cotula and Chauveau, 
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the HIV/AIDS epidemic has had a major impact on land use, and may have 
important implications for land rights, including a change in customary prac-
tices. The epidemic may lead to land-loss due to the distress sale of land by 
poor households, who may be forced to sell their land to pay for medical care 
and funerals. Examples from Kenya, Lesotho and South Africa also indicate 
that widows created by the epidemic are often deprived of access to their 
husbands’ lands (Drimie, 2002; Cotula, 2007). In addition, armed conflicts may 
disrupt local tenure systems and thereby contribute to changes in customary 
rules and institutions (Cotula, 2007). For example, in Burkina Faso, the large-
scale return of migrants from war-torn Ivory Coast increased pressure on 
land, and contributed to the increasing monetisation of land relations.
The flexibility and fluidity of customary regulations and institutions is 
an additional factor lying behind the changes observed in tenure systems 
(Delville, Ouedraogo et al., 2002). Customary law allows people to re-integrate 
and renegotiate, and is thus able to accommodate different perspectives and 
interests. Juul and Lund (2002) argue that fluidity not only results from the 
nature of the customary system but also from the interaction between cus-
tomary systems and the other institutions, especially in pluralistic legal sys-
tems. 
Customary tenure systems have shown remarkable powers of respon-
siveness to change, owing to the fact that tenure rules and institutions can 
remain adaptable and flexible in different conditions. While they are respon-
sive, however, customary tenure systems are often unable to deal with mod-
ern challenges. The flexibility in customary rules creates room for manipula-
tion and the advancement of individual interests (Ubink and Quan, 2008). In 
peri-urban areas, many kinds of tenure insecurity problems can be observed, 
such as the loss of agricultural land and usufructuary rights, forced evictions, 
and disenfranchisement, when cross-cultural marriage between ‘matriarchal’ 
and ‘patriarchal’ families leaves children without inheritance rights (Mathieu 
et al., 2003; Mahama and Dixon, 2006; Ubink, 2007). 
Increasing urbanisation and land development, which entail the conversion 
of agricultural land into residential plots, leave usufructuary rights particular-
ly insecure. Indigenous farmers can be forcibly evicted from their farmlands 
as a result of land development (Cotula, 2007; Amanor, 2009), leaving them 
landless and homeless (Kirk et al., 1998). The displacement of indigenous peo-
ple creates misunderstandings and, sometimes, opens hostility between dis-
placed families or individuals on the one hand, and traditional land custodi-
ans and new developers on the other (Alden Wily and Hammond, 2001; Kas-
anga and Kotey, 2001). Tenure insecurity also affects migrants and tenants, 
who find it difficult to access land or have to do so on more severe terms, 
for shorter periods and for financial sums that are often equivalent to having 
purchased the land outright (Delville, Toulmin et al., 2002; Cotula, 2007). 
Although in theory, land is not sold in customary tenure systems, due to 
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the development of land markets, land sales have become more or less 
acceptable in peri-urban areas (Mathieu et al., 2003). In peri-urban areas, 
there is a broad range of contracts allowing access to land between prospec-
tive developers and indigenous land-owning families, community members 
and chiefs. With this development, inheritance rights to land under custom-
ary tenure are no longer guaranteed, as many people belonging to land-own-
ing families are left to compete for less land (Amanor, 2006). Consequently, 
there have been bitter struggles between indigenes/families and chiefs over 
the right to sell land, and the conversion of farmland into residential land 
in particular. Various kinds of informal land transaction are occurring, cou-
pled with the widespread use of middlemen, as observed in Nigeria (Ikejio-
for, 2006). Informal transactions in peri-urban areas have a direct impact on 
tenure security, as they expose landholders, especially strangers, to fraudu-
lent transactions, such as the selling of the same piece of land to several per-
sons. In other cases, land has been illegally allocated to prospective develop-
ers. Invariably, these land developers have to pay more money in order to reg-
ularise their transactions and avoid losing the land acquired. These kinds of 
informal land transactions often breed conflicts over land. 
The account given above indicates that, although customary tenure sys-
tems show remarkable powers of responsiveness to change, in many peri-
urban areas, they have proved unable to withstand the pressures of urbanisa-
tion, land development and other social economic changes (Aryeetey, Kotey et 
al., 2007). Some have argued that these problems justify governmental inter-
vention in land-use planning and control, and in land management (Boydell 
and Holzknecht, 2003). In the next section, the concepts, models and debates 
pertaining to a number of approaches to the formalisation of customary ten-
ure systems will be discussed. 
 2.3 Concepts and models for customary tenure 
formalisation 
The term ‘formalisation’ is often used to describe the process of identify-
ing, adjudicating and registering interests in land (Meinzen-Dick and Mwan-
gi, 2009). Formalisation is not ‘merely an aid to solve particular problems, but 
an essential part of transition towards structured governance, order, and ulti-
mately civilisation’ (Benjaminsen et al., 2009: p. 28). The formalisation of cus-
tomary tenure is not a new phenomenon in Sub-Saharan Africa; it dates back 
to the colonial period, when laws and institutions were imposed on custom-
ary and indigenous African institutions. From the nineteenth century on-
wards, several formalisation strategies and land policies were adopted in Sub-
Saharan Africa. These aimed to improve tenure security and encourage eco-
nomic development in customary lands. Most of these strategies and policies 
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were based on theories and concepts that tended to replace or modify cus-
tomary tenure with freehold tenure options, and made state institutions re-
sponsible for land management. These replacement formalisation strategies 
have been influenced by the activities of donor agencies in the region. Over 
the last few decades, legal scholars and economists have questioned the ap-
propriateness of these formalisation strategies. Their debates have often cen-
tred on the efficiency, equity and sustainability of private property as com-
pared to common property, and the security of common property rights (Os-
trom, 1999). This section discusses four models that have played a key role in 
property formalisation theories and debates on property rights in the litera-
ture. 
 2.3.1  The replacement model
The basic principle of replacement formalisation is that customary tenure 
systems are replaced with statutory LA and management systems. Replace-
ment models tend to be linked to the substantive reformation of customary 
rights towards the consolidation of holdings and freehold tenure (Sjaastad 
and Cousins, 2009). The model is ‘fused with the logic of market economies to 
make real property a freely tradable good’ (Oestereich, 2000: p. 224). The con-
ventional logic governing replacement models can be summarised as follows:
■ customary tenure systems are dominated by group rights and do not pro-
mote individual rights, which leads to tenure insecurity among individuals 
(Peters, 2009); 
■ customary rights are inalienable and thus do not promote investment, and 
therefore hinder development and impede progress (Dorner, 1972); and
■ common property in customary tenure is a vestige of a past system that is 
likely to disappear in future (Ostrom, 2000). 
The roots of these views can be found in the work of economists such as Al-
chian, Demsetz, Ault, and Rutman (Alchian and Demsetz, 1973; Ault and Rut-
man, 1979). They also draw on the work of Hardin (1968), Harrison (1987) and 
Meek (1968), who questioned the efficiency of customary tenure systems in 
many respects. In Hardin’s (1968) essay on ‘the tragedy of commons’, he ar-
gues that it is inevitable that communally-controlled property leads to over-
use, overgrazing and the degradation of the natural resource base. According 
to Hardin, degradation is inevitable because each user has every incentive to 
use as many resources as possible. In a similar way, Harrison (1987) argued 
that customary tenure systems are deeply embedded in cultural and political 
systems that generally offer the members of a particular social group over-
lapping, multiple rights of land use, but which tend to exclude non-members 
of the group from land transactions. According to Harrison, such exclusion 
undermines the full integration of rural economies into national and inter-
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national markets. In addition, Harrison argues that because customary ten-
ure practices permit partible inheritance, they contribute to land fragmen-
tation and encourage litigation. Fragmented landholdings and collective use 
of land are portrayed as messy obstacles to modernisation, justifying the de-
vising and enforcing of rules of various kinds in order to simplify and make 
these practices more comprehensible for state institutions (Scott, 1998). Meek 
(1968) also described customary tenure as an inalienable system that was de-
signed to meet the subsistence needs of agriculture. According to Meek, such 
arrangements do not encourage individuals to invest in land-based econom-
ic activities, and therefore constitute a hindrance to development and an im-
pediment to progress. Notably, all of these arguments emphasise the need to 
individualise customary rights. In particular, it is argued that the individual-
isation of tenure through the titling of land was needed to ensure the com-
mercialisation of agriculture (Chimhowu and Woodhouse, 2006). These argu-
ments have been echoed in many policy documents produced by African gov-
ernments, international development agencies and some academics (World 
Bank, 1974; De Soto, 2000). 
Replacement models are described as ‘market-based’ models, because they 
hold that market mechanisms based on individual ‘ownership’ rights form 
the foundations of economic development. Advocates of this model believe 
that private property rights play an essential part in the economic devel-
opment process, due to the incentives associated with the various kinds of 
property relations. They argue that the vesting of exclusive ownership rights 
in individuals generates incentives that lead to higher levels of productivi-
ty. In other words, advocates of replacement models believe that individual 
private property rights lead to successful land development, increasing cred-
it opportunities, the promotion of land markets and effective conflict resolu-
tions (Nkwae, 2006). They hold that security of tenure can only be achieved 
within a state-organised framework, and therefore tend to empower state 
institutions to manage and control land (Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi, 2009). 
Hence the replacement approach emphasises individual property rights for 
landholders (privatisation) and the establishment of freehold titles to land 
through land titling and registration. In replacement models, statutory law 
replaces customary law, while state institutions are substituted for customary 
tenure institutions.
Replacement formalisation concepts lay behind many of the land reform 
activities in Sub-Saharan Africa from the 1970s to the 1990s that were spon-
sored by international financial institutions, especially the World Bank. Dur-
ing this period, much of the literature was devoted to testing and promoting 
the superiority of freehold tenure and the necessity of creating title deeds to 
African land (Dorner, 1972; World Bank, 1974). In particular, the World Bank 
argued that customary tenure systems should be replaced with property 
rights, which were seen as preconditions for development (Peters, 2009). For 
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example, the World Bank’s 1989 report on Sub-Saharan Africa stated that agri-
cultural modernisation combined with population pressure will make land 
titling necessary, and therefore the traditional tenure systems need to be cod-
ified (World Bank, 1989). These development strategies changed the rules gov-
erning access to land and introduced new LA institutions (Migot-Adholla and 
Bruce, 1994).
Market-based and replacement formalisation models have been criticised 
for being rooted in western (Roman, French and English) concepts of land ten-
ure. Advocates of the replacement model conceive of property rights in a nar-
row sense as ownership, instead of understanding them as overlapping bun-
dles of rights (Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi, 2009). Replacement models tend to 
ignore the multi-functional importance of customary land, and thus under-
represent the multiple rights and interests associated with ownership, while 
also failing to reflect local realities (Platteau, 2000; Kanji et al., 2002; Math-
ieu et al., 2003; Cotula and Chauveau, 2007; Quan, 2008). Creating ownership 
and individualising customary land rights creates an exclusivity of rights that 
tends to benefit primary right-holders, because issuing freehold titles termi-
nates specific second-party rights (Österberg, 2002; IIED, 2006; Benjaminsen et 
al., 2009); leads to increased marginalisation as wealthier and more powerful 
groups acquire rights at the expense of the poor and weaker groups (Migot-
Adholla and Bruce, 1994; Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi, 2009); and leads to high-
er levels of conflicts over land (Deininger and Castagnini, 2006; Bassett et al., 
2007; Benjaminsen et al., 2009; Peters, 2009). 
The critics’ arguments are based on research dating from the 1970s, which 
revealed the failure of land registration and titling programmes across Sub-
Saharan Africa to achieve their stated goals (Peters, 2009). Critics of market-
based models make a number of claims:
■ Advocates of private property models misunderstand the concept of com-
munal tenure (Gluckman, 1969; Noronha, 1985). Crocombe (1974) and 
Noronha (1985) argue that communal rights do not mean that individual 
land rights do not exist in customary tenure. This argument is based on the 
fact that in customary tenure systems, communal rights do not exist in iso-
lation, but in conjunction with individual rights (Ostrom, 2000). 
■ Gluckman (1969) argues that using the term ‘usufructuary’ rights to 
describe individual rights in customary tenure is misleading, because it 
does not capture the full range of customary land rights. As understood in 
Roman Law, usufructuary rights allow holders to collect the fruit of these 
rights over their lifetime and are not transmissible to heirs, as they are in 
the case of customary landholding. 
■ Customary tenure systems cannot be compared to ‘open access’ in com-
mon property systems, where specific rights are not assigned to anyone 
(Nkwae, 2006: p. 91). The fact that each member of a customary landholding 
group has the freedom to use any part of the land, as long as nobody occu-
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pies it, does not mean that there are no control measures relating to the 
use of land. There are rules that regulate the use of the land, and these are 
implemented by the authorities representing the group.
■ The claim that individual rights in customary tenure systems are insecure, 
and therefore present an obstacle to investment, is unconvincing for two 
reasons (Gluckman, 1969; Coldham, 2000; Peters, 2009): first, customary ten-
ure practices provide sufficient security of tenure to the group, individual 
members of the group and non-members of the group. Transactions in land, 
including share tenancies, borrowing, pledging and purchases are accorded 
sufficient recognition and as much protection as the formal titles is likely 
to give (Migot-Adholla and Bruce, 1994; Peters, 2009). Second, with time and, 
customary tenure systems allow individuals to obtain heritable long-term 
rights, and dealings with non-members tend to develop as the value of the 
land increases (Platteau, 2000).
■ The link between titling and tenure security is debatable. Tenure security 
is not automatically generated by the registration and titling of land. Mi-
got-Adholla and Bruce (1994) argue that the right to the continuous, unchal-
lenged use of land is perhaps the most critical measure of security of ten-
ure. Formal title certificates or other official documents are, at best, merely 
an affirmation of this social guarantee; they do not create it. 
 2.3.2 The De Soto model 
Like the replacement model, De Soto’s approach to the formalisation of prop-
erty rights is described as market-based, because his model assumes that for-
mal titles to land are needed in the form of title deeds, licenses, permits and 
contracts. While De Soto’s model is based on land titling (including agricultur-
al land), he emphasises other instruments in addition to titles. In particular, 
the model supports the conversion of ‘extra-legal’ into formal legal property 
rights, in order to encourage investment, allow for the use of titles as collater-
al, and to facilitate the development of the market (Meinzen-Dick and Mwan-
gi, 2009). De Soto argues that the main cause of poverty is the continued lack 
of access to formal property rights among poor people in developing coun-
tries. De Soto stresses that property held by the poor is ‘dead capital’ (De So-
to, 2000: p. 7), which only becomes useful when it is recognised by a formal 
system. Therefore, ‘capitalism can work to the advantage of the poor if their 
rights in land are formalised’ (Peters, 2009: p. 1319). De Soto further argues 
that formalising land rights would not only lead to increased economic activ-
ity and growth, but would also enable governments to improve tax networks. 
De Soto’s book The Mystery of Capital has been influential since it was pub-
lished in 2000, particularly among politicians and in the international devel-
opment industry (Benjaminsen et al., 2009). 
An important difference between De Soto’s approach and other econom-
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ic property rights models is that De Soto’s model is based on a pragmat-
ic strategy that is grounded in the registration of informal arrangements and 
the de facto use of land (De Soto, 2000). While other market-based formalisa-
tion models tend to focus on the substantive reform of rights in the direc-
tion of the consolidation of landholdings and freehold tenure through titling, 
De Soto’s formalisation model stresses the desirability of formalising already-
existing rights (Benjaminsen et al., 2009; Sjaastad and Cousins, 2009). Fur-
thermore, De Soto underlines the importance of ‘integrating formal property 
representations, and the information contained within them, into a unified, 
accessible registers’ (Sjaastad and Cousins, 2009: p. 2).
De Soto’s formalisation-based approach has generated a number of con-
cerns and has been debated in the popular and academic media during the 
last two decades. Critics point to the risks inherent in the formalisation pro-
cess, including the high costs involved, and the propensity of land markets 
to magnify wealth differentiation and inequality. The assumption that gov-
ernments possess the willingness and the capacity to create institutions in 
a pro-poor and democratic manner, to prevent domestic elites from abusing 
the process, and to effectively enforce the rights once they have been formal-
ly established, has also been challenged. Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi (2009) 
note that particularly in rural areas, the introduction of formalised proper-
ty systems tends to compete with, and even to destroy, well-established and 
effective local systems, opening the door to opportunism and possible cha-
os. Bromley (2009) argues that a familiar, legitimate and permanent custom-
ary system would seem more attractive than deficient, non-functioning state 
institutions. Apart from the adequacy and competency of state institutions, 
the willingness of the state to transfer power and authority to the local lev-
el in formalisation programmes, as proposed by De Soto, has also been chal-
lenged (Sjaastad and Cousins, 2009). 
Others object to the treatment of the poor as an undifferentiated group in 
De Soto’s model, rather than recognising the diverse rights and claims of oth-
er groups, such as young and the old, males and females, locals, migrants and 
immigrants (Benjaminsen et al., 2004; Toulmin, 2009). Like the poor, these oth-
er groups may be unable to benefit from formal rights. As with other market-
based models, the issuing of titles increases land values and tends to make 
tenure security expensive, and thus difficult for many vulnerable groups to 
access (Benjaminsen et al., 2009). There are legitimate concerns that De Soto’s 
approach proposes a simple approach to the complex relationships between 
people and land in customary tenure systems. Such complex social and polit-
ical relationships make it difficult to establish and enforce clear, secure prop-
erty rights using De Soto’s approach. Like the replacement model, De Soto’s 
model does not recognise the complex and overlapping nature of proper-
ty rights, the high risks for secondary right-holders of individual property 
titles, and the vital importance of common property resources to many rural 
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dwellers (Toulmin, 2009). Even where secure property rights are desirable, the 
implementation of De Soto’s model through titling introduces an uninten-
tionally inequitable property rights system (Joireman, 2008). 
Although there is evidence to support the idea that property formalisa-
tion, documentation and the issuing of title deeds are positively associat-
ed with investment and agricultural productivity (Johnson et al., 2002; Smith, 
2004), there is less evidence that the formalisation of land rights has facil-
itated access to credit in any African country as of yet (Holden et al., 2008). 
Titling and property rights can lead to other improvements in people’s lives, 
but they do not lead to the immediate availability of capital (Joireman, 2008). 
Thus, titling and property rights may provide a good stimulus when credit is 
required, but they themselves do not create credit markets – unless the poor 
require credit, the mere rationalisation of titles will not make credit availa-
ble to them. De Soto’s theory requires more solutions to secure tenure; aside 
from the market, there are other factors that contribute to investment (Gil-
bert, 2002). 
 2.3.3 Multiple or dual tenure models 
Multiple or dual tenure models promote legally-recognised dual tenure re-
gimes – that is, customary and statutory tenure – that regulate land use in 
parallel (Spiertz, 2000). In multiple tenure systems, some land is held under 
western European law, while other land is held under customary law (albeit 
law that has been formalised by legislation). Land held under customary ten-
ure is regulated by indigenous tenure institutions and practices, while statu-
tory tenure is regulated by statutes and state land management institutions. 
The main driving force behind the dual tenure model is the realisation that 
the complete phase-out of customary systems is ineffective, because in many 
places, people continue to access land using indigenous tenure practices. In 
many African countries, customary tenure systems proved resilient, even af-
ter colonial governments (and sometimes post-colonial governments) intro-
duced statutory land laws fashioned along the lines of those used in western 
or European economies (Bruce, 1988). In Sub-Saharan countries such as Ugan-
da, Nigeria and Tanzania, where land is administered using a dual tenure sys-
tem, statutory tenure operates in cities, while customary tenure systems op-
erate in rural areas under the aegis of local communities (Batungi and Ruther, 
2008). 
Multiple or dual tenure options have been criticised on the grounds that 
they keep customary and statutory tenure systems distinct, and thus fail to 
benefit from the possible synergies between them (Mulolwa, 2002). The coex-
istence of customary tenure with statutory tenure in peri-urban areas leads 
to complex legal problems, tenure insecurity and management uncertain-
ties. This is fuelled by competition between customary and statutory law, and 
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clashes between the two cultures (Nkwae, 2006). The conditions for access-
ing and securing rights under customary tenure are different from those 
using formal legislation. Such differences inevitably create uncertainty of ten-
ure, and situations in which those rights that are legitimate under custom-
ary rules are not recognised by legislation (Dowuona-Hammond, 2003). Fur-
thermore, it is argued that multiple institutional and legal structures result in 
contradictions and insecurity regarding whose rights count, whose rights will 
be supported in the event of a contest, and which decision-making structures 
are paramount (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan, 2002; Benjaminsen et al., 2009; 
Toulmin, 2009). Multiple structures lead to ‘institution shopping’ (Toulmin, 
2009: p. 13), a situation whereby people seeking justice will use those institu-
tions that are most likely to rule in their favour. Actual attempts to introduce 
dual systems have encountered difficulties, as shown by Indonesia in the 
1960s and Niger in the 1980s (Zevenbergen, 2002; Benjaminsen et al., 2009). 
 2.3.4 The adaptation model 
The adaptation model is emerging from current research in the social sci-
ences. The model is based on notion of a return to the autonomous manage-
ment of land by local communities (Delville, 2010). The view expressed in this 
formalisation strategy is that customary tenure is derived from social rela-
tionships and institutions, and that changes in tenure and property regimes 
therefore have implications for the social, spiritual and political ties that link 
kinship groups. In particular, the individualisation of rights in customary land 
undermines the social cohesion of groups and communities. Therefore, where 
tenure arrangements are structured to meet various objectives, it is not pos-
sible to use tenure reform strategies that are driven by economic efficiency 
alone (Payne, 2004). The scholars behind this theory, who are sometimes re-
ferred to as ‘evolutionist’, argue that historically, customary systems have 
demonstrated some flexibility and responsiveness to social and economic cir-
cumstances (Deininger, 2003; Cotula, 2007). The World Bank has given its sup-
port to the argument that customary tenure systems can provide tenure se-
curity. In one World Bank report (Deininger, 2003), it is argued that customary 
tenure systems provide tenure security to groups at a relatively low cost. The 
report further indicates that usufructuary rights in customary systems can 
encourage appropriate forms of investment, in the way that long-term leas-
es can generate substantial investment in western economies. Proponents of 
this model advocate the establishment of locally-based LASs that are built 
on indigenous institutional structures. The model also supports hybrid insti-
tutional systems and the recognition of group and individual rights in LA. A 
number of well-known adaptation-related approaches to the formalisation of 
customary rights are discussed below. 
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Locally-driven tenure models
Locally-driven tenure models provide transitional and alternative tenure ar-
rangements for various customary groups at the local level. The assumption 
behind these models is that customary tenure systems have diverse rules, 
norms, and practices that can differ according to the tribe or community con-
cerned. This makes it both expensive and difficult to integrate all varieties of 
tenure in a unified system (Toulmin, 2009). Furthermore, introducing a for-
malised property system into these diverse customary systems might lead to 
competition with, and even destroy, established local systems, thereby cre-
ating opportunism and chaos (Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi, 2009). Proponents 
of the model also argue that central governments lack the capacity to imple-
ment large-scale registration. For example, Toulmin (2009: p. 12) suggests that 
‘it is better to develop locally appropriate systems, rather than “single stand-
ard blue print “solutions”’. 
Unlike replacement models, locally-driven tenure models allow local com-
munities to participate in tenure formalisation programmes by deciding on 
which rights are important and should be recorded. Local participation is cru-
cial, because it makes local communities less likely to resist what seems to 
them to be inappropriate formalisation (Sikor, 2004). Another advantage of 
this approach is its flexibility, which allows for different strategies for secur-
ing property rights for groups and individuals, and for different local situa-
tions. This flexibility allows local communities to use simple and low-cost 
technology, tools and accessible language to record land tenure information 
that is based on local customs (Toulmin, 2009). This is important, because 
many local communities cannot meet the high capital costs of establishing 
land rights and maintaining up-to-date land registers. Local tenure models 
can be found in many countries across Sub-Saharan Africa. For example, in 
Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya and Niger, local institutions received support for 
LA activities (Fitzpatrick, 2005; IIED, 2006; Toulmin, 2009). 
Fitzpatrick (2005: pp. 457-465) distinguishes between four broad institu-
tional models that support locally-driven tenure models. The ‘minimalist’ 
approach is captured by the statement that ’customary rights to land are rec-
ognised’ (Fitzpatrick, 2005: p. 457). This means that there should be no legal 
intrusion into areas that are demarcated as customary and governed by cus-
tomary law. Fitzpatrick considers this an appropriate approach for relative-
ly isolated communities that are unaffected by changing market dynamics 
and have few internal problems. Second, according to the ‘agency’ approach, 
customary groups are represented by ‘agents’ who represent the groups in 
all land transactions. The advantage of this approach is that outsiders can 
deal with group representatives with formal legal confidence that any agree-
ment with the representative is binding on the group. According to the third 
approach, ‘group incorporation’, a corporate structure grants formal legal 
identity to a traditional group, enabling it to enter into legally secure transac-
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tions with external investors, should it wish to do so. According to the fourth 
approach, community members elect persons to ‘land boards’ in democratic 
elections. These boards are mandated to allocate land, adjudicate, and carry 
out land-related activities such as planning and collecting rents. For example, 
a number of land boards were established in Botswana in the late 1980s. 
Locally-driven tenure models have been criticised on the grounds that they 
are vulnerable to inequalities within communities. It has been argued that 
while customary tenure is characterised by flexibility and negotiability, these 
factors do not prevent – and can sometimes facilitate – the exclusion of some 
categories of users (Peters, 2009). The evidence suggests persistent competi-
tion and conflict over land, revealing processes of exclusion, deepening social 
divisions and class formation (Amanor, 2001; Peters, 2004). In addition, Toul-
min (2009) notes that strengthening the capacity of chiefs, landlords and oth-
er powerful local institutions may have unintended negative effects, as these 
actors can take advantage of this power to exploit poor tenants. Examples 
from Zambia indicate that limited human resources are a problem for local-
ly-driven models (Toulmin and Quan, 2000). In communities where customary 
institutions are very powerful, ‘agency’ methods would seem inappropriate, 
because they are likely to be challenged. With regard to the ‘group incorpora-
tion’ method suggested by Fitzpatrick (2005), Sjaastad and Cousins (2009: p. 6) 
question ‘the de facto reach of the de jure corporate constitution, and whether 
one can expect a corporation to codify and enforce customs in the long run’. 
Sjaastad and Cousins argue that in practice, incorporation has often proved 
to be ineffective and has had a polarising effect on influence and wealth, par-
ticularly when the groups involved are large. Sjaastad and Cousins (2009) note 
that this may require governments to introduce key elements of customary 
law through national legislation and policy implementation. 
Furthermore, locally-driven models are isolated models that do not facili-
tate decision-making by central governments, which may need the informa-
tion that is stored at the local level. Any attempt to unify these isolated sys-
tems in a single information system might be time-consuming and prone to 
errors (De Vries, 2004). 
Incremental or gradualist tenure models
The incremental approach supports customary systems that retain strong in-
ternal structures (Batungi, 2005). This method rejects the ‘big bang’ approach 
to formalising rights in customary areas. Instead, it favours the implementa-
tion of formalisation in a progressive, incremental and gradual manner. The 
incremental approach allows for the formalisation of multiple rights among 
multiple users (Benjaminsen et al., 2009). For example, Fitzpatrick (2005) notes 
that the incremental approach places relatively few demands on resourc-
es and institutional capacities. Furthermore, Fitzpatrick argues that the ap-
proach allows ‘customary rights to evolve over time in response to popula-
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tion changes and economic needs, without undue restriction or imposition by 
a formal legal regime’ (ibid., 2005: p. 458). Advocates of the incremental model 
do not reject the need to provide individual property titles, but consider this 
to be a long-term objective (Durand-Lasserve, 2006). The object of the model 
is to secure rights in a step-by-step, incremental manner; temporally-secured 
tenure can be upgraded to legalised tenure at a later time. Both Fitzpatrick 
and a study by the International Institute for Environment and Develop-
ment (IIED) describe several examples of this approach (Fitzpatrick, 2005; IIED, 
2006), notably the UN-HABITAT pro-poor management system, which has es-
tablished a continuum of rights and a flexible tenure system in Namibia (see 
Section 2.3.5). 
The incremental approach has been criticised on the grounds that it can 
only provide transitional solutions. Experience in Zambia and Kenya shows 
that the process of migrating to the final tenure status can be perpetually 
delayed, thus lengthening the formalisation process (Mulolwa, 2002). In this 
view, transitional solutions merely increase the number of steps in an already 
highly-bureaucratic process. In addition, it has been argued that the model 
gives a comparative advantage to elites, which may have more information 
and better contacts, thereby leading to corruption (Fitzpatrick, 2005; Sjaastad 
and Cousins, 2009). 
Unified tenure models 
The unified tenure model is founded on the principle of securing individual 
rights based on market models and principles grounded in the security of col-
lective rights and social cohesion, as outlined in locally-based models. Schol-
ars who promote this model argue that rather than replacing customary land 
rights with formal rights, or securing land rights in an incremental manner, 
‘hybrid tenure’ (unified tenure) is proposed. Unified tenure models build on 
the identified strengths of existing customary tenure by incorporating some 
non-conflicting elements of formal tenure concepts (Mulolwa, 2002). Accord-
ing to Mulolwa, by building on existing customary systems, unified mod-
els minimise the risk of severing tenure linkages and foster kinds of tenure 
that are much closer to indigenous models. One of the key pillars of the uni-
fied tenure model is its emphasis on rights to use land resources, rather than 
ownership (Mulolwa, 2002). Unified tenure models explore new institutions 
and approaches to the recording, registering and maintenance of land tenure 
information, to serve the interests of customary communities and investors 
alike. Cotula et al. (2004) argue that ‘hybrid’ tenure models promote democra-
cy, human rights and gender equality. For instance, 
legislation may give land users a menu of tenure options, including recognition of cus-
tomary rights, or may flexibly define and regulate the institutions empowered to hold 
and manage land, so as to allow communities to devise their arrangements on the basis 
[ 39 ]
of their specific needs and to retain the elements of customary systems they find useful 
(Cotula et al., 2004: p. 7). 
Hybrid or unified models have been implemented in various contexts. In Ben-
in, the customary land rights registration (PFR) is a hybrid registration system, 
which institutes a shift in focus from an oral tradition to the written docu-
mentation of customary transactions (Delville, 2010). The PFR uses systematic 
procedures for identifying and mapping land rights, and for generating a reg-
ister of rights that is based on the principle of land registration. However, the 
level of rights to be registered – that is, whether they are individual or collec-
tive – is determined by local actors, on a case-by-case basis. In the Narok dis-
trict of Kenya, the fundamental principle of the unified tenure model is based 
on issuing individual titles to land, while the use and sale of land are still gov-
erned by communal rules (Amman and Duraiappah, 2004). 
The main criticism of the unified model is how to determine the best bal-
ance between local and public regulations, and the extent to which custom-
ary laws and statute can be used (Delville, 2010). Like the dual tenure mod-
el, the unified model’s multiple institutional and legal structures leave the 
approach vulnerable to contradictions and insecurities. It is difficult to pro-
vide a clear legal framework that recognises the legitimacy of local rights and 
arrangements, which does not contradict the fundamental principles of the 
statutory system in question. Determining when and where it is appropriate 
to introduce statutory law is both crucial and difficult. 
 2.3.5  Innovative approaches to formalisation – examples
 
Over the last few decades, countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have introduced 
a number of innovations in land tenure and administration. These aim to 
improve security of tenure and property rights for the urban and rural poor, 
through the use of ‘pro-poor’ tools (Augustinus and Deininger, 2005). Innova-
tive land tenure tools, such as occupancy licenses, starter titles and certifi-
cates of occupancy, have been implemented in various ways to secure a con-
tinuum of rights (UN-HABITAT, 2004). Some of the useful rights that are usu-
ally recorded using these innovative tools include anti-eviction rights, occu-
pancy rights or the right of possession, adverse possession rights and group 
rights (Augustinus and Deininger, 2005). This section highlights some of the 
well-known innovative land tools that are used to deliver affordable security 
of tenure in Sub-Saharan Africa. Although they do not specifically deal with 
customary systems, the lessons learnt can be drawn upon when designing 
LASs in customary areas. 
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Community land trust (CLT) in Kenya 
CLT is new form of tenure in Kenya, which awards group ownership rights to 
urban land in informal settlement upgrading projects. The approach is based 
on the American CLT model, which splits the ownership of real property (Bas-
sett, 2005), and combines communal and market-based individual ownership. 
In principle, while the land itself is owned by communities, improvements 
that are made to the land – such as houses – are owned by the individuals 
who use the land on a long-term lease basis. 
Since the mid-1990s, CLT has been used in a number of Kenyan towns, 
such as Voi, as a means of providing affordable access to land for hous-
ing and related activities. The basic principle of the trust is to make the best 
possible use of the collective strengths of local communities, in their abili-
ty to obtain permits and infrastructure, keep all land under one title, and to 
encourage members to invest in their homes and in environmental improve-
ments (Durand-Lasserve, 2006). As a pre-condition to holding land in perpe-
tuity – an express objective of the CLT – communities have to organise them-
selves as ‘settlement societies’ (Bassett, 2005: p. 378). These act as legal enti-
ties that organise the day-to-day land management functions of the CLT. The 
settlement society, in turn, has to form a trust, an entity that holds the legal 
title to the land. This arrangement has the potential to control property trans-
fers and discourage land speculation (Durand-Lasserve, 2006). 
The implementation of CLT in Kenya has its shortcomings. The lease fee 
appears unaffordable for some communities, and the ability of less wealthy 
people in these communities to pay the lease fees to enable them keep their 
landholding over time remains a key problem. In some communities, CLT 
projects produced more squatters, when they were intended to prevent squat-
ter settlements from developing. This problem has been attributed to weak-
nesses in community participation in land management activities (Bassett, 
2005). Other problems observed in the CLT relate to a lack of understanding 
on the part of administrators, lengthy documentation processes, and a disin-
centive to invest in communal ownership, especially when people are not free 
to sell directly to outside buyers (Durand-Lasserve, 2006). 
Despite these shortcomings, the CLT model has a number of positive fea-
tures, including community participation in land management; a ban on 
absentee ownership; restrictions on the sale of land; provisions for commu-
nity control of land; and the retention of individual ownership rights, such 
as the right to sell improvements (Bassett, 2005). Community participation in 
land management activities creates empowerment. Land users are entitled to 
make decisions about land use, acquisition and financial management, and 
select the leaders of the trust. This improves transparency and accountability 
to a certain extent. Furthermore, retaining ownership in the community and 
providing leaseholds to land users make the approach useful for customary 
areas, even in peri-urban and urban areas.
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Certificates of Rights (COR) in Botswana
The Certificate of Rights (COR) model was one of the innovative tenure op-
tions introduced in Botswana in the 1970s. The approach targeted the needs 
of the urban poor, particularly those in informal (squatter) settlements. The 
second objective of COR was to provide a secure and inexpensive form of ten-
ure to support site and service schemes for the urban poor (Nkwae and Dum-
ba, 2009). COR provides landholders with the right to use and develop land, 
while retaining state ownership (Durand-Lasserve, 2006). In other words, the 
plot holder maintains the usufructuary rights, while the state maintains own-
ership. Usufructuary rights are inheritable, and can be assigned, pledged and 
ceded with the consent of the city/town council concerned (Nkwae and Dum-
ba, 2009). To meet the objective of providing a secure and inexpensive form 
of tenure, the boundary of the COR plot is demarcated on the basis of gener-
al plans or block diagrams. Over time, the COR is upgradeable to a full title – 
a Fixed Period State Grant (99-year lease). This occurs after a cadastral survey 
has been carried out, and the title registered (Durand-Lasserve, 2006; Nkwae 
and Dumba, 2009). The municipal authorities are responsible for administer-
ing the COR. The standardised procedures for allocating COR require an ap-
plicant to be a citizen of Botswana, and to have been a resident of the town in 
question for at least six months. The town council handles disputes relating 
to allocations, encroachments, inheritances, the illegal building of additional 
structures, loan repayments and service levies. 
The implementation of the COR concept in Botswana has its limitations. 
The administrative work involved is the same as that for allocating full prop-
erty titles (Durand-Lasserve, 2006). The demanding process and a lack of 
human resources have over-stretched the administrative capabilities of the 
agencies implementing the COR (Nkwae and Dumba, 2009). Although the sys-
tem protects the poor, the conditions for the allocation of the COR have the 
potential to exclude non-community members’ access to land. Another limi-
tation of the COR concept is that it has not been accepted by formal private-
sector financial institutions as collateral for loans (Durand-Lasserve, 2006). 
Nevertheless, the COR concept offers flexibility in laws and processes, 
allowing for the use of low-cost methods to define the boundaries of plots, 
and for the alteration of plans without recourse to the Land Survey Act and 
Deeds Registry Act. The upgradeability of the tenure from rights of occupan-
cy to leaseholds allows it to serve the needs of all categories of people. Legal 
flexibility and upgradeability of tenure have important implications for cus-
tomary areas. Flexible and low-cost tools are needed to identify and record 
rights in customary land, particularly where strict cadastral rules have proved 
unable to capture and represent the complexities of rights. In addition, differ-
ent types of use rights in customary land can be secured, and even upgraded, 
while the ownership of the land remains vested in the group. This is impor-
tant for customary areas, where there is a greater need to secure individual 
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use rights and, at the same time, preserve communal tenure.
Decentralised registration and certification in Ethiopia
Land in Ethiopia is state property, and citizens have use rights. These land-
use rights can be inherited, but they cannot be mortgaged. Prior to the 1990s, 
there was high tenure insecurity in Ethiopia, with arbitrary evictions and 
great inequity in land ownership. Land was highly under-utilised, which af-
fected productivity and investment (Deininger et al., 2008). To reduce wide-
spread tenure insecurity and its negative impact on investment, and to pro-
mote land conservation, a land certification programme was introduced (IIED, 
2006; Deininger et al., 2008). The programme, which began in the late 1990s in 
the country’s main regions, was based on the systematic registration and cer-
tification of land-use rights. 
The certification programme is carried out via a decentralised, low-cost reg-
istration system that is implemented at the community level. Although there 
are regional differences in approach, in general, the programme starts with 
the forming of land-use and administration committees. Committee mem-
bers are elected by popular vote and tasked with voluntarily implementing 
the field process. Complete participation on the part of the local communi-
ty is required (IIED, 2006). The registration of plots is a public process, with 
people’s neighbours present in the field (Deininger et al., 2008). The certifica-
tion process is supervised by a survey team and a staff composed of students 
and farmers, who have been trained in land measurement and registration 
(Toulmin, 2009). The certification process entails the use of simple, traditional 
tools to demarcate and measure plots. 
Land registries are established at village and district levels in the form 
of hand-written registry books. Information on the boundaries of plots is 
entered into an official form, with a stamp and a photograph of the farmer 
and his wife attached. Once registration is complete, households are given a 
registration certificate. These are issued as a single page, with the name of 
the head of household and details concerning the size, location and quality 
of the farm plots, and the names of the neighbours of each plot. Land is reg-
istered in the names of both spouses. Female-headed households (widows, 
divorced and single women) also receive certificates in their name for the 
land in their possession (Holden et al., 2009). Farmers may rent or lease their 
land, but the time period allows for regional differences, and also depends on 
the technology used to till the land (IIED, 2006).
An important lesson to be drawn from the Ethiopian decentralised regis-
tration and certification programme relates to its successful use of low-cost 
technology and participatory processes to adjudicate boundaries and regis-
ter land rights. About 20 million plots and some 5.5 million households have 
received title certificates in a very short time, and in a cost-effective man-
ner (Deininger et al., 2008). This achievement is unprecedented in Africa, both 
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in terms of scale and cost (IIED, 2006; Deininger et al., 2008). The use of sim-
ple tools and local language makes the certification process transparent and 
accessible for most land users. The flexibility in the general laws guiding the 
certification programme allows for implementation in different regions. This 
kind of flexibility is crucial for customary areas, where it may be necessary to 
introduce organisational and institutional changes in order to tailor LASs to 
diverse tenure systems, rules and conditions. 
Namibia’s flexible tenure and registration system 
Like the other innovative systems discussed above, Namibia’s flexible ten-
ure system is built on the assumption that supports a change in perceptions 
of freehold titles as the only possible vehicle for economic development. The 
motivation behind the flexible tenure system is that poor families do not 
need freehold titles, but they do need the security that will prevent them 
from being evicted from their land without compensation (Christensen et al., 
1999). Therefore, the main goal of the flexible tenure and registration system 
is to provide a simple, affordable and fast form of secure tenure to low-in-
come communities and informal settlers in particular (Christensen, 2005). 
Flexible tenure offers different levels of tenure at different costs, with the 
ability to move from one level to the other. Two new tenure types (starter 
and landhold titles) have been introduced, in addition to the existing free-
hold tenure. These two new tenure types are based on two principles: they 
function both in parallel and interchangeably with existing freehold titles 
(Christensen, 2005). They function in parallel in the sense that parallel insti-
tutions will be responsible for the registration of the different tenure types. 
Starter and landhold titles can be registered at the land hold registry at the 
community level, and the Registrar of Deeds at the main Windhoek registry. 
They are interchangeable in the sense that the different tenure types that are 
catered for in the parallel registries should be upgraded, over time, from an 
initial base that offers basic security, into an individual’s full ownership of a 
freehold title. These arrangements are made in accordance with the needs of 
individual households (Durand-Lasserve, 2006). 
Starter titles are basic forms of individual title that are provided on a group 
basis (Augustinus and Deininger, 2005). The starter title is an individual type 
of tenure, in that one person, such as the custodian for a family or house-
hold, is allocated a right to an unspecified site. It is also group-based, howev-
er, in that each household within a block parcel must abide by the rules of the 
community that have been laid down by the community association (Chris-
tensen, 2005). Starter titles are thus registered in respect of a block of land or 
settlement block that has been approved by a local authority (Kock, 2006). In 
principle, it should be possible to sell, donate and inherit starter titles, sub-
ject to restrictions that may be imposed by a group-agreed constitution, or 
other rights recognised by the group (Christensen, 2005). Starter titles rely on 
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simple survey descriptions and registration, thus enabling poor landholders 
in informal settlements to achieve security of tenure over the land on which 
they have settled. The periphery of a block of land is surveyed and registered, 
providing the holders with a perpetual occupation of a site within the block. 
However, the various land units within the block are neither surveyed nor reg-
istered. A starter title can be upgraded to a landhold title and then to a free-
hold title, or a starter title can be upgraded to freehold title. 
Landhold titles are a more advanced form of tenure, which are registered 
parallel to the freehold title. This is a statutory form of tenure with all of 
the most important aspects of freehold ownership, but with a limited range 
of associated transactions (Christensen et al., 1999). In principle, the most 
important aspects of ownership (including mortgages) are allowed, but not 
the full range of transactions that might arise from freehold ownership. Like 
starter titles, the underlying parcel of land on which landhold title rights 
are registered would remain registered in the Windhoek Deed Registry, but 
endorsed to the effect that it is subject to the registration of landhold title 
recorded in the landhold-title register (Christensen et al., 1999; Christensen, 
2005). Landhold-title holders are permitted to build permanent structures. 
Freehold title is the final step towards a full cadastral title and, as such, has 
to follow the procedure of conducting a survey and proclaiming the whole 
settlement block development as a new extension of the town. 
This innovative incremental tenure and registration project was piloted in 
the late 1990s. The government of Namibia approved the principles of the 
flexible land tenure system in 1997. The final draft of the Flexible Land Ten-
ure Bill was produced in 2004. Translating this draft law into practice has been 
a difficult and slow process, however. To date, the bill has not been passed 
by the Namibian Parliament (Christensen, 2005). As it has not been imple-
mented, its real effect cannot yet be determined, but some lessons can still 
be learnt. The main advantage of the proposed system lies in its social ben-
efits, which result from communities obtaining full ownership of the land on 
which they live, in a quicker, easier and cheaper way than that offered by the 
existing freehold system (De Vries and Lewis, 2009). However, problems have 
been identified relating to cost, delays and information flow (De Vries and 
Lewis, 2009); the extensive technical resources needed, even without the need 
for professional surveyors (Christensen, 2005); and the potential risk of creat-
ing informality in the long term (Van Asperen and Zevenbergen, 2007). 
Nevertheless, an important lesson that can be learnt from Namibia’s flex-
ible tenure system is that the formalisation of customary rights can secure 
both group and individual rights. Thus, a continuum of rights in customary 
land can be secured at different levels, by individuals or a family, or collec-
tively by a group, as the case may be. While the customary group bounda-
ry is secured (such as the block in the Namibian case), provisional titles can 
be issued to usufructuary right-holders, which can be progressively upgrad-
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ed in accordance with the changing needs of individuals and the group. Such 
arrangements can preserve the social link within communities, and also 
give communities time to adapt (Durand-Lasserve, 2006). However, in cus-
tomary tenure systems, the issuing of freehold titles can erode the allodi-
al ownership held by the group. In customary systems, the concept of lease-
hold would seem appropriate and acceptable under customary law, because 
it at least meets the objective of securing land for future generations (Ollenu, 
1962; Curry, 2001). The group can opt not to renew a lease if the land is need-
ed for group use (Nkwae, 2006). At the same time, leasehold meets the inter-
ests of the present holder, because land can be used as a commodity during 
the leasehold period, even as collateral to secure a bank loan (Nkwae, 2006). 
Furthermore, it has been argued that allowing members to hold leasehold in 
group titles makes it possible to control transfers and discourage speculations 
(Durand-Lasserve, 2006).
 2.4 Good land governance and land administra-
tion 
 2.4.1 The importance of good governance in land admin-
istration
As LASs are increasingly confronted with global developments (Williamson et 
al., 2010) that affect the use and management of land as a resource, there is a 
crucial need to introduce good governance in LA and formalisation strategies. 
Awareness of the importance of good land governance in institutions can be 
summed up in the statement made by Deininger et al. (2010: p. 188), that ‘it is 
now increasingly recognised that, in practice, the establishment and mainte-
nance of institutions to define rights, record and maintain information about 
these rights, and make information on them available is an important public 
sector role’. 
Bad land governance is related to growing insecurity in property rights and 
a high level of bribery and corruption in LA activities, especially in the devel-
oping world (Bell, 2007; Van der Molen and Tuladhar, 2007). Indigenous farm-
ers, the poor, women and other vulnerable groups in the society are most 
affected by bad land governance. In the public land sector, bad governance is 
linked to: weak institutional frameworks governing security of tenure, inad-
equate, incoherent and improperly-enforced legal provisions, a lack of trans-
parency, inequity, a lack of accountability, and institutional irresponsiveness 
to the plight of land users (Deininger, 2005; Burns, 2007; FAO, 2007; Kaufmann 
et al., 2007; UN-HABITAT, 2007). Slow and bureaucratic procedures and the 
high cost of LA services give rise to bribery, corruption and the misappropri-
ation of public resources (Zakout et al., 2007). Weak governance distorts offi-
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cial decision-making processes (formal and informal) and leads to inequality, 
which in turn impedes economic development (Zimmermann, 2006). 
In customary systems, bad governance is manifest in forced evictions, the 
manipulation of customary law, the abuse of power by chiefs, a lack of trans-
parency in land allocations and the prevalence of outdated tenure practices 
(see Sections 1.4 and 2.2.2). Indigenous farmers and the poor in customary 
areas can be forcibly evicted from their land (Toulmin and Quan, 2000; Ubink, 
2008a). The rich and powerful claim the land of weaker groups, thereby caus-
ing land disputes and conflicts (Mathieu, 2006). Millions of women‘s rights to 
own, inherit, manage and dispose of their land are abused around the world, 
particularly in customary areas where patrilineal inheritance is practised 
(Zimmermann, 2006). However, in LASs, access to land and the objective of 
protecting land rights is not only a public sector role, but also that of indige-
nous tenure institutions. It is thus important that principles of good govern-
ance are promoted in all institutions involved in LA, including CTIs. Extend-
ing good land governance to CTIs presents an opportunity to analyse and 
reform LA, which would not be possible if the exercise were limited to formal 
institutions and legislation.
Good land governance is a critical precondition for sustainable develop-
ment in a number of respects. Good land governance encourages long-term 
investment; protects the livelihood of vulnerable groups; facilitates low-cost 
transfers; encourages private sector investment; and enhances local gov-
ernment accountability (Deininger et al., 2010). Many international organisa-
tions and donor agencies recognise that the quality of land governance is an 
important factor in improving tenure security, and thus contributes to the 
eradication of poverty and the achievement of sustainable development goals 
(UNCHS-HABITAT, 2000; UN-FIG, 2001; World Bank, 2001; UNHS and Transpar-
ency International, 2004). It is argued that clear and transparent rules, effi-
cient processes, access to land information, improved tenure security and 
the reduction of corruption have a direct impact on improving the lives of the 
poor and achieving sustainable development goals. In addition, the need for 
good land governance has recently been reinforced by the increased demand 
for rural and urban land, as a result of higher and more volatile commodi-
ty prices and population growth (Deininger et al., 2010). Consequently, since 
the declaration of the Millennium Development Goals, governance does not 
only occupy central stage in the development discourse, but is also consid-
ered a crucial element of development strategies. Governance is often consid-
ered to be the fourth dimension of sustainable development, in addition to its 
economic, social and environmental dimensions (Burns and Dalrymple, 2008). 
Furthermore, over the last decade, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank have embraced ‘good governance’ as a set of principles 
to guide their work with member countries (Woods, 2000). The evolution of 
the World Bank’s land-related projects indicates that since the year 2000, the 
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Bank has focused its attention on institutional reform and good governance 
(Bell 2007). As most LA reform activities in developing countries are funded by 
the World Bank and IMF, governments who display elements of good govern-
ance are likely to benefit from these financial institutions. 
Recognising the importance of good land governance, a number of initia-
tives have recently been introduced to address weak governance in LA. In the 
following sections, concepts of good land governance and approaches to good 
land governance assessment in LA are discussed. 
 2.4.2 Concepts of good governance 
While the concept of governance is not new, it means different things to dif-
ferent people and institutions. In practice, the concept’s meaning is general-
ly influenced by the scope, rationale or objectives of the approach being fol-
lowed (Bell, 2007). One can distinguish between different contexts of govern-
ance, such as corporate governance, international governance, national gov-
ernance and local governance. The broad meaning of the term means that 
whenever it occurs, however, its definition varies slightly. For instance, to the 
World Bank, ‘good governance’ encompasses the form of a political regime; 
the process by which authority is exercised in the management of a country’s 
economic and social resources for development; and the capacity of govern-
ments to design, formulate and implement policies and discharge functions 
(Thomas et al., 2000; Kaufmann et al., 2007). Governance in public administra-
tion, meanwhile,‘embraces structures, processes, players and their relation-
ships, rules, control, enforcement and accountability mechanisms, incentives 
and in general all elements bearing on decisions in the public sphere’ (Longo, 
2008: p. 194). To the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), governance is 
‘the way in which society is managed and how the competing priorities of in-
terests of different groups are reconciled, and includes the formal institutions 
of government but also informal arrangements for achieving these ends’ (FAO, 
2007: p. 5). 
Although there is neither one single and exhaustive definition of good gov-
ernance, nor is it possible to limit the scope of the concept in a way that is 
universally accepted, one can identify a number of principles that are thought 
to strengthen good governance in any society. Depending on the context and 
the overriding objective at hand, good governance has been said at various 
times to encompass: respect for human rights, the rule of law, predictabili-
ty, responsiveness, effective participation, multi-actor partnerships, political 
pluralism, transparent and accountable processes and institutions, an effi-
cient and effective public sector, legitimacy, access to knowledge and infor-
mation, the political empowerment of the people, equity, sustainability, and 
attitudes and values that foster responsibility, solidarity and tolerance (UNDP, 
1997; Woods, 2000; Kaufmann et al., 2007; UN-ESCAP, 2009). 
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Kaufmann et al. (2007) identify three pillars of governance: economic, polit-
ical and administrative. Economic governance includes decision-making pro-
cesses that affect countries’ economic activities and their relationships with 
other economies. Political governance is the process of decision-making to 
formulate policies, while administrative governance is the system of policy 
implementation. It can therefore be deduced that good governance relates to 
the ways in which important decisions are made by societies, organisations or 
group of persons, and that it encompasses the choices made by people to par-
ticipate in such decision-making, as well as who renders – and how to render 
– an account of the entire process. 
There are no universally accepted indicators for assessing and evaluating 
good governance in LA (Burns and Dalrymple, 2008). However, the land gov-
ernance assessment frameworks presented below can provide important 
input into the assessment of governance in LA. The framework is based on 
some useful guidelines on what constitutes good governance in LA, which 
have been developed by international organisations, corporate bodies and 
individuals.
 2.4.3 Approaches to governance assessment in land ad-
ministration 
 
Various governance indicators have been developed in the literature, which 
can be categorised as either ‘rule-based’ or ‘outcome-based’ (Kaufmann and 
Kraay, 2008: pp. 4-10). The former uses indicators that assess whether the in-
stitutions that are generally presumed to be associated with good governance 
are indeed in place. In the latter, assessment is based on broad citizen percep-
tions, and the extent to which users feel that public institutions are easily ac-
cessible and responsive to their needs (Deininger et al., 2010). 
In LA, indicators based on the opinions of land sector experts have been 
most frequently used (Deininger et al., 2010). At the multilateral level, the 
indicators used to address governance in land tenure and administration 
include the World Bank Governance and Doing Business Index by Kaufmann 
et al. (2007), the United Nations Development Programme Governance Indica-
tors (UNDP, 2006), the UN-HABITAT governance indicators (UNHS and Trans-
parency International 2004; UN-HABITAT, 2007), the FAO‘s indicators on good 
governance in land tenure and administration (FAO, 2007), and the World 
Bank and FAO’s indicators of the success of LA reform (Burns, 2007). These 
organisations emphasise the role played by state structures in ensuring good 
governance. The World Bank’s Governance and Doing Business Index uses 
several hundred indicators that address six key aspects related to account-
ability, political stability, the rule of law, and control of corruption (World 
Bank, 2006). The UN-HABITAT urban governance indicators assess the many 
ways individuals and institutions (private and public) plan and manage a city 
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(Stewart, 2006). The UN-HABITAT Transparency International Toolkit (2004) 
provides tools to support transparency in local governance. The FAO land ten-
ure studies provide guidelines on what the FAO and its many international 
collaborators have discovered to be ‘good practice’ for a particular aspect of 
land tenure and administration (FAO, 2007). The World Bank and FAO indi-
cators of success in LA reform suggest that security, clarity and simplicity, 
timeliness, fairness and accessibility are needed to improve the quality of 
land information systems (Burns, 2007). These LA reform indicators use indi-
cators such as the total number of parcels registered, the number of land 
transfers registered, the time taken for registration and the annual running 
costs, in order to evaluate the effectiveness of tenure security in LA (Chim-
hamhiwa et al., 2009). The UN-FIG Bogor and Bathurst declarations on cadas-
tre and LA, FIG-Agenda 21 and FIG-Guidelines on Women Access to land (UN-
FIG, 1996; 1999; 2001) are additional guidelines that have been developed to 
ensure that the activities of professional surveyors meet good governance 
objectives in LA. 
These indicators reveal a long list of variables, which include participation 
and empowerment, transparency and access to information, equity and fair-
ness, legitimacy, accountability, efficiency and effectiveness, the rule of law, 
legitimacy and responsiveness. All of these variables are key issues in LA 
governance, and emphasise the different ways in which power relations are 
structured in a given society.
In a similar way, Burns and Dalrymple’s (2008: p. 6) framework for assessing 
governance in LA advocates that governance assessment should concentrate 
on ‘political economy’, by primarily looking at factors that affect historical 
and current LA arrangements and policies, land market activities, and other 
social and economic drivers for development. The framework addresses eight 
key objectives: 
■ land policy in line with principles of fairness and equity; 
■ legal recognition in property rights; 
■ justification of land management instruments; 
■ clarity and transparency of the mandate of land management institutions; 
■ reliability and accessibility of information; 
■ transparent public management processes; 
■ property valuation that serves market and support land policies; and
■ accessibility of judicial and non-judicial institutions. 
Equally important is the work of Zakout et al. (2007), which identifies eight 
key dimensions for assessing good governance in LA. These dimensions, 
which could be applied more generally to the governance of the civil service 
(Bell, 2007), focus on the protection of property rights and the development 
of an efficient land and property market. They emphasise that good service 
standards – defined in terms of time and cost – are needed to guarantee the 
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implementation of good governance principles. Good service includes clear-
ly-defined steps, transparent and fixed transaction fees, the use of stand-
ard forms, transparent procedures and the availability of complaints mecha-
nisms. 
Deininger et al. (2010: p. 191) discuss a more specific approach to assessing 
land governance, both as basis for ‘diagnosis and policy dialogue’ and to gen-
erate data in a replicable and cost-effective way. Their assessment identifies 
five key areas of good land governance, namely: 
■ a legal, institutional and policy framework that recognises existing rights 
and enforces them at a low cost; 
■ arrangements for land-use planning and taxation, conducive to avoiding 
negative externalities and supporting effective decentralisation;
■ clear identification of state land and its management in a way that effec-
tively provides public goods;
■ public provision of land information in a way that is broadly accessible, reli-
able and cost-effective; and 
■ accessible mechanisms to authoritatively resolve disputes and manage 
conflicts at a low cost.
It is evident that governance in LA can be assessed through several govern-
ance principles and indicators. These indicators are not exhaustive, and each 
can be contested depending on how they are being used (Stewart, 2006; Van 
der Heijden, 2009). Whichever combination of governance principles and in-
dicators is used for the assessment, they cannot stand alone (Kaufmann et 
al., 2007) and therefore should be mutually reinforced. However, the goals to 
be pursued, the object of the assessment and the context within which the 
assessment is being applied should determine what to measure and how to 
measure it. 
 2.5  Concluding remarks 
This chapter has reviewed theories of customary tenure systems and the 
strategies that have been adopted in the formalisation of customary land 
rights. In the last section, the concept of good land governance was exam-
ined. The aim was to understand the theories behind customary tenure sys-
tems and the strategies that are used to formalise rights in customary ten-
ure, and the contexts in which these strategies have been implemented. The 
lessons drawn from the formalisation strategies and key issues in current de-
bates on customary tenure formalisation and good land governance will help 
us to develop appropriate strategies for designing LASs for customary areas. 
Several strategies have been adapted to formalise customary rights in 
Africa. Nevertheless, the debate on formalising rights in customary land 
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and administering land in customary areas often tends to focus on wheth-
er tenure security should be provided using property titles and land own-
ership based on the replacement of property rights (market-based models), 
or by using alternative unconventional approaches, which emphasise social 
and economic integration and the security of the commons; and whether LA 
should be based on state-led institutions or locally-based, indigenous institu-
tions. 
The classic concept of formalising land, based on registration and the issu-
ing of ownership titles, as used in the replacement, market-based and De 
Soto models has been directly inspired by standard western ownership rights. 
This view has been countered by scholars who use empirical studies to ques-
tion the applicability of such concepts in Africa (see Section 2.3.4). These crit-
ics see the state as a source of problems and conflict over land, since suc-
cessive colonial and post-independence governments have imposed unsuit-
able models on customary systems. Their main argument is that custom-
ary tenure systems are not compatible with western concepts of property 
rights. Instead, they are embedded in complex social processes, and attempts 
to change them therefore involves prohibitive risks and costs, such as high 
administrative costs, elite capture, a lack of state capacity to implement poli-
cies nationwide, inequality, too great an emphasis on technical specifications, 
the disintegration of bundles of rights in customary land, and the creation of 
exclusive rights that are based on the western concept of ownership, which 
undermines social networks in customary areas and amplifies tensions 
between individual and communal rights. Drawing on current social scien-
tific research, these thinkers advocate the use of adaptation models. Adapta-
tion models formalise customary tenure incrementally, using a community-
based approach. The historical timelines of the models indicate a paradigm 
shift, from replacement theory in the 1950s to adaptation theory in the 2000s 
(see also Nkwae, 2006).
The adaptability of customary tenure to the various formalisation strate-
gies proposed, particularly in the African context, continues to be a topic of 
debate. The literature discussed above shows that many of the formalisation 
approaches that have been adopted to administer customary rights in Afri-
ca have yielded abysmal results. A number of issues in the debate on formal-
isation of customary tenure are reflections of social and political authority 
over land and people, access to land and its use, or local and national author-
ity over land. Yet, researchers like Batungi and Ruther, still argue that the 
assumption that indigenous people are unable to adapt to western forms of 
individual ownership is a ‘political gimmick aimed at supporting and justify-
ing the mandatory acquisition and formalisation of customary land for exclu-
sive use of non-Africans’ (Batungi and Ruther, 2008: p. 127). Their argument is 
that both ‘negotiated and enforced non-negotiated formalisation approaches’ 
(Batungi and Ruther, 2008: pp. 126-127) adopted in Uganda proved to be suc-
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cessful, and are preferable in the African context. 
The literature shows that customary tenure systems in areas with low pop-
ulation densities, and where land is plentiful, are largely successful in provid-
ing secure tenure for groups and individuals. However, in peri-urban areas, 
demographic change, urbanisation, colonialism, socio-economic and cultural 
change, legislation and pressure from land development are stretching ten-
ure institutions to their limits, and they are failing to provide adequate ten-
ure security. Peri-urban areas present a particular set of problems that require 
innovative and unconventional approaches to securing land rights (Van der 
Molen, 2006b; Toulmin, 2009). Thus, the new forms of tenure observed in 
peri-urban areas can only be supported by new systems with an enhanced 
range of skills and institutions, which can accommodate group and individ-
ual rights, and which can integrate both social and economic perspectives on 
tenure. The lesson from this literature review is therefore that a more spe-
cific and flexible approach is needed, which pays attention to local settings, 
specific objectives and tools. It is important that in customary areas where 
socio-cultural issues are paramount, formalisation should not be seen merely 
as a technical tool, but must also take account of politics and culture (Sjaas-
tad and Cousins, 2009). The strategies should also be able to provide security 
to the whole continuum of rights in customary land, ensure community par-
ticipation, allow the use of low-cost procedures and also allow for adaptation 
to local institutions. These conditions suggest that adaptation models offer a 
potentially useful approach to designing LA in peri-urban customary areas.
Adaptation models allow for socio-cultural and economic factors, and can 
therefore be adapted to local situations. The ability to accommodate inter-
mediate rights makes the adaptation model suitable for dynamic tenure 
environments, such as peri-urban customary areas. Nevertheless, the ques-
tion remains as to what constitutes an appropriate institutional framework 
for administering rights in customary areas, so as to minimise the problems 
associated with the formalisation of customary land rights. This study relies 
on the three concepts in the adaptation models discussed above – name-
ly, that they are locally-based, incremental and that tenure is hybrid – in its 
development of the strategies required to design an appropriate institution-
al framework for administering land in peri-urban customary areas. Taking 
account of the hybrid nature of contemporary land tenure in peri-urban areas 
and the great diversity of tenure situations, it is important to build dynamic 
links between local laws and statutory laws, and to draw links between legiti-
macy, legality and actual practice. On the one hand, to design a LAS that can 
manage the dynamics of tenure, it will be necessary to take an incremental 
approach. On the other hand, adapting the principle from locally-based ten-
ure models will allow us to design a LAS that can be adapted to the diverse 
conditions in various customary areas. 
In so far as it is important to decentralise and adapt LA to local institutions 
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in order to secure rights, it is also important for indigenous institutions to 
adhere to principles of good governance. Thus, adapting LA to the institution-
al framework of customary tenure will also require extending the principles 
of good governance to indigenous institutions. As discussed in Chapter 1 and 
in Section 2.2.2, the development of the customary tenure system raises sev-
eral issues relating to weak governance in customary tenure institutions. The 
activities of CTIs are often characterised by the abuse of power, land grabbing, 
conflicts, evictions, tenure insecurity and a lack of accountability (Alden Wily 
and Hammond, 2001; Ubink, 2007; Toulmin, 2009). 
So far, good governance assessment in LA has paid attention to civil society, 
the performance of statutory institutions and regulation. These assessments 
emphasise how formal and public institutions can be reorganised using pol-
icy reforms and institutional measures. It is equally important to consid-
er how CTIs can provide equitable, transparent, efficient and effective land 
delivery services in order to meet good governance objectives in LA. Assessing 
governance in CTIs presents an opportunity to analyse and reform LA. 
The next chapter looks at how Ghana embraced the formalisation and land 
reform agenda during the colonial and post-colonial eras. Lessons from these 
formalisation strategies, governance principles and the characteristics of cus-
tomary tenure will then be used as a basis for developing a framework for 
designing LA in peri-urban areas (Chapter 4). 
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 3 The legal framework for 
administering customary 
land in Ghana 
 3.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2, it was observed that since the colonial era, a number of formal-
isation strategies have been adopted in Sub-Saharan African countries with 
the aim of improving tenure security, increasing agricultural productivity, pro-
moting investment and regulating customary tenure. These objectives were 
pursued by means of various policy and legislative interventions and land re-
form programmes. This chapter discusses how, to what extent and with what 
objectives government policies have sought to regulate customary tenure and 
land management systems in Ghana. It analyses how the current framework 
of administering land in Ghana supports or inhibits the administration of cus-
tomary land at the local level. Understanding the policy framework and the 
institutional development for governing customary land in Ghana will help us 
to identify the challenges that will need to be overcome when adapting LA to 
the local institutional framework of customary tenure. First, the chapter sets 
out the background to LA (Section 3.2) and customary land management (Sec-
tion 3.3) in modern Ghana, paying particular attention to peri-urban areas. 
Second, the framework of LA in Ghana is discussed by examining trends in le-
gal, organisational and institutional reform, and in the management of cus-
tomary land (Section 3.4). In Section 3.5, particular attention is given to the 
Land Administration Project (LAP), a long-term multi-donor support project 
that is currently underway in Ghana. The chapter ends with an analysis of 
how the legal framework supports or inhibits the decentralisation of the ad-
ministration of customary land at the local level (Section 3.6). 
 3.2 General environment 
Ghana’s administrative territory of land and inland water areas covers a to-
tal of 238,539 square kilometres. The country is rich in land and natural re-
sources, upon which its political and material strength and sustainable devel-
opment are built (National Land Policy, 1999). Gold, timber, and cocoa produc-
tion are major sources of foreign exchange. The domestic economy continues 
to revolve around subsistence agriculture, which accounts for about 36% of 
GDP and employs about 60% of the workforce, mainly small landholders (Gha-
na Statistical Service, 2005).
Ghana is a unitary republic that has ten administrative regions, subdivided 
into 170 districts (as of 2010). There are over 60 ethnic groups, 52 major lan-
guages and hundreds of spoken dialects. The Constitution of Ghana (1992) is 
the supreme law of the country. The constitution recognises the roles played 
by socio-cultural institutions (e.g. chieftaincy), customary law and custom-
ary land management in reaching sustainable development goals. Customary 
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land management is the main source of access to land (80%). In the Land Poli-
cy (1999), Ghana recognises that the social, cultural and economic activities of 
its people are closely linked to the country’s highly-valued but limited natu-
ral resources and therefore there is the need for prudent measures to protect 
land resources. 
The country’s estimated population is about 24.2 million, a provisional fig-
ure from the 2010 Population and Housing Census (Ghana Statistical Serv-
ice, 2011). It is estimated that there are 5.5 million households in Ghana (Gha-
na Statistical Service, 2008). Projections indicate that by 2030, more than 51% 
of the total population will be living in urban areas (Farvacque-Vitkovic et al., 
2008). The statistics available also indicate a 60% housing deficit across the 
whole country. Thirty-one per cent of adults, representing a little over 4 mil-
lion people, have never been to school. For the economically active popula-
tion aged 15 years or older, the unemployment rate is estimated at 10.4%. 
The majority of the working population (60%) is employed in agriculture, and 
35% of household income in Ghana comes from agricultural activities. Food 
accounts for two-fifths of total household expenditure (Ghana Statistical 
Service, 2008).
The statistics above show that demand for land for housing and agriculture 
is high in Ghana, making land a valuable asset in the country. The prudent 
management of land and natural resources, ensuring easy access to land, ten-
ure security and the judicious use of land, is therefore vital. With high unem-
ployment, high poverty levels, and with customary land tenure being the 
main source of access to land, measures that emphasise pro-poor land man-
agement and that are adaptable to customary systems can improve LA in 
Ghana. The subsequent parts of the chapter analyse how land is administered 
in Ghana. 
 3.3 Land tenure system in Ghana
Ghana has a dual tenure system, in which statutory and customary land 
management run in parallel to one other. In the customary system, land is 
owned by traditional societies that take the form of tribes, clans or families. 
Customary lands are managed by the head of the corporate bodies – chiefs 
and family heads, who have the authority to enforce rights and obligations 
related to the land that has been granted. These arrangements are support-
ed by the Constitution of Ghana, 1992 (Article 267). Unlike some countries in 
Africa, such as Nigeria and Malawi, where customary tenure only prevails in 
rural areas, in Ghana, customary tenure exists in both rural and in peri-ur-
ban and urban areas. In these areas, customary tenure institutions (CTIs) play 
a pivotal role in land allocation, land-use planning and the management of 
the land under their jurisdiction. In general, the state does not own land, ex-
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cept for lands acquired by lawful proclamation, ordinances, statutory proce-
dures or international treaties (Kuntu-Mensah, 2006). Such lands are man-
aged by statutorily-established state institutions or land agencies. The five 
broad classes of land ownership in the current tenure regime in Ghana are 
described below.
Stool/Skin land – These are customary lands vested in a traditional chief, or 
other community leaders, on behalf of and in trust for the tribe (stool/skin), 
in accordance with customary law and usage. These lands include all those 
lands that are at the disposal of local communities. The heads of the groups 
of chiefs and councils of elders are responsible for managing the land on be-
half of the Stool or Skin. However, the Constitution of Ghana, 1992 (Article 267 
clause (3)) requires that the disposition of stool lands must receive the ap-
proval of the Lands Commission, and must be consistent with the approved 
development plan for the area concerned (Government of Ghana, 1993). 
Family land – These are customary lands that are collectively owned by fam-
ilies or clans with a common ancestor, who might have acquired the land 
through purchase, long settlement, or conquest. The term ‘family’in this 
sense, means a group of persons all related exclusively through either a patri-
lineal or matrilineal line. 
Individual or private land – These are lands that have been acquired by indi-
viduals as private property. These lands have been either purchased or other-
wise acquired or inherited, and are at the disposal of the individual. Individ-
ual lands are not subject to any family sanctions or restrictions, and holders 
have freehold rights over such lands.
State land – These are lands that have been formally acquired by the state in 
the public interest. They include lands that belong to the state at all levels of 
government – local, urban, departments, state corporations, and so forth. Un-
der the provisions of the State Lands Act, 1962 (Act 125), the President can ac-
quire an absolute interest in any land in the country. Such acquisitions are 
made through the publication of an Executive Instrument, which clearly iden-
tifies the required area of land and declares that the land is needed in the 
public interest. The public interest concerns the development and utilisation 
of any property in a way that is of benefit to the public, whether this is for de-
fence, public safety, public health, or town and country planning (Constitu-
tion of Ghana, 1979; 1992). On the publication of the Instrument, the abso-
lute interest in the land is vested in the state. The National Land Policy (1999) 
provides for the payment of compensation when land is de-vested, and the 
Lands Commission is responsible for the management of such lands. 
Vested land – This is land that previously belonged to a given indigenous com-
munity, but that has been declared under the appropriate instrument to be 
vested in the state. In ‘vested land’, dual ownership is created, whereby the 
legal title is transferred to the state, whilst the beneficial interests reside in 
the stool or community. The President of Ghana is vested with the power to 
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administer such lands. In practice, the President may take all decisions relat-
ing to alienation and utilisation of such lands, without any reference to the 
affected stool or community. Under the vesting order, the government does 
not pay any compensation. However, any income from the land vested is paid 
into the respective stool land and is dispersed according to the constitutional 
sharing formula (see Section 3.4.3).
 3.4 Customary tenure
 3.4.1 The nature of customary landholding in Ghana 
Customary tenure is the primary source of all landholding in Ghana with var-
ying tenure and management systems (Larbi, 1994; Kasanga and Kotey, 2001). 
Customary land tenure provides land for the residential and other economic 
activities of most Ghanaian citizens. Prior to colonisation, Ghana consisted of 
highly centralised and ‘independent traditional states’, with unique tradition-
al structures. These traditional states were made up of people who formed 
tribes of the same lineage, and shared religious beliefs and language. Land 
was one of the strong unifying forces in these people’s existence, and access 
to land was therefore an integral part of social relations. There are over 100 
linguistic and cultural groups, clans and states in Ghana, each with its own 
identity. There are clear north-south differences, as well as differences be-
tween the centralised ‘chiefdoms’, which are based on the matrilineal system 
of the Akan and the lineage-based landholding systems of the patrilineal Ewe 
and Ga (Aryeetey, Ayee et al., 2007: p. 17). Although customary systems vary in 
terms of culture and place, they have some commonalities when it comes to 
ownership, use, institutions and land management practices. 
Customary tenure systems in Ghana fall into two distinct categories. The 
first category, land ownership is vested in communities that exist as chief-
doms. In this category, land tenure relations are based on territorial control, 
in which access to land is governed by a complex network of reciprocal bonds 
within families, lineages and larger social units (see Section 2.2.1). This ten-
ure relation is common in Southern Ghana, mainly among the Akans, in whose 
system the stool is the ‘embodiment of a political community in which alle-
giance also implies recognition of rights over land’ (Crook et al., 2007: p. 28). 
Such communities are represented by chiefs and councils of elders, who gov-
ern and manage land within their jurisdictions on behalf of their communities. 
In the second category, common among non-Akan communities, land own-
ership is vested in clans, not stools, as is the case for tribes such as the Ga 
Adangme and the Anlo (Crook et al., 2007). In such groups, land is collective-
ly owned by clans, which may in turn have inherited the land from a com-
mon ancestor. In northern Ghana, land ownership rights traditionally resided 
[ 59 ]
in the tindambas or land priests, who undertake rituals for maintaining the 
sanctity of the land, and are responsible for the allocation of land and settle-
ment of disputes (Aryeetey, Kotey et al., 2007). 
In all the above categories of customary groups, the main modes of land 
acquisition are through one (or a combination) of the following: discovery and 
uninterrupted settlement; conquest through war and subsequent settlement; 
gift from another land-owning group or traditional overlord; and purchase 
from another land-owning group (Ollenu, 1962). Whether ownership is vest-
ed in communities or families, chiefs or family heads hold the land in trust 
for group members and are therefore accountable to them. These tradition-
al authorities are responsible for allocating land and for the overall manage-
ment of the customary land in their jurisdiction. However, in the urban are-
as where there is the need for land-use planning, environmental monitoring, 
and provision of infrastructural services, customary tenure institutions have 
practically ceased to manage land on behalf of communities. In such areas, 
customary authorities have almost become landowners, as they only take 
decisions in relation to land ownership. 
 3.4.2 Rights and interests in customary land 
Customary tenure systems are characterised by a co-existence of different in-
terests in land (Asante, 1975). Fundamentally, landownership under Ghanaian 
customary tenure is based on an absolute allodial title, from which all other 
lesser titles, interests and rights in land can be derived. These lesser titles in-
clude usufructuary and individual cultivators’ rights in the form of tenancies.
Allodial title – This is the highest interest in land under customary law (Kasan-
ga and Kotey, 2001). It is absolute and permanent, and sometimes referred to 
as a ‘radical’ or ‘ultimate’ interest, because the holder of the allodial title has 
complete authority to deal with the land (Ollenu, 1962; Woodman, 1966). Al-
lodial titles are vested in communities, which are represented by stools, sub-
stools, skins, clans and families. An allodial title is vested in a continual flow 
of people, and remains in them for generations (Woodman, 1966). Although 
allodial titles belong to the whole community, the right to alienate or dispose 
of lands is vested in the chief or family head, or other traditional leaders, as 
the case may be. The holder of the allodial title acts as a trustee, holding the 
land for use by the community or family. The holder ‘executes judicial, gov-
ernance, and management functions’ (Kasanga and Kotey, 2001: p. 13), but 
cannot dispose of the land without the consent of the members of the com-
munity. 
Usufructuary estate – A usufructuary estate is an extensive interest in custom-
ary land, and is sometimes referred to as ownership (Woodman, 1966). Such 
rights are normally owned by the subjects of stools, skins or families. These 
subjects may exercise their inherent right to develop any vacant virgin com-
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munal land (Ollenu, 1962; Da Rocha and Lodoh, 1995). Usufructuary estates 
give the holder a beneficiary occupation right in the land concerned, and they 
can be inherited (Woodman, 1966). Usufructuary estates can include the right 
to use land for farming, building, grazing, growing subsistence crops, gather-
ing minor forestry products, or fishing. The holder of a usufructuary estate 
has security for use, and the right is only terminable upon abandonment, for-
feiture or failure in succession (Mahama and Dixon, 2006). The holder of usu-
fructuary estate may dispose of his interest to other subjects as he pleases, 
and cannot be deprived of any of the rights that constitute the interests. How-
ever, complete alienation to a stranger can only be effected with the consent 
of the whole community. 
Tenancies and farming rights – Tenancies are share-cropping contractual ar-
rangements made between allodial title holders or usufructs, and strangers. 
These interests allow the holder to occupy and use the land for a definite pe-
riod. In tenancy agreements, a tenant farmer gives a specified portion of the 
produce or the farm to the landlord at each harvest time. The two best-known 
tenancies in Ghana are the abunu and abusa.5 The decision to split land into 
abunu or abusa depends on the tenurial practice in the customary area. Nev-
ertheless, land availability, the kinship of the landlord or social connections 
linking the two parties, the intensity of labour required for cultivation, and 
the reputation of the farmer have also been identified as factors that can af-
fect the decision to split land into abusa or abunu (Blocher, 2006). Sometimes, 
these annual contributions serve as a form of rent on the use of the land, and 
also as an acknowledgment of the community’s allodial rights over the land. 
All of the above-listed rights can co-exist on the same piece of land. For 
example, for a piece of land in which the allodial interest is vested in a chief, 
a subject who has usufructuary rights over the land during his or her lifetime 
can give the land to other tenants under other contractual tenancy agree-
ments. At the same time, other subjects in the customary area may have the 
right to collect fruit or pass on the land. 
 3.4.3 Transfer of interests in customary land
Rights in customary land can be transferred in many ways, including via 
grants, rents, sharecropping contracts, inheritances and gifts. The roots of 
these land transfer mechanisms are embedded in tradition, and reflect the 
5 In abunu tenancy, the returns from the farm or the farm itself are shared equally (i.e. 50-50) between the 
landowner and the tenant. This form of tenancy often occurs where a person who has already cultivated the land 
hands it over to another person to maintain it. The two people then share the land or the proceeds from the land 
at the end of the season. In abusa, the farm or produce is shared according to a ratio of 1:2. In this arrangement, 
the landlord takes one-third, while the tenant takes two-thirds. 
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socio-economic arrangements of the area where the land is located (Agbo-
su, 2000). Customary land may be transferred to settlers or strangers through 
grants, contracts, or any of the above-mentioned means. However, long-term 
undisturbed occupation by a stranger does not mature into ownership (Agbo-
su, 2000; Blocher, 2006). Whether customary land is transferred to an indigene 
or a stranger, the recipient is required to offer some customary drinks to indi-
cate his acceptance of the transfer, and to publicise and guarantee the trans-
action (Fred-Mensah, 1999). Several forms of land alienation can be identified 
in Ghanaian customary tenure jurisdiction: 
■ Sale – The sale of customary land transfers all the interests that the trans-
feror has in the property to the transferee, unless expressed to the contrary. 
The sale of customary land involves agreeing to part with one’s interest in 
a given tract of land and actually parting with it in return for an item of 
value, generally money (Da Rocha and Lodoh, 1995). 
■ Gift – A voluntary transfer of land to another, where the recipient has the 
right to the land without paying rent or discharging any obligation to the 
landowners (Da Rocha and Lodoh, 1995). A gift of right in land can be made 
to members or non-members of the community. A gift, however, can-
not override allodial interests in the land (Levina, 1992; Agbosu, 2000). The 
donor must be the owner and must have the capability to transfer the land. 
■ Pledges – Land pledging is an indigenous form of collateral system. A pledge 
transfers the right to use the land to a creditor, to hold and use it until such 
time that the money owed the creditor has been fully paid, or an obligation 
has been fully discharged (Da Rocha and Lodoh, 1995). The creditor may 
use the land and enjoy the products from the land, as a form of accruing 
interest on the money owed, until the payment is made. The creditor is not 
answerable for any deterioration that is a natural result of usage. 
■ Customary mortgage – ‘Mortgage’ is defined in Ghanaian customary law as 
a conveyance of land or an assignment of chattels as security for the pay-
ment of the debt or the discharge of some other obligation for which it was 
given (Da Rocha and Lodoh, 1995). The difference between a customary 
mortgage and a pledge is that the debtor continues to use the land during 
the period of the mortgage. In the case that the debtor refuses to pay the 
debt on the expiration of the specified term, the creditor takes possession 
of the land and continues to use the land until the debt is settled. 
■ Customary lease – This is the grant of the use of land for the purpose of culti-
vation for a period of time. The lease terms involve an agreement on a peri-
od for the use of the land. The lessor can take the land back if the contract 
is breached. 
■ Inheritance – Land can be inherited through matrilineal and patrilineal sys-
tems. In the former, land is transferred along a line of succession, which 
descends by seniority of brothers from the same mother and nephews. 
Matrilineal inheritance is mainly to be found in the Akan ethnic group. In 
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patrilineal systems, land is transferred through male members of the same 
group from successive generations, by seniority or by rotations of segment 
of a group. Patrilineal inheritance is common in the Greater Accra, North-
ern, Upper, and Volta regions of Ghana. 
In the customary institutional set-up, land management activities have sev-
eral informal characteristics. In some areas, the stools/skins and the land-
owning institutions may differ. Land allocation processes may be control-
led by several people, who work in an uncoordinated manner. Furthermore, 
all land transfers and transactions used to be oral (Woodman, 1988). Such ar-
rangements have created a number of problems, including uncertain bound-
aries of adjacent customary areas; protracted chieftancy disputes within par-
ticular stools and families; the allocation of the same piece of land to two or 
more persons; and informal land markets. 
 3.5 Statutory tenure and land administration 
Land tenure in Ghana is administered in a plural environment, with statutes 
and customary laws and norms, public and indigenous institutions, tradition-
al and corporate norms all operating alongside each other. The Constitution 
of Ghana (1992) recognises the following sources of laws in the country: the 
Constitution; Acts of Parliament; orders; rules and regulations; common law; 
and the judicial decisions of the Superior Court of Judicature (Article 11). Cur-
rently, there are over 100 statutes on land ownership, tenure, planning and 
use, in addition to the various customary laws that pertain to specific loca-
tions (Larbi, 2006). The legal, organisational and institutional frameworks for 
administering land in Ghana are discussed below. 
 3.5.1 Legislative framework 
The legislative framework for administering customary land in Ghana has a 
long history. The state has made several interventions to regulate customary 
tenure. Since the colonial era, pre–independence and post-independence gov-
ernments have promulgated various pieces of legislation that have sought to 
introduce new land-governing systems in customary areas. Governments have 
justified their interventions in LA on the grounds of: the satisfaction of public 
interests, the public good and national interest; the correction of abnormalities 
in the customary land delivery processes; the introduction of written records 
as a means of promoting investment; and the acceleration of development by 
easing land acquisition and documentation procedures (Kasanga and Kotey, 
2001). However, these new land governance systems did not only limit indige-
nous institutions’ control of customary land, but were also used as a means by 
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which the government could accumulate land for itself. The statutory meas-
ures that were instituted were different, depending on the area in which the 
land was located and the nature of land tenure in that area. Below, the discus-
sion of the historical development of the legislative framework has been cate-
gorised into pre-independence and post-independence interventions.
Colonial legislative interventions 
Colonial statutory intervention to regulate and control customary tenure 
dates back to the late nineteenth century. Between 1891 and 1897, two un-
successful attempts were made by the colonial government to intervene in 
customary tenure by vesting the administration of unoccupied lands in the 
Crown. First, in 1894, the Crowns Land Bill was proposed to vest all lands, in-
cluding the forest and mineral lands of the Gold Coast (modern Ghana) in the 
English crown. The effect was that any future grant of such lands or miner-
als was to be made by, and at the discretion of, the then Governor of the Gold 
Coast, and would confer absolute title to the grantee (Aryeetey, Ayee et al., 
2007). The bill stated clearly, however, that this would not affect indigenous 
rights under native law. The second intervention was the Public Lands Bill 
of 1897, the aim of which was to declare all unoccupied communal or tribal 
lands as public (Abdulai and Ndekugri, 2007). The Public Lands Bill also vest-
ed the power of administration of all public lands in the colonial state. These 
proposed bills, which were to be adopted in other British colonies and pro-
tectorates, were ultimately dropped in the Gold Coast due to mounting op-
position (Branney, 1959). The main opposition came from the Aborigines 
Rights Protection Society, which represented the interests of chiefs, tradition-
al elders, native lawyers, the nascent middle class, the educated elite and Eu-
ropean firms (Agbosu, 2004). 
Instead of the abortive Crown Lands Ordinance, the Concessions Ordinance 
of 1900 was promulgated to ensure security of title for investors in the min-
ing and timber industries. Although the Concession Ordinance of 1900 did not 
make any attempt to take over or interfere with the rights of indigenous own-
ers, the affected chiefs protested against its introduction (Aryeetey, Ayee et al., 
2007). Despite this, the Ordinance was successfully passed. 
Between 1900 and 1950, several other legislative efforts were made to regu-
larise customary landholdings in the country as a whole, or some parts of the 
country. Those pieces of legislation that were enacted for specific areas aimed 
to obtain administrative control over forest or mineral resources in those are-
as. For example, the Stool Property Protection Ordinance (Ordinance No. 22 
of 1940) was specifically meant to protect the stool property of the Ashantis. 
Other legislation included the Forest Ordinance of 1912 (cd. 6278); the Native 
Administration (colony) Ordinance of 1927 (Ordinance No. 18); the Native 
Administration (Treasures) Ordinance of 1951 (Cap. 96); the Kumasi Lands 
Ordinance of 1943 (Cap. 145) for Kumasi areas; and Local Government Ordi-
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nance of 1951 (Ordinance No. 29, Cap. 64). These laws were enacted to control 
customary land revenue administration and the overall management of cus-
tomary land (Agbosu, 2004).
The effect of colonial influence differed in northern and southern Ghana. In 
the South, where the chiefs tended to be more powerful, land ownership was 
retained by customary chiefs under a system of indirect rule (Amanor, 2008). 
By contrast, in the North, the Administration (Northern Territories) Ordinance 
of 1902 (Cap. 111) and the Land and Native Rights (Northern Territories) Ordi-
nance of 1931 (Cap. 143) were passed by the colonial government to control 
and manage land in the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast, on behalf of 
the people. The former gave the Commissioner power to acquire land in the 
Northern Territories for public use, while the latter vested control of all lands 
in the Northern region in the Governor, with rights to grant and charge rent 
for land occupancy by both natives and non-natives (Aryeetey, Ayee et al., 
2007). With these acts, while land was legally owned by individuals and fam-
ilies, the state’s general modus operandi was to take land for public purposes 
without giving compensation. Under these conditions, it was difficult to dif-
ferentiate between public land and land that was merely vested in the state 
(Lund, 2009). 
In all, several attempts were made to regulate the management of revenue 
from tribal and family lands and to vest ownership and administrative con-
trol in the state. Although most of the colonial government’s attempts were 
fiercely opposed by stronger tribes, the measures had a severe impact on cus-
tomary tenure practices in Ghana, with weaker tribes mainly being affect-
ed. In sum, indigenous communities lost their customary land under coloni-
al laws and policies. A vast amount of communal land was vested in the state. 
The rights of indigenous community members were greatly affected by the 
colonial government’s capitalistic land agenda. Individualised property rights 
replaced communal rights. Usufructuary rights in particular were affected, 
as they were not recognised as complete titles. In some regions, the coloni-
al rules provided opportunities for powerful chiefs to centralise their political 
control, including their control over land. For instance, the institution of para-
mount stools or skins, in which particular chiefs were regarded as the highest 
authority, came to predominate in customary territories (Quan et al., 2008). In 
fact, the customary values that were retained were often those which suited 
the objectives of colonial rule (Ranger, 1993; Pottier, 2005).
Post-colonial legislative interventions
Like those by the colonial government, many legislative interventions 
have been made by the government since independence to lay the founda-
tions for managing customary land. The post-colonial interventions start-
ed in the 1950s, when the Convention People’s Party (CPP) assumed some 
control of government business. The CPP government passed a number of 
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laws aimed at weakening chiefs’ financial bases, by transferring the ‘control 
and management of stool lands and stool revenue’ from the chiefs to new-
ly-established councils (Ninsin, 1989: p. 167). Among the laws that were in-
troduced to achieve this aim were the Local Government Ordinance of 1951, 
State Council (Ashanti) Ordinance No. 4 of 1952, State Council (Northern Ter-
ritories) Ordinance No. 5 of 1952, and the State Council (Colony and South-
ern Togoland) Ordinance No. 8 of 1952. Other more explicit laws included the 
Akim Abuakwa (Stool Revenue) Act of 1958 (Act 8), the Ashanti Stool Lands 
Act of 1958 (Act 28) and the Stool Lands Control Act of 1960 (Act 79). For ex-
ample, the Ashanti Stool Land Act was introduced to control and administer 
all land in the Ashanti Kingdom. These laws, ‘in various ways, gave the state 
power over stool and other lands; power to authorise the acquisition and use 
of such lands for either private or public purposes; and (the power) to regulate 
the collection and use of stool revenue’ (Aryeetey, Ayee et al., 2007). 
The policy reforms that were adopted in the 1960s also strengthened state 
control over customary land. The government passed various laws that facil-
itated the acquisition of land from tribes. The Administration of Lands Act, 
1962 (Act 123) and the State Lands Act, 1962 (Act 125) were enacted for the 
acquisition and management of land in the interest of the people of Ghana. 
The Administration of Lands Act repealed most of the enactments made dur-
ing the colonial period. Nevertheless, the act’s power to vest customary land-
holdings is extensive, whilst the State Lands Act embodies sweeping power 
with regard to compulsory acquisition and compensation (Kasanga, 1988). The 
Administration of Lands Act empowers the President to use the stool land for 
any purpose that is deemed necessary for the welfare or interest of the state. 
The State Land Act has been used extensively to acquire land for public bod-
ies, such as government ministries and departments, corporations, and so 
forth. The Administration of Lands Act and the State Lands Act now govern 
all land transactions in Ghana (Kasanga, 1988). Other legislation also confers 
on the state the authority to collect revenue on customary land. For exam-
ple, the Administration of Lands Act 1962 made the state responsible for col-
lecting stool land revenue, and also made the state responsible for overseeing 
and regulating transactions in stool land. 
Furthermore, the co-existence of customary tenure and a market econo-
my concealed the fact that investors and urban real estate developers contin-
ued to be hampered by insecure titles, resulting in the promulgation of other 
statutory regulations. The Survey Act, 1962 (Act 127), Land Registry Act, 1962 
(Act 122), the Conveyancing Decree, 1973 (NRCD 175), and later the Land Title 
Registration Law (PNDCL 152), were enacted to provide secure titles for land 
users. The Local Government Law, 1988 (PNDCL 207) provides for the decen-
tralisation of the decision-making machinery, with all important decisions 
relating to land development to be taken at the regional and district levels. 
These enactments and others form the basis of the institutional and organi-
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sational frameworks for current LA in Ghana (Sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3). 
A major land policy reform took place in 1979. In 1979, the land in North-
ern Ghana was returned to customary custodians as a result of a ‘sustained 
campaign of northern elites and chiefs’ (Amanor, 2009: p. 100). This poli-
cy reform allowed the affected customary areas full ownership of their land 
and gave the country a unitary LAS. As a result, with the exception of land 
legally acquired under the State Lands Act (Act 125, 1962), all other lands were 
returned to the respective customary authorities (Lund, 2009). 
The National Land Policy and land reform
The major land policy reform in Ghana took place since the 1980s. This re-
form became necessary due to the effects of long-term environmental change 
coupled with economic liberalisation, which resulted in stress on tradition-
al livelihood resources and worsening hardship in many parts of Ghana (Ary-
eetey, Ayee et al., 2007). To facilitate investment, the state designed an ena-
bling legal and institutional environment to attract both local and foreign in-
vestors. The government perceived a need for a radical overhaul of the land 
tenure system in the country, justified by the numerous problems that had 
been associated with the customary tenure system (Agbosu, 2004). One of the 
main policies that was introduced was the enactment of the Land Title Regis-
tration Law (see Section 3.5.2). 
In 1999, a comprehensive National Land Policy (NLP) was launched to pro-
vide a policy direction for managing all land in Ghana, including customary 
areas. The development of the NLP dated back to 1973, when the Law Reform 
Commission submitted its Interim Report on the Reform of Land Law in Gha-
na (NLP, 1999). The major development in the current Ghanaian LAS occurred 
between 2000 and 2003, when a Land Administration Project (LAP) was devel-
oped with assistance from the World Bank and other donors. The LAP was 
intended to elaborate on the broad thrust of the NLP, and brought about legal 
and institutional reform in LA service delivery. A major component of the LA 
reform is the enactment of the Lands Commission Act, 2008 (Act 767), which 
consolidates all of the major land sector agencies in a New Lands Commis-
sion (see Section 3.4.3). 
In sum, it seems that there was no major shift in approach from the coloni-
al and to the post-colonial land reform activities. One of the most important 
issues covered in the laws enacted during both periods has been the vesting 
of ownership of customary land in the state. In many areas, the government 
has acquired large amounts of land through compulsory acquisition from 
tribes, most of which have yet to be compensated. Such lands are still the 
subject of considerable tensions between traditional authorities and the state 
(Kasanga and Kotey, 2001). In some areas, these lands have not been used for 
the purposes for which they were acquired. 
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 3.5.2 Institutional framework 
The state management of land, which is principally carried out using the leg-
islation and instruments discussed above, usually involves the administration 
of land (consent and concurrence for validation of the grant of stool and skin 
lands, and the collection and distribution of revenue), land registration, sur-
veying and mapping, and land-use planning. 
Administration of land 
The state provides a legislative framework that regulates the administration 
of customary land. As indicated above, the Administration of Lands Act, 1962 
(Act 123) makes provisions for the vesting of stool land in the state. Although 
in principle, ownership is still vested in the stool, the Act empowers the state 
to administer the affected land on behalf of the community. In general, the 
state takes administrative control of customary land for a number of reasons: 
those relating to politics, chieftaincy and land disputes, and land-use plan-
ning (Dowuona-Hammond, 2003). For example, where there is conflict over 
land ownership between customary areas, the state may take administra-
tive control of such lands until the dispute has been resolved. For the prudent 
management of forest and mineral resources, there are instruments that al-
low the state to manage such resources on behalf of a customary area. 
In addition, Section 8 (1) of the Administration of Lands Act, 1962, makes 
it compulsory for all dispositions of stool lands to non-members of the stool 
to be granted concurrence from the Lands Commission. However, under the 
Lands Commission Act, 1994 (Act 483), the Lands Commission is only required 
to certify that the disposition or development of stool land is consistent with 
development plans drawn up or approved by the local planning authority. Fur-
ther control relates to the management of stool/skin land revenue. The Office 
of Administrator of Stool Lands Act, 1994 (Act 481) empowers the state to man-
age all revenues due to stools/skins in the form of rents, compensation and so 
forth, to be paid to the Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands, and to dis-
burse these to beneficiaries according to a predefined formula (Section 3.4.3). 
Some of the measures put in place to administer customary land have cer-
tain shortcomings. For example, the communities who are beneficiaries are 
not involved in the collection of ground rents, and the process is instead 
handled by state institutions. Transparency in the collection and disburse-
ment of such revenues has been an issue of concern among the traditional 
rulers. Although Act 481 indicates that a 22.5% share should be given to the 
stool/skin for its maintenance, there is no legal requirement for the stools to 
account for such revenues in the community. The absence of such require-
ments creates room for greedy and corrupt chiefs to use the revenues to fur-
ther their own interests. With regard to the state acquisition of customary 
land, annual rents and compensation are rarely paid to the affected com-
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munities and stools (Kasanga and Kotey, 2001). Some of these expropriations 
are carried out without the knowledge of local people; local leaders only find 
out about them when development starts on the land (Kasanga, 2003). Con-
sequently, there have been persistent calls by some traditional rulers for 
the return of all state-acquired land to stools/skins. These chiefs argue that 
they have enormous responsibilities towards their people, and therefore they 
should have control over the use of the land and resources in their jurisdic-
tions (Aryeetey, Ayee et al., 2007). 
Land registration 
Registration entails the recording of all interests in land. Two forms of regis-
tration are currently used in Ghana, namely deeds and title registrations. 
Deeds registration 
Deeds registration has been used since the nineteenth century, when the 
Land Registration Ordinance of 1883 (which was repealed by the Land Reg-
istry Ordinance of 1895) was introduced to govern the registration of deeds 
on land transactions. Since independence, the Land Registry Act, 1962 (Act 
122) has provided for the registration of all instruments affecting land in the 
whole of Ghana. With the exception of a judge’s certificate, the Land Registry 
Act requires all instruments to be registered. The Act requires all instruments 
to be registered to have a site plan that describes the land. The registration 
of deeds is recorded by the Deeds Registry, which operates under the Lands 
Commission Secretariat.
Deeds registration has been criticised on several grounds. First, the law 
allows only the documents to the land to be registered, meaning that the reg-
istration process does not ensure sufficient investigation of titles prior to reg-
istration. Second, whereas in English common law, execution of the docu-
ment by the parties has the effect of delivering the title to the purchaser, this 
is not the case under deed registration in Ghana (Asiama, 2003). For example, 
Section 24(1) of the Land Registry Act, 1962, indicates that at best, ‘the process 
of registration grants equitable interest to the purchaser, rather than trans-
fers a right as is probably understood by the party involved’ (Agbosu, 2003). 
Both educated and uneducated individuals would find it difficult to compre-
hend such details (Zevenbergen, 2002; Aryeetey, Kotey et al., 2007). Third, and 
most importantly, the Land Registry Act provided for the registration of land 
with written titles, and therefore excluded the registration of oral transac-
tions to land under customary law (Kasanga and Kotey, 2001; Aryeetey, Aryee 
et al., 2007). The written documents contained ‘technical expressions’ (Zeven-
bergen, 2002: p. 168). Consequently, people had to incur expenses by relying 
on lawyers to draw up transaction documents. The parties acquiring the land 
therefore declined to register their acquisitions, and only those people who 
sought to secure credit from banks, or who preferred greater security of ten-
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ure than they believed could be attained under the customary system, regis-
tered their land. Furthermore, most cadastral plans attached to these deeds 
were improperly surveyed, and were therefore unable to help with the iden-
tification and establishment of boundaries (Zevenbergen, 2002). This led to 
multiple registrations of the same piece of land and a relatively large amount 
of land litigation in state courts. Thus, the Land Registry Act of 1962 and the 
deed registration system failed to achieve what had been intended. 
Land Title Registration
The persistence of the problem of tenure insecurity in land titles and uncer-
tainty of land transactions prepared the ground for radical change. The Land 
Title Registration Law (LTRL), 1986 (PNDCL 152) was enacted to register titles 
to land. The objective of land title registration was to create certainty, facili-
tate proof of title, render dealings in land simple, safe, and cheap, and prevent 
fraud (LTRL, 1986). The LTRL was designed to provide the machinery for com-
pulsory title registration, and to provide for the registration of all interests in 
land, including customary law and common law. Stools, skins and families 
can be registered in the name of a corporate group (Section 110). Other inter-
ests in land that may be registered under the LTRL include usufructs (custom-
ary freehold), freehold, leasehold, customary tenancies, concessions and min-
ing licenses. Under this law, the right of the registered proprietor is indefea-
sible and ‘is held by the proprietor with all privileges and appurtenances at-
tached to it free from all other interests and claim whatsoever’ (Section 43). 
Section 123 of the law also provides for compensation for people who have 
suffered damage as a result of the registration of an interest in land.
The LTRL applies only to areas that have been declared Registration Dis-
tricts by the Minister for Lands and Forestry. The first registration follows a 
systematic adjudication process. According to this, when an area is declared 
a Registration District, the Survey Department prepares a cadastral map 
(sectional maps) for the entire District. In this way, all land within the are-
as affected by the declaration is demarcated and surveyed (Section 5). Within 
14 days, the Chief Registrar must issue notice to claimants of land within the 
area to submit their applications for the first registration (Sittie, 2006). In this 
first registration, unregistered lands or registered instruments under the Land 
Registry Act, 1962 (Act 122) are added to the Land Register. 
The registration of titles in Ghana has been criticised on many grounds. 
First, the need for title registration is contested. According to some crit-
ics (Zevenbergen, 2002), the deed registry’s main drawbacks stem from tech-
nical, organisational and legal aspects of the existing system. According to 
Zevenbergen, some of these problems are obvious flaws that could have been 
repaired gradually, instead of introducing land title registration (Zevenbergen, 
2002). Second, the implementation of the LTRL has also experienced difficul-
ties. One major setback has been the failure to check and convert the infor-
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mation on the registered deed into the provisional titles and register (Zeven-
bergen, 2002; Kuntu-Mensah, 2006; Sittie, 2006). This has discouraged people 
who had registered their documents under the deed system from re-apply-
ing for title registration. It is also argued that in a country where customary 
law over land is predominant, the implementation process should have start-
ed with allodial titles and moved down to the village and individual levels, 
instead of starting with individual certificates (Zevenbergen, 2002). Further-
more, on paper, land title registration was supposed to be compulsory and 
systematic. However, implementation seems to be sporadic. Land title regis-
tration has been very slow; since its inception in 1986, the land title registra-
tion has only covered Accra, Tema and parts of Kumasi. This is partly attrib-
uted to undue delays caused by the fact that cadastral plans can take 3-12 
months to prepare. 
Apart from these design and implementation defects, the LTRL has had a 
number of effects on customary tenure systems and the peri-urban poor. In 
principle, the LTRL recognises that usufructuary rights can be registered. In 
trying to recognise these usufructuary rights, however, the LTRL more or less 
introduces a number of overriding interests, some of which cannot be regis-
tered. For example, usufructuary rights, such as the right to collect fruit and 
forest products, cannot be registered separately. Also, in practice, usufructu-
ary rights are registered as an ‘encumbrance on communal interests’ (Asia-
ma, 2002: p. 28). Consequently, since the inception of land title registration, 
no customary freeholds or tenancies have been registered. 
Furthermore, the LTRL has failed to secure the land rights of poorer and 
more marginal groups. The law’s design does not appear to have been based 
on any deliberate attempt to incorporate the specific needs of poorer groups 
(Dowuona-Hammond, 2003). The technical language used and the other 
standards required cannot be met by the majority of the poor and by illiter-
ates. Although the full cost of the first registration is borne by the state, many 
landholders cannot afford the registration costs. The cost of registering land 
tends to be high in terms of money, time and effort effort6. Applicants have 
to make a number of visits to all of the land sector agencies involved in the 
registration process, including the Land Title Registry, the Lands Commis-
sion, the Land Valuation Board (LVB) and the Survey Department. This creates 
opportunities for the use of middle-men to track the various stages of the 
registration processes. The cumbersome, bureaucratic, time-consuming and 
expensive registration process makes registration unattractive to land users, 
and deters the poor from registering their documents. 
6 By law, all instruments attract stamp duty, which is often based on the value of the property.
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Land surveying and mapping
Another element for controlling customary land management is the require-
ment for land transactions to be surveyed and mapped in accordance with 
the Survey Act, 1962 (Act 127). The Survey Act empowers the Director of Sur-
veys to carry out all aspects of surveying, including cadastral, topographic, 
aerial, engineering, and hydrological surveying. The Act gives the officers of 
the Survey Department the power to go onto any land to conduct surveys. The 
Act also empowers the Director of Surveys to check surveys, to ensure that 
they comply with the requirements specified in the law, and to impose sanc-
tions for non-compliance. 
Act 127 also provides for a system of survey work. This is complemented by 
the Survey (Supervision and Approval of Plans) Regulations, 1989 (LI 1444). Act 
127 and Legislative Instrument (LI) 1444 require that all land allocations, land 
registration and land-use planning activities be preceded by surveying and 
mapping, which should be undertaken by governmental or private surveyors. 
Regardless of whether these surveys are carried out by the government or by 
private licensed surveyors, they have to be approved by the Director of Sur-
veys or his representative at the regional level. The approval of surveys is a 
rigorous process involving site inspections, examinations of field documents 
and computations, and cartographic checks. LI 1444 also specifies technical 
standards and regulates the conduct of surveyors. 
The major problem associated with surveying and mapping process-
es relates to the strict technical requirements and standards for the various 
types of surveys defined by LI 1444. In general, demarcation and surveying in 
Ghana are based on fixed boundary concepts, where the boundaries of land 
are defined by accurately positioned beacons.7 Some of these technical stand-
ards have been constructed using outdated equipment and techniques, and 
therefore need to be revised to commensurate with modern equipment. Strict 
adherence to these technical standards also creates bureaucracy and slows 
the mapping process. The Survey Act 127 requires that base maps for devel-
opment planning are prepared by licensed surveyors, and should be approved 
by the Director of Surveys. However, in most peri-urban areas, this directive 
is not followed, due to lengthy approval processes and the high cost of land 
surveying services. Most often, the customary authorities are too impatient 
to wait until the lengthy approval pro-cess is completed before using a map. 
Consequently, in most cases, customary authorities rely on unlicensed and 
unprofessional surveyors to provide land surveying services. This has resulted 
in many land conflicts and the construction of buildings in unapproved loca-
tions. 
7 In some areas, aerial photos have also been used in mapping.
[ 72 ]
Land-use planning 
A number of laws empower state organisations to control land-use develop-
ments and planning. The Town and Country planning Ordinance, 1945 (Cap. 
84), the Town and Country Planning (Amendment) Act of 1960 (Act 33) and 
the Local Government Act of 1993 (Act 462) provide for the establishment of 
planning authorities and for the supervision, land-use control, preparation 
and implementation of development plans. The Act 462 requires villages and 
towns to draw up land-use planning schemes, aided by the Town and Country 
Planning Department (TCPD) and the District Assemblies (DAs). 
Section 4 (10) of Act 462 provides that no physical development can be car-
ried out without prior approval, in the form of written permit granted by the 
DAs. In addition, the laws require land to be allocated only when the lay-
outs for the allocations have been approved by the DAs who are the planning 
authorities in the given area. Therefore, the preparation and approval of plan-
ning schemes, the granting of planning permission and development permits, 
and enforcement and sanctions all rest with the DAs. However, this regulation 
is only enforced when prospective developers apply for building permits. The 
TCPD department within the DAs then checks whether the site plan conforms 
to the area’s planning scheme. Furthermore, the laws require the DAs to col-
laborate with customary authorities in the planning of customary areas. 
In practice, there is no collaboration between the planning authorities and 
customary communities. In some peri-urban areas, especially in the district 
and regional administrative capitals, where the authorities engage in urban 
planning, there is no community input into the planning processes. In most 
peri-urban customary communities, especially where demand for land is 
very high, customary authorities independently prepare the layout schemes 
by making private arrangements. To be able to raise enough money to offset 
the cost of surveying and planning, customary authorities sometimes allocate 
land to users prior to the approval of the layout schemes. Furthermore, most 
land developers do not seek for approval from the DAs before erecting their 
structures. Most often, developers apply for a permit only when they are sum-
moned to produce a permit. These inefficiencies are attributed to the lack of 
adequate skilled manpower and logistics within the DAs (Kasanga and Kotey, 
2001). 
The institutional framework for administering customary land is shown in 
the activity diagram in Figure 3.1. 
The land acquisition process starts with the customary tenure system and 
moves through to formal institutional processes. This makes land acquisition 
cumbersome, creating management and administrative uncertainties for land 
users. When there are problems in the acquisition processes, landholders are 
uncertain as to which mechanisms they should use to solve them.
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 3.5.3 Organisational framework 
Enabled by the wide array of legislation discussed in Section 3.5.1, the state 
has established a formal administrative framework, consisting of a number 
of land sector agencies, to facilitate a rational LA system. The main institu-
tions involved in LA are the Lands Commission, the Office of Administrator 
of Stool Lands, the Land Title Registry, the Lands Valuation Board and the Sur-
vey Department. These institutions lie under the Ministry of Land and Forest-
ry (MLF). The TCPD, which falls under the Ministry of Environment and Sci-
ence, is another department that provides LA services. Other institutions that 
are more marginally involved in LA include the Metropolitan/Municipal/Dis-
trict Assemblies, the State Courts, and the Traditional Institutions (Tradition-
al Councils and House of Chiefs). The structures of these institutions are dis-
cussed below.
Lands Commission 
Established by the 1992 Constitution of Ghana and under the Lands Commis-
sion Act, 1994 (Act 143), the Lands Commission is the main body that admin-
isters all public and vested lands. The Lands Commission (LC) first came into 
existence following the 1969 Constitution, under the Lands Commission Act 
of 1971 (Act 362). The LC is decentralised, and has offices in all of the ten re-
gions in Ghana.
The duties of the LC, as spelt out in the 1992 Constitution (Article 258), 
include the management of public lands and other lands vested in the Presi-
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dent or the Commission on behalf of the government; the making of recom-
mendations for national policy on land use and capability; and the main-
taining of up-to-date records on public lands. The Commission is therefore 
responsible for advising the government, local government authorities and 
traditional authorities on land policies. The LC also oversees the disposition 
of stool lands and grants consent to them (Constitution of Ghana, 1992). The 
LC is also the central government body responsible for the expropriation of 
land for all public services. In addition, the Commission is responsible for the 
registration of deed documents. 
The dual role assigned to the LC as both an administrative body in charge of 
public land management, and as a regulatory body that grants consent to cus-
tomary land acquisition, has the potential to generate conflict. Conflicts have 
occurred over the extensive compulsory acquisition of land for public use, 
state administrative authority over customary land and communal agitation 
over unused land and low levels of compensation (Aryeetey, Kotey et al., 2007). 
Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands8
The Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands (OASL) was established un-
der the 1994 act of the same name (Act 481). Prior to the 1992 Constitution, 
the OASL functioned as part of the Lands Commission. The OASL is decen-
tralised to district level, and has offices in almost all of the regional capitals 
and several districts. The district offices are mainly revenue-collection points 
where ground rents – annual governmental fees payable on land leases – are 
collected. The main responsibility of the Office is to establish stool/skin land 
accounts, into which the Administrator pays rents, royalties, compensations 
and other revenues, whether these are in the form of income or capital col-
lected on behalf of the respective stool/skin (Article 267 (2) of Constitution of 
Ghana, 1992; Section 2, OASL Act 1994). In addition, the OASL is responsible 
for coordinating with other land sector agencies stools and skins on issues re-
lating to the administration and development of stool/skin lands, including 
the policy framework. 
The OASL is also responsible for disbursing stool/skin land revenues, in 
accordance with a disbursement formula specified by the 1992 Constitution 
and Sections 2 and 8 of the OASL Act of 1994 (Act 481). The disbursement 
formula is as follows: OASL – 10% for administrative expenses;9 stool/skin – 
22.5% for maintenance; Traditional Council – 18%; and the District Assem-
bly – 49.5%. Despite an improvement in the revenue-disbursement formula 
that seems to favour the stools/skins, the OASL has attracted a lot of criti-
8 OASL was established for stool lands, but its functions were later extended to cover skin lands. 
9 Before the 1992 Constitution and under the Lands Commission Act 401, 1980, the disbursement of revenue 
was as follows: the stool/skin – 10%; Traditional Council – 20%; Local Government Council – 60%; and Govern-
ment – 10%.
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cism from traditional authorities, which see it as irrelevant. Chiefs and oth-
er traditional authorities regard the establishment of the OASL as an imposi-
tion. Nevertheless, the state justifies the disbursement on the grounds that it 
is the state that has provided public amenities and infrastructure in custom-
ary areas over the years, not the customary authorities. The OASL can with-
hold payment of any disbursement to a stool/skin if there is a dispute regard-
ing the occupancy of the stool or ownership of the stool lands, or has reason 
to believe that the monies would not be spent responsibly.
Survey Department 
Established by the Survey Act, 1962 (Act 127), the Survey Department is the 
central government department responsible for all surveying and mapping 
in the country, including cadastral, geodetic, topographic and hydrograph-
ical surveys. The Survey Department is responsible for the approval of base 
maps for development planning in all communities, including customary are-
as. The Survey Department maintains regional offices in all of Ghana’s ten re-
gions. The Survey Department has played an instrumental role in the land ti-
tle registration process (Kasanga and Kotey, 2001; Asiama, 2003; Aryeetey, Ko-
tey et al., 2007). Under Section 3 of the Land Title Registration Law, 1986 (PNDC 
152), the Survey Department is responsible for providing sectional maps cov-
ering the declared registration districts and individual site plans. The Sur-
vey Department supervises and endorses all site plans and maps prepared 
by licensed surveyors. However, a lack of equipment and adequate staff has 
slowed the preparation of base maps. This has led to the production of inac-
curate and unreliable maps, which has been cited as a major contributing fac-
tor to multiple land sales, uncontrolled development in urban areas and nu-
merous land disputes in many parts of Ghana (Kasanga and Kotey, 2001). 
Land Title Registry
The Land Title Registry, established under the Land Title Registration Law, 
1986 (PNDCL 152), is responsible for the registration of titles to interests in 
land in a parcel-based registration system. The Land Title Registry is divided 
into the Recording and Receiving Section, the Technical Section, the Records 
Management Section, and the General Administration Section. The Land Title 
Registry has its head office in Accra and two sub-offices in Kumasi and Tema, 
all of which have been covered by land title registration since the system’s in-
ception in 1986. Like the other departments discussed above, the Land Title 
Registry has inadequate human and technical resources. The available tech-
nology in the registry is unable to match current demand for land transac-
tions (Kuntu-Mensah, 2006). 
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Land Valuation Board 
Established in 1986 under Section 43 of the PNDC Proclamation (Supplemen-
tary and Consequential Provisions Law, 1982 (PNDCL 42)), the LVB was charged 
with responsibility for land valuation in Ghana. The Board has regional offic-
es in all regions and in a number of districts in each region. The LVB has over-
sight responsibilities over the private sector, in so far as government interests 
are concerned (Asiama, 2003). The LVB’s main functions as the government’s 
valuer include:
■ determining all matters of compensation for land acquired by the govern-
ment or any of its agencies;
■ preparing valuation lists for property rating purposes; 
■ valuation of interests in land, including all customary land, for the adminis-
tration of stamp duty; and 
■ advising the Lands Commission and the Forestry Commission on royalty 
payments on forestry holding and products. 
Like the other land sector institutions, the LVB lacks qualified and experi-
enced valuers, and sufficient logistics capacity for field operations (Aryeetey, 
Kotey et al., 2007). 
Town and Country Planning Department
The TCPD is one of the departments whose functions are decentralised by the 
Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462) and operates under the MMDAs. Gov-
erned by the Town and Country Planning Department Ordinance, 1945 (Cap 
84), the TCPD is responsible for preparing land-use development planning 
schemes for the country. The National Building Regulations, 1996 (LI 1630) set 
standards for structural and zoning requirements. The TCPD operates at the 
national, regional and district levels. At the regional level, the department is 
responsible for interpreting national policy, developing plans on broad issues 
such as the environment and transportation, and approving layout plans de-
veloped at the district level and forwarding them for approval at the nation-
al level (Asiama, 2003). At the district level, the department is responsible for 
planning, and serves as Secretary to the District Planning Committee. 
Although the TCPD is decentralised to the district level, over the years, the 
TCPD’s activities have focused on urban areas. Consequently, many rural are-
as lack development plans, a situation that has contributed to haphazard 
land development in Ghana. 
Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies 
The local government system is made up of Metropolitan/Municipal/District 
Assemblies (MMDAs), Urban/Zonal/Town/Area councils and Unit Committees. 
The MMDAs were created as a pivot for administrative and developmental de-
cision-making in districts, and are therefore the basic unit of government ad-
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ministration. The governing body of the MMDAs is made up of Chief Execu-
tives, government appointees and Assemblymen. The Chief Executives are 
the heads of local governing councils, who are appointed by the President. As-
semblymen are elected persons representing the towns and villages that con-
stitute the local council. The urban, zonal, town and area councils form a sub-
political administrative structure within the MMDAs. Urban, zonal, town and 
area councils are responsible for the management, implementation and en-
forcement of local policies. Unit Committees are responsible for implement-
ing these policies at the community level (see Figure 3.2). 
The establishment of MMDAs dates back to 1986. Given legal backing by the 
1992 Constitution and the Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462), the MMDAs 
have legislative and executive powers to plan for the overall development 
of districts. With regard to land administration, the MMDAs have legislative 
powers to make by-laws in respect of building, sanitation and the environ-
ment. The preparation and approval of planning schemes, the granting of 
building permits and the enforcement of regulations and sanctions for non-
compliance all rest with the Assemblies (Kasanga and Kotey, 2001). 
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State courts 
The state courts play an essential role in solving disputes of all kinds in cus-
tomary areas, whether these relate to chieftaincies, boundaries, titles, and so 
forth. The state courts thus play a crucial role in ensuring certainty regard-
ing land transactions and titles. There are various levels of court, and there 
are magistrate and high courts in all regions. Nevertheless, the court system 
is confronted with a number of problems that have reduced its effectiveness 
in land dispute resolution and adjudication. Land cases are reported to form 
about 40% of all cases filed in the state courts (Dowuona-Hammond, 2003). 
The state courts are finding it difficult to cope with the volume of disputes, 
resulting in a backlog of unresolved cases. Notwithstanding the large volume 
of cases in the state courts, many land conflicts never even reach the state 
courts. 
Even when some of these land cases are resolved, the courts’ decisions 
seem to have a minimal effect. Some of these cases reappear in the state 
courts for various reasons, including: the inability of the state courts to 
implement their solutions; the inability of the affected parties to agree to the 
court decision; or the nature of the conflicts and their interpretations cre-
ate room for alternative interpretations. This seems to suggest that the state 
law courts are inefficient when dealing with land cases, especially when the 
causes of the conflicts are embedded in chieftaincies over which the courts 
have no jurisdiction (Ubink and Quan, 2008). These issues highlight the need 
for attention to be paid to establishing mechanisms and adopting procedures 
that are not only accessible to those in need of redress, but are also affordable 
for the majority of people. A system of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) 
can be used to complement the state court machinery, and ADR conflict reso-
lution mechanisms have proved to be effective in many instances (FAO, 2006).
Traditional Councils and Houses of Chiefs
In accordance with customary law, the Constitution of Ghana (1992) estab-
lished Traditional Councils (TCs), Regional and National Houses of Chiefs. 
Each TC is made up of Divisional Chiefs and some Sub-chiefs under stools/
skins that exist as paramount areas, with the Paramount Chief as the head. 
The TCs serve as a link between indigenous communities and the DAs. TCs 
are responsible for the welfare and progress of their traditional areas. All de-
velopment matters affecting traditional areas are discussed by the TCs. TCs 
have judicial committees that handle all cases pertaining to land and chief-
taincy disputes, except when these involve the paramount chief. 
The Regional Houses of Chiefs are non-political institutions made up of 
mostly paramount chiefs from the various TCs in the regions. The Regional 
Houses of Chiefs are responsible for resolving all matters related to the nomi-
nation, election, selection, installation or disposition of chiefs, including par-
amount chiefs. The National House of Chiefs is made up of five elected para-
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mount chiefs from each of the ten regions. The National House of Chiefs has 
responsibility for regulating customary law, solving chieftaincy problems and 
gazetting chiefs10. The National House of Chiefs serves as a link between the 
chieftaincy institutions and the central government, parliament and the judi-
ciary, and plays a major role in the governance of the country. The institution 
is represented in the Council of State. The interaction between the statutory 
institutions that manage customary land is shown in Figure 3.3. 
The organisational structure shows that the establishment of the various 
institutions to administer the different aspects of LA in Ghana has resulted in 
the fragmentation of agencies, duplication and overlapping functions. These 
agencies administer different aspects of the LA process and maintain land 
records, but lack appropriate mechanisms for coordination, cooperation and 
consensus. Some of these agencies are engaged in different but complemen-
tary processes relating to a single transaction. For example, in the manage-
ment of vested lands, the operations of the LC and the OASL overlap, while 
the operations of the LVB in relation to assessing rent are duplicated by the 
10 In Ghana, recently appointed paramount chiefs can only be recognised by the state only when their names 
have been placed on the Gazette list for publication at the National House of Chiefs. This process is preceeded by 
the traditional installation process. 
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LC, as well as the Forestry and Mineral Commissions (Asiama, 2003). Oth-
er problems arise due to the dual management responsibilities held by the 
Lands Commission: first as an authority for the management of state lands, 
and second, as the giver of consent and concurrence for stool land transac-
tions. Some of these functions seem to conflict with the managerial functions 
of the customary authorities, as enshrined in the constitution. The conse-
quence is that consent for an allocation of stool land is never sought by chiefs 
(Ubink and Quan, 2008). Only lessees who wish to formalise their acquisitions 
seek concurrence from the LC, which is a highly bureaucratic and complex 
process. 
 3.6 The Land Administration Project and institu-
tional reforms 
The Land Administration Project (LAP) is a multi-donor assisted project that 
seeks to restructure LA in Ghana. The project was designed as a 15-year 
project of LA reform, beginning with a five-year pilot phase running from Oc-
tober 2003 to 2008 (World Bank, 2003). The LAP seeks to address the princi-
ples presented in the NLP of 1999, which emphasise stimulating economic de-
velopment, reducing poverty, promoting social stability by improving security 
of land tenure, simplifying the process for accessing land and making it fair, 
transparent and efficient, developing the land market and fostering prudent 
land management (Ministry of Lands and Forestry, 1999). The LAP is the first 
phase in the LA reform project, which lays the foundations for the implemen-
tation of long-term (15-25 years) LA reform. A major feature of the LAP is its 
role in providing an enabling environment for exploration, testing and learn-
ing by doing. The goals of the programme include: 
Enhancing economic and social growth by improving security of tenure, simplifying the 
process of acquiring land, developing the land market and fostering prudent land man-
agement by establishing an efficient system of land titling, registration and administra-
tion based on clear, coherent and consistent policies and laws supported by appropriate 
institutional structures (World Bank, 2003: p. 102). 
The LAP has four components (World Bank, 2003):
■ the harmonisation of land policies and the legislative framework with cus-
tomary law, for sustainable land administration; 
■ institutional reform and development;
■ improving land titling, registration, land use planning and valuation; and 
■ project management, monitoring and evaluation.
The long-term programme aims at: clarifying customary land holding, foster-
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ing links to land-use planning, encouraging active participation and engage-
ment with customary land owners in decision-making, clarifying the roles de-
fined for the land sector agencies, and fostering coordination and coopera-
tion among the land sector agencies, DAs, customary authorities and the pri-
vate sector (World Bank, 2003). The Customary Land Secretariat (CLS) and the 
New Lands Commission are the two main institutional reforms that have tak-
en place in the LAP.
The Customary Land Secretariat (CLS)
The goal of the programme establishing the CLS is to ‘lay the foundations 
for a clearer and more cohesive development in the customary land admin-
istration sphere and for its further consolidation and evolution in subse-
quent land administration projects’ (World Bank, 2003: p. 47). To achieve this, 
the CLS aims to help customary authorities to improve and develop custom-
ary land administration. In the long-term, the CLS will ‘provide effective land 
management harmonised with government land agencies and district assem-
blies, so as to establish unified, decentralised public record of land availabil-
ity, use and transactions’ (Ubink and Quan, 2008: p. 205). This is to promote 
confidence-building between customary authorities and the government, es-
pecially to improve trust in the manner in which DAs utilise revenues gener-
ated by stool and skin lands. 
Institutionally, in some areas, the CLSs are established as centralised sec-
retariats modelled on the customary institutional framework of the area in 
question (Asantehene’s Land Secretariat and the Gbawe-Kwatei Family Land 
Secretariat). In others, village land allocation committees or similar institu-
tions have emerged as the administrative authority, under the aegis of the 
local chief or family head. In all of these set-ups, the aim is to increase the 
accountability of traditional authorities to their constituent land holders 
(World Bank, 2003). Among other things, CLSs also aim to assist communi-
ty members to resolve disputes, adopt simple land-use planning procedures, 
develop landholding rules, and establish simple registries to record land allo-
cations. 
Since 2004, a number of pilot CLSs have been established. These CLSs oper-
ate either at a stool level under a paramount chief, or under the land-own-
ing families. Thirty-eight land secretariats had been established in all ten 
regions as of 2009, when the pilot phase of the programme ended. The imple-
mentation of the CLSs has encountered a number of challenges. In some cas-
es, the computers and other office equipment provided were not appropriate, 
and the draft guidelines needed more discussion (Aryeetey, Ayee et al., 2007). 
According to the LAP’s project management, monitoring and evaluation sec-
tion, the biggest challenge has been the implementation of the project as a 
mainstream activity in both 2004 and 2005 (Ministry of Lands and Forestry, 
2005). The report notes that the use of the same staff members carrying out 
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the statutory mandates of the agencies are expected to drive the LAP activ-
ities within the strict requirement of project implementation; the demand 
inconsistent with mainstreaming. 
The new Lands Commission 
In order to fulfil the LAP’s objective of reforming and developing land sector 
institutions, the Lands Commission Act, 2008 (Act 767) was introduced. Act 
767 establishes a new Lands Commission, which merges all five land sector 
agencies in a single administrative unit. The new Lands Commissions thus 
have five divisions: Surveying and Mapping (formerly the Survey Depart-
ment); Land Registration (which combines the former land title registry and 
deeds registry); Land Valuation (Formerly the LVB); Public and Vested Lands 
Management (activities carried out by the former Lands Commission); and 
any other divisions that the Commission may decide to create. The Commis-
sion, which came into force during the last quarter of 2009, is entrusted with 
functions that include (Lands Commission Act, 2008 (Act 767), Section (5)):
■ advising the government, local authorities and traditional authorities on 
the policy framework for the development of land in Ghana;
■ formulating recommendations on national policy with respect to land-use 
sustainability;
■ advising and assisting with respect to the execution of comprehensive land 
title registration throughout the country; and 
■ ensuring sustainable land-use planning. 
While the objective of achieving coordination and synchronisation in the de-
livery of LA services is clear and commendable, combining all of the land sec-
tor agencies in one single administrative unit is likely to lead to problems. 
The agencies have entrenched identities, and any such change is likely to 
cause disruption (Karikari et al., 2005). 
 3.7 Concluding remarks
This chapter has given an overview of the legal framework of LA in Ghana. It 
has examined the different legal, institutional and organisational structures 
in peri-urban areas and, in particular, the interaction and areas of overlap be-
tween customary systems and statutory structures. The purpose was to dis-
cuss how, the extent to which and with what objectives government policies 
have sought to regulate customary tenure, and to analyse how the current 
framework of administering land in Ghana supports or inhibits the adminis-
tration of customary land at the local level. This helps to highlight the chal-
lenges that need to be tackled when adapting LA to the institutional frame-
work of customary tenure. 
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The analysis shows that Ghana has broad institutional and legal frame-
works for LA. It has been described as a country with a comprehensive land 
policy that recognises customary tenure in LA (Deininger, 2003). However, the 
orientation in current policy interventions still follows colonial models. The 
trend in the administration of LA is towards replacement, rather than adap-
tation to existing customary practice. The De Soto approach to land tenure 
formalisation has been the main driving force of the land tenure reform pro-
grammes in the country, with its emphasis on land title registration as the 
sole means of securing rights. Furthermore, both colonial and post-coloni-
al land policy interventions introduced legal and institutional changes that 
restrict customary land management in several ways. These policies appro-
priate vested customary land for the state, restrict the management of reve-
nues from customary land, and impose state institutions on indigenous insti-
tutions. The state land management machinery continues to be the main 
instrument for pursuing the formalisation and administration of customary 
land. In addition, ad hoc legal and institutional arrangements have generat-
ed complexities in the Ghanaian LAS. Having too many regulations and bad-
ly coordinated institutions result in delays, high transaction costs and tenure 
insecurity. 
In the present situation, ambiguities and misunderstandings tend to dom-
inate discussions on the appropriate way to securing tenure relations and 
design LASs in Ghana. Large parts of the current debate among stakeholders 
stem from misunderstandings concerning the dynamics of land tenure rela-
tions in customary areas, the need for pro-poor policies to secure land, and 
the need for community participation and the empowerment of local insti-
tutions to manage their land. Although the policy reforms recognise tenure 
insecurity as a major problem in the LAS and seek to address it, the policies 
seem to lack a clear pro-poor vision. For instance, the NLP document fails 
to address how to protect the land rights of vulnerable groups, such as ten-
ants, migrant farmers, women, young people and low-income groups (Ary-
eetey, Ayee et al., 2007). The vision of extending land title registration across 
the country, and the continuing use of technocratic approaches in various 
aspects of the LA process, rather than simple and innovative tools, tend to 
exclude the poor. 
The LAP, which establishes CLSs, seems to support the objective of decen-
tralising customary land administration to the local level. However, the vari-
ous policies and institutional arrangements that prevent the CTIs from inde-
pendently carrying out LA activities have not been modified. A new legal 
framework will be needed to effectively adapt LA to the institutional frame-
work of customary tenure. Furthermore, this new land reform framework 
pays little attention to analysing the institutional capacity of CTIs to effec-
tively administer land.
In the next chapter, the requirements and the framework for design-
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ing LASs in peri-urban customary areas will be analysed. This analysis will 
be based on observations made in the legal and institutional framework for 
administering land in Ghana and the formalisation strategies outlined in 
Chapter 2. 
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 4  Requirements and frame-




The preceding chapters offered a historical overview and analysis of the ap-
proaches that have been adopted to formalise rights and administer custom-
ary land in Sub-Saharan Africa (Chapter 2) and Ghana (Chapter 3). In these 
Chapters, it became clear that in an attempt to create tenure security in cus-
tomary areas, governments have sought to individualise customary rights 
and regulate the social norms and values of customary tenure with statuto-
ry regulatory frameworks. This approach reflects the ideological assumptions 
that underpin replacement formalisation models. In practice, these approach-
es have led to social and economic conflict, and to many tenure insecurity 
problems in LA in customary areas (Section 2.4). In addition, from the debate 
on formalisation in Chapter 2, it was observed that there is a need to support 
a wide range of tenure forms and incorporate the social dimensions of tenure, 
in order to effectively address tenure insecurity problems in customary are-
as. These requirements have led to a new trend, based on adaptation formal-
isation strategies, in which alternatives for administering customary land are 
grounded in local customary institutions (Section 2.3.4). The argument is that 
customary tenure systems are dynamic and adaptable to change, and thus se-
curing land rights can be achieved gradually at the local level. Most of these 
adaptation models are implemented in the form of a hybrid system, in which 
tasks and responsibilities in LA are shared between the state and CTIs. 
It has been acknowledged that formalising rights and incorporating the 
social dimensions of customary tenure into formal LASs is a complex under-
taking. It is complex in the sense that a critical system analysis is needed in 
order to meet all of the diverse needs of the people and the local land rights 
associated with it, and to create a suitable institutional framework that can 
adequately administer these rights. Addressing these complexities in peri-
urban environments is even more complicated. Several LA issues highlight-
ed in Section 1.4 and Section 2.2.2 indicate that peri-urban customary areas 
are characterised by a rapidly-changing tenure environment. Alternative and 
innovative LASs are thus needed in order to respond to this particular chal-
lenge. Identifying the distinctive characteristics of institutional arrangements 
will help us to design a more effective and efficient system for administering 
customary rights in peri-urban areas, and developing a general framework is 
an important step towards doing so. 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse LA requirements and to devel-
op a framework for designing LASs for peri-urban customary areas. The key 
requirements for designing alternative LASs to address the major issues 
affecting LA functions and processes in peri-urban areas are discussed in Sec-
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tion 4.2. A conceptual framework for designing LASs for peri-urban areas is 
discussed in Section 4.3. The framework examines three priority issues that 
should be considered when designing LASs for peri-urban areas: the dynam-
ics of tenure and institutional arrangements; good land governance; and 
indigenous knowledge and institutional capacity enhancement. A brief sum-
mary in Section 4.4 concludes the chapter. 
 4.2 Key requirements for designing a land 
  administration system for peri-urban 
  customary areas 
The literature identifies the important requirements for establishing well-
functioning LASs as: simplicity, accuracy, timeless, security, clarity, fairness, 
accessibility, cost effectiveness, sustainability, expedition, acceptability and 
good governance (Simpson, 1976; FIG, 1995; UN-ECE, 1996; Dale and McLaugh-
lin, 1999; Williamson et al., 2010). These requirements are general and applica-
ble to all LASs, regardless of the environments in which they are established. 
Apart from these requirements, effective and sustainable mechanisms for se-
curing tenure and administering land in peri-urban customary areas must 
satisfy six other key requirements, namely: adaptability, flexibility, upgrade-
ability, affordability, legitimacy and credibility of institutions, and good land 
governance. The choice of these key requirements draws on the literature 
on the characteristics of customary tenure systems, the debates on the for-
malisation strategies and good land governance introduced in Chapter 2, and 
the realities of the framework for administering land in Ghana discussed in 
Chapter 3. In the following paragraphs, I offer a general description of these 
requirements and explain the reasons for selecting them. The requirements 
are summarised in Table 4.1. 
 4.2.1 Adaptability 
The ability to respond and adapt to change is an important requirement for 
LA (Williamson and Ting, 2001). Nevertheless, one of the main criticisms of 
the replacement and other market-based formalisation strategies is that they 
are based on western concepts of tenure, which are foreign to customary ten-
ure systems and cannot be adapted to them (Migot-Adholla and Bruce, 1994; 
Platteau, 2000; Toulmin and Quan, 2000; Kanji et al., 2002; Mathieu et al., 2003; 
Cotula and Chauveau, 2007; Quan, 2008; Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi, 2009; Nk-
wae and Dumba, 2009). It is generally acknowledged that LA models cannot 
be transplanted from place to place (Deininger, 2003). The adaptability of LA 
to local situations and conditions should therefore be a core principle of de-
signing LASs in peri-urban areas. 
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As discussed in Chapter 2, customary land tenure is diverse and unique, 
reflecting the cultures, attitudes, governance, environment, and social stabil-
ity of the areas. Adaptability in the design of LASs for peri-urban areas should 
be addressed through the use of unique approaches that are sensitive to local 
issues and tailored to local customs and norms. The tools used to adminis-
ter rights should thus be designed with the operation of customary ten-
ure arrangements in mind. It may not be necessary to adopt every aspect of 
the indigenous arrangements. However, adopting some of the practical and 
proactive elements of the tenure and institutional arrangements of custom-
ary tenure systems would seem appropriate. This may require a critical exam-
ination of local tenurial and institutional arrangements in the administration 
of land rights. 
This study emphasises two important aspects of adaptation: first, adapta-
tion to the dynamics of tenure, and second, adaptation to local institutional 
arrangements relating to customary land delivery. In the former, adaptability 
means that the procedures and processes for administering land rights must 
accommodate the actual dynamics of tenure and changing societal needs. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, customary tenure systems are under threat in peri-
urban areas, mostly from population increases and the general transition 
from more traditional systems of tenure to the modern social, economic and 
political order. The LASs designed for these areas need to be sensitive to these 
threats and patterns of tenure change. At some stage of the tenure evolution, 
it may be necessary to secure group rights, while at another stage, individual 
rights may need to be secured. Adaptability to these changing needs and ten-
ure dynamics may demand that the formalisation approach is executed in a 
gradual and incremental manner, not as a massive, one-off effort (Sjaastad 
and Cousins, 2009). 
Adaptation to existing institutional arrangements requires formalisation to 
be based on local institutional arrangements for accessing land. The use of 
local institutional frameworks for allocating land rights and solving disputes 
may be crucial. This may also mean that LASs may have to be based on a vari-
ety of institutional frameworks, at different levels, whether these are those of 
the family, clan or village, depending on the institutional structure of the cus-
tomary area. When LA can be adapted to the framework of customary ten-
ure systems, the group can decide which rights need to be recorded. In addi-
tion, this allows local mechanisms for allocating these rights and solving con-
flicts related to such allocations to be used. Customary land rights registra-
tion (PFR) in Benin (Section 2.3.4) and decentralised registration and certifi-
cation in Ethiopia (Section 2.3.5) are both examples of innovative land tenure 
tools that have embraced the principle of adaptability.
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 4.2.2 Flexibility 
In view of the arguments advanced by advocates of the various formalisation 
strategies in Section 2.3, it can be seen that flexibility plays a crucial role in 
the arrangements for administering land rights in peri-urban customary ar-
eas. Other scholars have used flexibility to justify a shift in focus from a re-
placement paradigm in LA to adaptation formalisation strategies (Österberg, 
2002; Fitzpatrick, 2005; Nkwae, 2006). As discussed in Chapters 1, 2 and 3, con-
ventional LASs are often based on rigorous, top-down legal, institutional and 
technical procedures. These arrangements make it difficult to implement LA 
in a ‘flexible customary tenure’ environment, where tenure systems are dy-
namic, and the technical, human and financial capacities of tenure institu-
tions are inadequate and unable to cope with rigid rules. Flexible legal, in-
stitutional and technical arrangements are therefore crucial when designing 
LASs for peri-urban customary areas, and these are discussed below. 
Legal flexibility
The main function of a LAS is to protect the rights that people have in land 
and property (Dale and McLaughlin, 1999). The details and structure of the 
laws regulating land rights are therefore important (Bogaerts, 1999). As dis-
cussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the legal framework for administering rights in 
conventional LASs is based on rigid statutory laws. Having a rigid legal frame-
work makes it difficult to administer land in a customary tenure environment, 
where social norms and values control tenure relations. To effectively secure 
tenure and administer land in peri-urban customary areas, there should be 
flexibility in the legal arrangements. The term ‘legal flexibility’ has been used 
by scholars to mean the development of a variety of legal systems, to ensure 
fair assessment of compensation for expropriations of customary land (Nk-
wae, 2006). In this study, legal flexibility means that LASs should be adaptable 
to various customary laws and also to some aspects of statutory law. 
Customary law varies from place to place, as do tenure systems. There-
fore having a flexible legal framework also means, being able to adapt to an 
area’s specific customary laws. Legal flexibility also means that legal recog-
nition of customary rights and land registration should not alter the existing 
rights in customary land, but record them as they exist (Österberg, 2002). The 
laws should be flexible enough to allow the local communities to determine 
the level of rights to be recorded or registered (collective, usufructuary, tenan-
cy and other contractual arrangements). Most importantly since many inter-
ests that co-exist in customary land change over time in response to chang-
ing conditions, there should be flexible policies and laws that can accommo-
date diverse land tenure models within this process of evolution. The legal 
framework should thus be sufficiently flexible to recognise the continuum of 
rights that may arise during the tenure evolution. 
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Institutional flexibility
Conventional LASs are based on standardised and rigid institutional arrange-
ments, which involve several investigative and approval-related steps based 
on statutory law. Applying these rigid institutional arrangements in a cus-
tomary tenure environment, where access to land rights and land manage-
ment are based on negotiation and local knowledge (Amanor, 2008), would 
seem problematic. A flexible institutional infrastructure is required to imple-
ment LA in such a complex and dynamic environment, and this should there-
fore be an important requirement for the design of LASs for peri-urban are-
as. In a customary tenure environment where socio-cultural norms, practices 
and indigenous knowledge govern access to land, the response to formal in-
stitutional requirements that are based on rigid statutory specifications and 
rules becomes complex, and may be well beyond the skills and capabilities of 
many local communities in customary areas (Mathieu et al., 2003; Meinzen-
Dick and Mwangi, 2009). Thus, it is important for unconventional tools to be 
used in approaches towards securing rights and administering land in cus-
tomary areas (Van der Molen, 2006b). Flexible institutional arrangements are 
needed to allow for the use of low-cost, innovative and unconventional tools 
in LA processes. Institutional flexibility means adopting flexible procedures 
for administering customary rights, by taking a ‘snapshot’ of local practices 
for accessing and allocating land. Furthermore, flexibility in institutional ar-
rangements also implies allowing a variety of non-conflicting institutions, 
both formal and informal, to undertake various responsibilities in the LA 
process, and allowing new roles and responsibilities to be incorporated, when 
and where necessary. 
Technical flexibility
It has been recognised that information has to meet certain standards in or-
der to be transparent and reliable (Steudler, 2004). Conventional LA, and in 
particular cadastral systems, is based on certain standards, which in most 
cases exclude non-standardised information from playing a role in LA. Con-
sidering the general situation in customary areas, and in particular the hu-
man and financial resource constraints and the variability in land values in 
different areas, it is vital to have flexible technical standards for administer-
ing rights. For example, it may be important to rely on different data sources; 
one LA system might combine sketch maps and satellite imagery with rigid 
survey data. Technical flexibility means that there should not be strict adher-
ence to conventional technical standards for administering rights. Flexibility 
in technical specifications will allow for the use of these different types of da-
ta and information quality. It means that there should also be a compromise 
between standards of accuracy and the socio-economic objectives of design-
ing LASs for these areas. 
Achieving flexible technical arrangements may seem complex from an 
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information system development point of view, as it may be affected by het-
erogeneity and interoperability problems (De Vries and Lewis, 2009). How-
ever, such problems can be solved with the aid of technical tools (Ezigba-
like et al., 1995). More importantly, however, flexibility in technical specifica-
tions and standards will reduce the cost of demarcation, surveying, and map-
ping, recording and registration, the adjudication of rights, and conflict res-
olution. Having flexible legal, institutional and technical arrangements, for 
example, is the basic principle of Botswana’s COR and decentralised certifica-
tion in Ethiopia. Flexible legal, institutional and technical arrangements allow 
programmes to be adapted to suit local conditions and reduce costs (Durand-
Lasserve, 2006; Deininger et al., 2008). 
 4.2.3 Upgradeability 
As discussed in Chapter 2, in customary systems, rights to land and natural 
resources often form complex sets of individual and collective rights at dif-
ferent levels and exist as ‘bundles of rights’ (Platteau, 2000; Meinzen-Dick and 
Mwangi, 2009; Delville, 2010). While some of these rights are for temporal use, 
others can be enjoyed over the lifetimes of the landholders (Cotula, 2007). Dif-
ferent use rights may also emerge at different times, as a result of tenure evo-
lution. A range of authors and agencies (Arko-Adjei, 2001; UN-HABITAT, 2004; 
Fitzpatrick, 2005; Benjaminsen et al., 2009) advocate an alternative solution 
based on locally-based systems, which provide temporal and partial – rather 
than full – rights to these ‘bundles of rights’. 
In peri-urban customary areas, it should be possible for the system for 
administering rights to evolve to provide alternative solutions, which pro-
vide partial interests that can progressively be upgraded in accordance with 
the changing needs of individuals and the group, thus reflecting the dynam-
ics of tenure. Upgradeability of tenure and rights should therefore be seen as 
an integral part of the requirements for designing LA in peri-urban custom-
ary areas. Upgradeability will help LASs achieve the objective of securing a 
continuum of rights that can cut across all tenures, and that can cater for dif-
ferent categories of land-users at different times (UN-HABITAT, 2004;2008). 
Upgradeability of rights is a characteristic feature of the flexible tenure sys-
tem in Namibia (Christensen, 2005) and COR in Botswana (Durand-Lasserve, 
2006), both of which are targeted to the needs of the urban poor, particular-
ly those in informal settlements (see Section 2.3). The provision of partial 
and provisional titles, and the possible upgrading of these titles, can preserve 
social links within communities, give communities time to adapt (Durand-
Lasserve, 2006) and reduce costs. Such arrangements can also help to produce 
alternative rights for various different groups in customary areas, and ensure 
that indigenous members of the group do not lose their rights.
Nevertheless, since the objective of the adaptation tenure model is to pro-
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tect all rights and preserve social links in customary systems, upgrading 
should emphasise improving tenure security in a way that does not cause the 
bundle of rights to disintegrate, especially when the bundle is stable. In oth-
er words, measures should be taken to avoid making some rights stronger 
than others. Tenure upgradeability also leads to institutional upgradeability. 
This means that systems need to be designed in such a way that it is possible 
to upgrade institutional arrangements to meet tenure upgrading objectives. 
For example, while no special arrangements may be needed to secure tenure 
during the early stages of tenure evolution, over time, it may be necessary to 
upgrade institutional arrangements in line with new demand and standards. 
However, at this point, it may be necessary to undertake thorough assess-
ments to determine the answers to questions such as, ‘when it is appropriate 
to upgrade tenure’, ‘who determines the appropriate time’ and ‘under what 
conditions should tenure be upgraded’? 
 4.2.4 Affordability and pro-poor objectives
Several scholars and international bodies emphasise cheapness and afford-
ability as crucial factors that determine the success of conventional LASs 
(Simpson, 1976; FIG, 1995; Deininger, 2003). These publications emphasise the 
need for measures that ensure cost recovery. In particular, they recommend 
that in order to avoid overburdening land users, costs should be recovered in 
such a way that development costs should not be absorbed by land users (FIG, 
1995). One World Bank report recommends that tools used for administering 
rights should be free from costs that result from technical and legal compli-
cations (Deininger, 2003). This means that activity cost transactions (Chim-
hamhiwa et al., 2009) – the cost of carrying out the formalisation activities – 
should be minimal. This can be achieved by adopting different mechanisms 
to minimise the operational cost for identifying and recording land transac-
tions. For example, the operational cost of surveying and registration can be 
reduced by implementing simplified procedures (Sjaastad and Cousins, 2009).
Yet, one of the main criticisms of market-based formalisation approach-
es is the high cost involved in securing rights in land, which gives a com-
parative advantage to the rich (see Section 2.3.2). Obviously, expensive sys-
tems of securing rights in peri-urban areas will not be effective, because they 
are not used and do not benefit many people who are below the poverty line 
(Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi, 2009). This makes affordability and the need for 
pro-poor objectives critical, and an important requirement in the design of 
LASs for peri-urban customary areas. 
When designing LASs for peri-urban areas, the principle of affordabili-
ty should lead to an emphasis on the use of simple and innovative tools to 
define rights in ways that facilitate the identification and exchange of land 
at a cost that is low and affordable for all. Using simple and innovative tools 
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that are easily comprehended by land users can reduce or remove the cost 
implications from the technical and legal complexities, allows customary ten-
ure institutions to be self-financing, and ensures sustainability (Deininger, 
2003). The need to use innovative and pro-poor land tools to secure tenure 
has been highlighted by several publications and projects undertaken by the 
UN-HABITAT Global Land Tool Network (UN-HABITAT, 2003;2004;2008). 
 4.2.5 Institutional legitimacy and credibility 
One important issue that has featured prominently in debates about formal-
isation and decentralisation in LA (Chapters 2 and 3) is that of the legitima-
cy and credibility of the implementing institutions. As discussed in Section 
2.3.1, in conventional LASs, it is perceived that an effective provision of ten-
ure security can only be achieved within state-organised institutional frame-
works (Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi, 2009). However, state institutions to en-
force property rights are not available in all areas, particularly in many rural 
and peri-urban customary areas. Even if they are available, the potential ad-
vantages brought by these institutions are unlikely to materialise when they 
are unable to understand and interpret tenure issues that relate to local cul-
tural norms and values (see Chapter 3), or lack legitimacy in local communi-
ties. Instead, they create ‘a vacuum that often lead to power struggles at the 
local level’ (Deininger, 2003: p. 163). 
Based on these observations, one can note that although institutions 
responsible for administering customary land require adequate legal back-
ing (Deininger, 2003), and the use of state institutions may be important, 
the social legitimacy and credibility of these institutions are equally impor-
tant. The notion of institutional legitimacy is a central concept underpinning 
adaptation models (Section 2.3.4). The legitimacy and credibility of the imple-
menting institutions is important, because the ability to enforce land rights 
depends on the ease with which rights holders can access the required insti-
tutions and obtain legally binding decisions from them (Deininger, 2003). 
The formalisation of rights and the administration of land in peri-urban 
customary areas should therefore put emphasis on credible institutions that 
enjoy local and social legitimacy and support (Deininger, 2003; Lund, 2006). 
Social legitimacy and credibility are important, due to the danger of creating 
‘empty institutions’ rather than ‘credible institutions’ (Ho, 2009: p. 8). Empty 
institutions are those that, despite having legal recognition, tend to be inef-
fective because they do not enjoy social recognition. Particularly in areas 
where there are many potential sources of land-related conflict, due to tenure 
transition, these institutions should not only have the power to rule over con-




 4.2.6 Good land governance 
Chapters 1, 2 and 3, we discussed that though there are internal mechanisms 
that ensure ‘good’ governance in traditional societies, a number of issues re-
lated to ‘bad’ land governance in current approaches to accessing land and 
administering land rights in customary systems have been observed. Specifi-
cally, these issues relate to the accessibility of land, forced eviction, diminish-
ing stewardship and abuse of power by customary authorities, lack of trans-
parency in the land delivery processes, lack of participation by community 
members in decision-making, supremacy of custom and usage, a lack of ac-
countability, the inequitable distribution of land resources, and inefficiencies 
in customary land management. These issues indicate that it is important to 
include good land governance as a requirement in the framework for design-
ing LASs for peri-urban areas.
Current trends in land administration practice and research indicate that 
good land governance is directly linked to tenure security, sustainable devel-
opment and poverty reduction (FAO, 2007; Deininger et al., 2010; Williamson 
et al., 2010). A more detailed framework on assessing land governance in cus-
tomary tenure institutions in peri-urban areas is provided in Section 4.4.2.
 4.3 Conceptual framework of the study 
This study investigates how we can design LASs in peri-urban areas that can 
be adapted to the dynamics of tenure and to the institutional frameworks of 
customary tenure. In doing so, I explore the links between the underlying the-
ories of customary tenure systems, LASs, good land governance and the real-
ities of the framework for administering land in Ghana. These links are sum-
marised in the conceptual framework presented in Figure 4.1.
The conceptual framework contains three levels of analysis: 
1. A multi-level demand analysis to determine the requirements for designing 
LASs in peri-urban areas (Figure 4.1 (Level 1)). This theoretical analysis is 





Affordability and pro-poor objectives
Institutional legitimacy and credibility 
Good land governance
Requirements
LA should be adaptable to changing needs, the dynamics of tenure and to 
the local institutional framework of customary land tenure. 
Legal, institutional and technical arrangements should be flexible to allow 
for different customary laws, data types and technical standards for 
administering land. 
Provision must be made to secure temporary or partial rights in land that 
can be upgraded along a continuum of rights. It should be possible to 
upgrade the institutional arrangements along the continuum. 
Cost of securing rights must be affordable for all social groups. LA should 
emphasise the use of innovative tools that are easily understandable and 
free of technical and legal costs. 
The institutions responsible for administering land should not only have 
the legal power, but also the local and social legitimacy to implement all 
decisions related to land. 
Land governance must emphasise active participation by community 
members in decision-making relating to the use of their land, in order to 
enhance equity, transparency, accountability and efficiency.
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presented in Section 4.2;
2. A multi-level institutional capability analysis of customary tenure systems, 
to determine whether or not it is feasible to adapt LA to the institutional 
framework of customary tenure. This supply analysis involves an analysis 
of the dynamics of tenure and local land management capability analysis 
(see Figure 4.1 (Level 2)); 
3. The development of strategies for designing LASs based on the institutional 
framework of customary tenure (see Figure 4.1 (Level 3)). 
In the following paragraphs, I examine three aspects of customary tenure sys-
tems that are central to the question of whether it is feasible to adapt LA to 
the institutional framework of customary tenure. These are: (1) an analysis of 
the dynamics of tenure; (2) the good land governance assessment; and (3) IK 
and the local capacity for LA. These three issues were identified in Section 1.5 
on ‘problem definition’. 
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 4.3.1 Dynamics of tenure and institutions
As discussed in the introduction and in Chapter 2, customary tenure sys-
tems constantly adapt and change in response to the prevailing conditions. 
These changes can be caused by factors such as population growth, urbanisa-
tion and colonial legislative influences. Customary tenure systems have their 
own mechanisms of adapting to specific conditions. Kalabamu (2000) explains 
that some aspects of tenure practices that are out of step with the prevailing 
conditions are dropped, while others are maintained. As explained in Section 
2.2.2, the ways in which customary tenure systems respond to such chang-
es vary substantially according to context. In general, however, the dynamics 
of customary tenure are manifested in tenurial practices and the institution-
al framework of the land delivery process. This study assumes that it is im-
portant to explore and understand the dynamics of customary tenure and the 
uniqueness of the environment. Therefore, the dynamics of customary tenure 
are taken as the point of departure. 
In the analysis of the dynamics of customary tenure, two main aspects are 
investigated: first, tenure and second, institutional arrangements (see Fig-
ure 4.1 (Level 2)). The former investigates how the various aspects of tenure, 
including ownership, use rights, modes of transferring land rights, and land 
use practices, change over time. In the latter, emphasis is placed on how the 
institutional arrangements for accessing and managing land, including land 
allocation processes, conflict resolution mechanisms, and the socio-politi-
cal governance structure, adapt to changes in tenure. These two aspects will 
help us to understand the dynamics of diverse people-to-land relationships 
and the need to incorporate them in LA. Furthermore, it will also help us to 
understand which aspects of tenure are sustainable and can be protected, 
and which aspects of customary institutional arrangements can be adapted 
or enhanced.
 4.3.2 Good land governance 
In Section 4.2.6, a number of key issues related to land governance in peri-ur-
ban areas were discussed. Importantly, these help us to identify which land 
governance dimensions will be critical when designing LASs for peri-urban 
areas. Acknowledging that others may also play important roles, it is essential 
to consider five dimensions – participation, equity, transparency, accounta-
bility, and efficiency and effectiveness – in any thorough assessment of land 
governance in customary tenure institutions. This choice was based on the 
following factors: 
■ the dimensions selected were found to be common to what is considered as 
good governance in LA; 
■ they are related to key issues of critical importance in customary land 
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delivery in peri-urban areas; and
■ to some extent, these dimensions overlap and ensure that a wider spec-
trum of governance issues is considered. 
The following paragraphs discuss the characteristics of the selected govern-
ance dimensions, and are summarised in Table 4.2.
Participation 
Participation requires that all people have a voice in decision-making, ei-
ther directly or through legitimate institutions that represent their interests 
(Kaufmann et al., 2007). Participation entails consultation, cooperation and 
collaboration, representativeness and interactive approaches to decision-
making, and is built on freedom of association and speech (Kaufmann et al., 
2007). Participation creates representation, which is a key indicator of em-
powerment, and hence the extent to which people have a voice on issues that 
affect their future (Blair, 2000). Participation in customary land delivery leads 
to improved accountability, reduction of conflicts, more flexible and efficient 
land management, increased legitimacy, the potential for the better use of 
place-specific knowledge, and so forth. 
Many recent attempts to decentralise LA have had limited success, partly 
because they have failed to give a voice to local communities and have not 
allowed them to effectively articulate their demands (Deininger, 2003). Land-
holders tend to ignore many statutory restrictions and decisions in which 
they play no part. In the customary land delivery process, several people have 
a stake in decision-making on the use of land, and community participation 
should be seen as an integral part of good land governance assessment. Com-
munity participation in LA is cited as important for promoting group mem-
bers’ sense of ownership, and the collective need to safeguard heritage and 
ensure sustainable land usage (Dorner, 1972). 
Any assessment of participation in LASs for peri-urban areas should 
address membership composition, selection procedures, and the level of 
diversity in the representation of interest groups. Effective participation in 







Governance assessment determinant 
The various groups in customary areas should be represented. Community 
members should be involved in decision-making processes. CTIs should 
collaborate with professional institutions in the administration of land.
Land should be accessible to all community members, male and female. Access 
to information, tenure security and land dispute resolution should not be handled 
in a discriminatory manner. Measures should be put in place to ensure access to 
land for future generations. 
Institutions and land information should be accessible. Decision-making 
processes should be open to all stakeholders in customary land. Customary laws 
should be clear to all community members.
CTIs should regularly report on their stewardship to community members by 
responding to questions, explaining actions and providing evidence of what they 
have been entrusted to do.
Procedures for allocating land must be clear and simple. Customary laws should 
be implemented well. Adequate mechanisms must be provided to ensure 
certainty and security of tenure. Adequate human resources capacity is needed to 
ensure the efficient and effective administration of tenure.
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the customary land delivery process would entail diversity in the composition 
of participants in decision-making, as well as the inclusion of highly-skilled 
facilitators who have knowledge of the process. The subgroups within land-
owning groups, gender groups and other stakeholders should be well-repre-
sented in the decision-making process. CTIs should collaborate with profes-
sional institutions in the land delivery process. An approach that involves 
consultation, cooperation, collaboration, representativeness and interactive 
participation, where individuals and groups choose to take an active role in 
making decisions that affect them, can improve tenure security. 
Equity 
Equity means fairness of outcomes, both now and in the future, with respect 
to who benefits from – or is included in – the process of decision-making for 
development action (Brown and Corbera, 2003). In LA, equity is based on the 
notion that all people should have the same access to land tenure informa-
tion and justice delivery and receive the same service standards (Kaufmann 
et al., 2007; Zakout et al., 2007). In the framework for designing LA for custom-
ary areas, the assessment of equity should look at the extent to which CTIs 
deal fairly and impartially with community members and settlers by provid-
ing non-discriminatory access to land, land tenure information and justice 
delivery. Specifically, the customary land delivery processes should address 
how the needs of all interest groups – sub-families and members constitut-
ing the land-owning group – are considered in the land allocation process and 
distribution of proceeds accrued from land resources. 
Curry (2001) discusses equity from two perspectives: those of distribution-
al and intergenerational equity. The former refers to how land rights are dis-
tributed fairly across existing population of interests. Distributional equi-
ty ensures that the needs of minorities and vulnerable groups in the socie-
ty are provided for. In the latter, the focus is on how rights are apportioned 
such that they are used effectively and efficiently at present, without com-
promising their use by future generations. Intergenerational equity address-
es the mechanisms that ensure that the resources being utilised today will be 
available for use by future generations. In the design of LASs for peri-urban 
customary areas, the assessment of equity should further emphasise meas-
ures that protect women and vulnerable groups, and ensure that future gen-
erations are not deprived of communal resources.
Transparency 
In simple terms, transparency means sharing information and action in an 
open manner (UNDP, 1997). Transparency means providing a right of access 
to full, reliable and timely social and economic information, for use by all rel-
evant stakeholders (Fraser and Ellis, 2009; Kolstad and Wiig, 2009). Transpar-
ency is built on the principle of the free flow of information between stake-
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holders (Kaufmann et al., 2007), enabling them to uncover abuses and defend 
their interests (UNDP, 1997). Although transparency can be addressed from 
several perspectives (UN-HABITAT, 2007), in the design of LASs for peri-urban 
customary areas, accessibility, clarity and openness are crucial for assessing 
transparency. 
Access to information is a central component of transparency (Deininger, 
2003; Piotrowski and Van Ryzin, 2007). Transparency in the design of LA for 
customary areas should stress the need for access to information about the 
existing situation, decisions, actions and the people entrusted to keep such 
information. Other measures, such as clarity of land delivery processes and 
customary laws, are important for improving transparency in CTIs. In addi-
tion, openness of decisions on who occupies or uses land and other commu-
nity resources is worth considering. Clarity in the procedures for acquiring 
land and openness to all stakeholders are also crucial. Clear and comprehen-
sible laws will remove any ambiguities in the role to be played by communi-
ty members and their leaders in the land delivery process. Good transparen-
cy practice is achieved when the rules governing land delivery processes are 
made clear to all stakeholders, and when possible, customary laws are coded 
and recorded for future reference. 
Accountability
Accountability means demonstrating of stewardship, and has been cited as 
important for reducing bribery and corruption (FAO, 2007). Accountability is 
closely related to transparency in the discourse of good governance, as both 
concepts emphasise the need for institutions to open up their activities to 
their clients (Schultz, 2008). An assessment of accountability in the design of 
LASs for customary areas should emphasise the factors that make CTIs ac-
countable to community members: reporting on what they have been entrust-
ed to do, responding to questions, explaining their actions and providing ev-
idence of their performance (FAO, 2007). Factors such as the frequency of in-
teraction with community members, feedback and record-keeping are an im-
portant measure of accountability in CTIs. It is important to consider meas-
ures for ensuring financial accountability within CTIs in the governance as-
sessment. Achieving accountability would not only prevent corruption and 
the abuse of power by customary authorities, but could also constitute a basic 
step towards commanding confidence and trust in these authorities’ steward-
ship over the resources that have been placed in their care.
Efficiency and effectiveness 
Most problems in customary land delivery are related to tenure insecurity. 
Therefore, efficiency and effectiveness to improve tenure security for all land 
users should be the main goal of the governance assessment. Efficiency and 
effectiveness are related to all of the other dimensions, and thus play a spe-
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cial role in this study. Indicators such as the implementation of customary 
laws, measures to address tenure insecurity, use of competent staff, the ex-
istence of well-established information desks, clarity of land delivery process-
es and the enforcement of resolved land conflicts are all potential determi-
nants of efficiency and effectiveness in customary land delivery. The choice 
of these indicators was determined by the argument that efficiency and ef-
fectiveness require the formulation of strategies that enable the production of 
results that meet the needs of society (Kaufmann et al., 2007), and the devel-
opment of policies and programmes that enable the delivery of high-quality 
services and standards (FAO, 2007).
Efficiency should emphasise that procedures for allocating land and resolv-
ing land conflicts should follow due process, as defined by customary law. An 
efficient customary LAS is when CTIs develop new ways to record and main-
tain land information, so that service delivery can be achieved within a rea-
sonable time. Equally important in the assessment is the need for a well-
established information desk that can link the customary authorities to the 
land-users, thereby providing accessible land information. Efficiency in cus-
tomary LASs should examine the clarity and simplicity of procedures for allo-
cating land and resolving conflicts. When the procedures are clear and land 
information is accessible, there are fewer opportunities for corruption. Effec-
tive customary land delivery also ensures that the rights of all groups and 
stakeholders of the landholding groups are respected and protected. The use 
of competent staff to control important aspects of the land delivery process, 
thereby producing accurate work, is an important measure of effectiveness. 
Furthermore, effectiveness in customary land delivery can be assessed by 
looking at the extent to which customary laws regulating land tenure and jus-
tice delivery are enforced. In addition, as a good practice, CTIs should enforce 
and respect community decisions and the decisions taken on resolved land 
conflicts. Professional advice from statutory institutions and other profes-
sional bodies should also be sought. When customary laws are followed and 
competent staff members are used, it is likely that the incidence of land con-
flicts will fall, thereby improving tenure security for all land users.
 4.3.3 Indigenous knowledge and local capacity for land 
administration 
The need to decentralise LA to the institutional framework of customary ten-
ure implies that technical capacity will be required. As explained in Section 
1.5, the question of how to develop the necessary technical capacities in cus-
tomary environments poses a considerable challenge. A customary tenure 
system is a socio-cultural humankind-to-land relationship, based on tradi-
tional local knowledge or IK that has developed within a particular geograph-
ical area. Such knowledge grows within a social group, incorporating learning 
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from experiences over generations, and underpins access to land rights and 
decision-making in land management, agriculture, and other activities within 
customary areas (World Bank, 2005). 
It is generally agreed that the concepts of ‘indigenous knowledge’, ‘tradi-
tional knowledge’, ’local knowledge’, ‘community knowledge’, ‘rural peo-
ples’ knowledge’ have many commonalities – central of it being the purpose 
the concept is used and also the fact that local people own the knowledge 
(Minang and McCall, 2006). IK is described as an information base that facil-
itates communication in local decision-making. As such, it may be the only 
resource that the locals, especially the ‘resource-poor’, genuinely own (McCa-
ll, 2003). Ownership by a local community implies a connection with local pri-
orities. IK has become an important and valuable aspect of the management 
of sustainable development programmes (Ngulube, 2002). It has proved to be 
useful, complementing scientific knowledge in land-use planning, forestry 
and natural resource management (Kyem, 2002; Tripathi and Bhattarya, 2004; 
Minang and McCall, 2006). 
In the design of LASs in customary areas, where information on the histor-
ical, social and cultural value of land is needed, one cannot separate IK from 
scientific knowledge. For the effective administration of customary land, IK is 
critical when making decisions about what to collect, how to collect it, what 
to store, how to store and process information about all the rights that exist 
in land. Acknowledging this has important consequences for how one views 
institutional capacity and attempts to establish LASs that are based on the 
institutional framework of customary tenure. In this study, it is argued that 
if IK can be enhanced, local community capacity for LA could be improved. 
Here, the use of IK as a means of enhancing local capacity for LA is the key 
issue of investigation. 
PGIS has become synonymous with integrating IK with participatory 
approaches (Jankowski, 2009). PGIS consist of a variety of approaches that 
aim to make GIS and other spatial decision-making tools more accessible and 
meaningful to local communities that have limited resources. PGIS practice 
is geared towards eliciting and adding value to IK (McCall, 2006; Wang et al., 
2008). PGIS has proved to be effective in empowering local communities and 
promoting interactive participation by all stakeholders in the generation and 
management of indigenous information (Rambaldi, Kyem et al., 2006) (McCall, 
2003). The practice of PGIS helps to narrow communication gaps between vil-
lagers and outsiders (Rambaldi, Chambers et al., 2006). This study also exam-
ines these characteristics of PGIS, and explores how PGIS can help elicit IK on 
tenure and enhance local capacity for LA. 
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 4.4 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has described the theoretical framework for designing alterna-
tive LASs in peri-urban customary areas. First, the requirements for design-
ing LASs were developed. LASs designed for peri-urban areas need to satis-
fy six key requirements, namely: adaptability, flexibility, upgradeability, af-
fordability, institutional legitimacy and credibility, and good land governance. 
The legal, institutional and technical processes need to be flexible and adapt-
able to changing tenure and socio-economic patterns, and should be built on 
socially and politically legitimate customary tenure institutions. The system 
should be affordable, and should be capable of securing a wide range of tem-
poral rights that can be upgraded along a continuum of rights. 
Examining the nature of land tenure and administration issues in peri-
urban areas, the requirement of good land governance should focus on partic-
ipation, equity, transparency, accountability and efficiency and effectiveness. 
Participation should be examined by looking at group membership partic-
ipation in selection of community ledearship and decision-making process-
es, and collaboration with professional institutions. Equity must be addressed 
with respect to distribution and access to land, access to land information, 
and justice delivery. Transparency should be addressed with respect to access 
to information, the accessibility of CTIs, clarity of land allocation process-
es and clarity of customary law. Accountability encompasses measures that 
ensure that CTIs provide evidence of stewardship. Efficiency and accounta-
bility must be addressed on the basis of those measures that are necessary to 
provide certainty of rights and improve tenure security. 
Having discussed customary tenure systems, formalisation strategies and 
problems associated with securing land rights and administering land in 
peri-urban customary areas in Chapter 2, the legal framework for admin-
istering land in Ghana in Chapter 3, and having dealt with the key require-
ments for designing LA for peri-urban areas (Section 4.2), it can be concluded 
that in order to design LASs for peri-urban areas, there should be a paradigm 
shift away from conventional top-down LA models based on state-led strat-
egies, towards adapting LA to the institutional framework of customary ten-
ure. In this study, conventional LA concepts are modified to suit a perspec-
tive that sees the institutional frameworks within customary tenure systems 
as the foundations for LA. The strategy of adapting LA to the local institution-
al framework of customary tenure gains support from Ho’s (2009) argument 
that if tenure insecurity means the possibility that the land-user may lose his 
rights at a certain point in time, it should also be understood that eliminating 
such a risk can be achieved not only through a formal LA framework, but also 
through customary tenure institutional frameworks. This argument is sup-
ported by Bromley (2009), who claims that it would be better to have a famil-
iar, legitimate and ‘ever present’ CTIs than deficient state institutions. 
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In the literature, the idea of ‘adapting’ LA to customary tenure is not new 
(see Section 2.3.4). This study will elaborate on the idea, however, by linking 
it to the dynamics of tenure to explore and explain the logic behind adapting 
LASs to the institutional framework of customary tenure. In this study, I will 
investigate three aspects of customary tenure systems to establish whether 
or not it is feasible to adapt LA to the institutional framework of customary 
tenure. These are: (1) the dynamics of tenure; (2) good land governance; and 
(3) IK and local capacity for administering land. The analysis of these three 
aspects of customary tenure, which form the basis of the field study, will help 
us to develop the needed strategy for establishing affordable and sustainable 
LASs that are built on the local institutional framework of customary tenure. 
In the next chapter, I will discuss the research design and methodology used 
in the field study.
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 5 Empirical study design 
and methodology 
 5.1 Introduction 
The goal of this study is to investigate how land administration systems 
(LASs) in peri-urban areas can be adapted to tenure and the institution-
al framework of customary systems. In Chapter 4, it was argued that LASs 
should satisfy six important requirements, namely those of adaptability, flex-
ibility, upgradeability, affordability, legitimacy and credibility, and good land 
governance. The field study examines and explains whether the customary 
tenure systems of Ghana meet these requirements, by focusing on the dy-
namics of tenure, good land governance and local capacity for LA. To do this, 
qualitative and quantitative research approaches were considered.
The basic difference between qualitative and quantitative research meth-
ods is one of flexibility (Krefting, 1991; Creswell, 2003; Yin, 2003; Collier et al., 
2004; Mack et al., 2005). On the one hand, the study aims to provide an in-
depth understanding of the dynamics of customary tenure by examining local 
knowledge relating to norms, values, practices and experiences in the context 
of local tradition. This analysis will require a qualitative research approach 
that is appropriate for providing information about the ‘soft’ sides of prob-
lems (Yin, 2003). On the other hand, since the study aims to analyse and com-
pare responses across respondents and study areas, the use of quantitative 
methods is appropriate (Krefting, 1991; Creswell, 2003). Quantitative research 
methods are often considered to be rigorous and reliable, and employ valid 
investigative approaches that are outcome-oriented and therefore genuinely 
scientific (Yin, 2003).
This chapter aims to explain the methodology and methods that were used 
to carry out the field studies and analyse the case evidence reported on in 
Chapters, 6, 7 and 8, and the reasoning behind them. Since there has been 
much debate on the characteristics of qualitative and quantitative research 
and, in particular, on case study research techniques, in Section 5.2, I first 
briefly explain the reasons for developing the case study research design. I 
discuss why the case study approach was used and its applicability to achiev-
ing the objectives set. Section 5.3 covers the selection and description of the 
case study areas. Section 5.4 describes the research methods used for the 
field study. The section highlights the quantitative and qualitative data col-
lection and analytical tools used to represent the case evidence. The descrip-
tions of the methods are based on the three main areas of investigation, 
namely: the dynamics of tenure; good governance assessment; and IK and 
local capacity enhancement. An outline of the limitations of the applied 
research methodology is offered in Section 5.5, and the chapter ends with 
concluding remarks in Section 5.6. 
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 5.2 Case study research 
Yin describes case study research as an empirical enquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, using multiple source 
of evidence (Yin, 1994; Yin, 2003). Although case study research involves dis-
tinct procedures (Yin, 1994; Yin, 2003), these leave far more room for discre-
tion on the part of the researcher than other research methods (Zevenbergen, 
2002). As discussed in Section 1.7, this flexibility makes case study method-
ology suitable for addressing problems that are ‘unstructured’ or ‘soft’ in na-
ture (Yin, 1994). Unstructured or soft problems might include a situation in-
volving obscure or conflicting goals that revolve around human understand-
ing and interpretations of an environment, or a situation in which there are 
multiple variables that can be influenced over time (Barry and Fourie, 2002). 
These characteristics can be seen in customary tenure systems and the prob-
lems being addressed in this study. Case study research methodology has 
been used in related research in LA (see Silva and Stubkjaer, 2002).
A case study is not intended as a study of an entire system, organisation or 
object. Rather, case studies are intended to focus on a particular issue, fea-
ture or unit of analysis (Noor, 2008). The unit of analysis is therefore a criti-
cal factor in case study research. In this study, the customary tenure system 
(in a broad sense, as described in Chapters 2 and 3) within each study area 
was chosen as the unit of analysis. Nevertheless, the focus in each investi-
gated customary area is mainly on tenure and the tenure institutions, each 
of which is taken as a distinct unit of analysis. To be able to adequately ana-
lyse complex tenure and institutional arrangements in customary systems 
requires an analysis of several sub-components or sub-units. This study 
therefore involves multiple case studies, consisting of three cases and sev-
eral sub-units of analysis. The multiple case study approach is one of the 
most appropriate strategies for investigating systems containing more than 
one unit of analysis. It allows a multiplicity of methods to be applied with-
in the sub-units, and the detailed information on each sub-unit of analysis to 
be integrated in the final analysis (Scholz and Tietje, 2002). The use of multi-
ple sources of evidence provides a rich store of information that permits the 
analysis of a single issue from several perspectives, a process known as ‘tri-
angulating data’ (Chaiklin, 2000; Yin, 2003).
Case study research involves multi-spectral analysis, and therefore the 
researcher considers not just the voice and the perspective of the stakehold-
ers, but also relevant groups of actors and the interaction between them. 
Customary tenure is a socio-cultural system involving several complex ten-
ure relations and institutions with different stakeholders. Multiple sourc-
es of evidence and multiple methods of collecting data are therefore needed 
to adequately understand and represent such complex and dynamic human-
kind-to-land relationships. In this study, the interactions between CTIs and a 
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number of actors, including community members, strangers, government 
officials and private organisations, have been investigated. 
Many well-known case study researchers (Stake, 1995; Chaiklin, 2000; Yin, 
2003; Noor, 2008) have written about case study research, and suggested pro-
cedures and techniques for designing, organising and conducting case study 
research successfully. This study draws upon their work. While it is desirable 
to have a protocol for all studies, Yin (1994) states that case protocol is essen-
tial in a multiple-case study research design. Case protocols make it easier 
to replicate the research, which is a prominent feature of scientific research 
(Zevenbergen, 2002). A case protocol should include:
■ the background to the case (project objectives and the reasons for the 
study);
■ case selection;
■ field procedures (data collection methods that provide credible data sourc-
es);
■ case study questions that the investigator should always keep in mind dur-
ing the data collection; and
■ a guide for reporting that provides the outline and format of the report (Yin, 
1994).
This case protocol has been used in the case study. The background to the 
case that explains the reasons behind the study is described in Section 1.7.2 
above. The other parts of the case protocol are elaborated in the sub-sections 
below. 
 5.3 Selection and description of case study 
  areas 
A multiple case study design was used to provide empirical material for un-
derstanding and describing individual and societal behaviour, individuals’ re-
lationships with land and land management practices. In customary tenure 
systems, land tenure practices cut across different peoples, cultures, econom-
ic and political landscapes and processes, with the result that these practic-
es are diverse and vary from place to place (see Chapters 2 and 3). It was not 
possible to find cases suited to literal replication, and a balance was therefore 
sought between predictable similar and predictable contrasting results. As a 
strategy, therefore, it was necessary to confine the study to three cases in or-
der to build generalisations for similar customary groups. 
The selection of the case study areas was identified through site visits 
and a literature review, which provided insights into current customary ten-
ure issues and the stage of development in the areas. Japekrom, Tamale and 
Gbawe are the three peri-urban customary areas that were selected as appro-
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priate locations for conducting the field study. The selection of the three cus-
tomary areas was based on the following criteria: 
■ diversity in tenure, customary institutional structures, land use actors;
■ changes in tenure due to rapid urbanisation;
■ demand for land;
■ levels of development and a variety in land development activities; 
■ fair representations of the three types of land-owning group in Ghana; and 
■ determining whether the changes that occur in land tenure systems and 
their effect on security of tenure is a growing national problem that affects 
all three customary tenure groups in Ghana. 
The three case study areas are described in terms of their locations, demo-
graphic information, land tenure systems, customary tenure institutions and 
the development of land-use activities. 
 5.3.1 Japekrom stool land
Location and demographic information
Japekrom is an ancient community, located about one kilometre of the centre 
of New Drobo, the district capital of the Jaman South District, in the Brong-
Ahafo region. The community has borne the brunt of urbanisation, and the 
area has undergone a gradual transformation in terms of tenure and liveli-
hood, due to increasing demand for urban land. The population of Japekrom, 
the seat of the paramount area, is estimated as 5,600 (Ghana Statistical Serv-
ice, 2005). Most of the inhabitants of the Japekrom customary area are sub-
sistence farmers. The stool is rich in natural resources such as timber, forest, 
and arable agriculture. Faago, Kwasibuokrom, Botokrom and Kojokesekrom 
are the sub-stools of the Japekrom customary area that were used as study 
sites. 
Land tenure system 
The land tenure system of Japekrom customary area is based on absolute al-
lodial ownership. Allodial ownership in the customary area is held by the 
stools and sub-stools that constitute the customary area. However, the al-
lodial title is vested in the paramount chief, who holds the land in trust for 
the people. Community members of the stool and sub-stools enjoy all forms 
of usufructuary rights – farming, building, hunting, and so forth – which re-
main in the possession of the holders throughout their lifetimes. These usu-
fructuary rights can be transferred through inheritance, tenancy, customary 
lease, pledge, gift and other tenurial arrangements, as permitted by the cus-
tomary law of the area. The transfer of land through family succession is de-
termined by matrilineal inheritance – the relationship to mothers and sisters. 
Matrilineal inheritance allows a man’s valuable property, including land, to be 
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passed on not to the man’s children, but to his brother or sister’s son (Wood-
man, 1966). Migrant farmers also gain access to farmland freely of charge, at 
very little cost, or through tenancy agreements. However, these arrangements 
have changed since the mid-1970s. With increasing cash crops and the high 
demand for land, all land allocation has to pass through the paramount chief, 
including land for farming. At present, the commonest form of accessing land 
is through short- and long-term leasehold arrangements.
Tenure institutions
The tenure institutional structure of Japekrom customary area, like any Akan 
cultural group, is based on kingship, which is organised in a hierarchy of 
chieftaincy institutions and steering committees. The basic structure of the 
chieftaincy institutions includes: the Abusuapanin (head of the household), 
the Odikro (chief of the village), the Ohene (the territorial chief, at the sub-
stool level), and the Omanhene (the paramount chief). Most chiefs are men, 
but women are also elected as chiefs – ‘queen mothers’. Queen mothers are 
traditional female leaders who represent women in governance structures.
Six territorial chiefs and about 60 sub-chiefs represent the various arms of 
the chieftaincy institutions. The territorial chiefs, together with their queen 
mothers, constitute the Mpuasu-Japekrom Traditional Council. The para-
mount chief is the head of the TC and represents the traditional area at all 
levels of governance. The TC has a Registrar, who is a civil servant appointed 
by the state. The registrar records meetings and handles all correspondence 
between the TC and the state/other chiefs/traditional councils. 
The day-to-day management of land in the traditional area is vested in the 
chiefs of the various settlements in the customary areas. The steering com-
mittees assist these chiefs in day-to-day land management (see Figure 5.1). 
Each sub-stool has a land allocation committee that is responsible for allocat-
ing and taking decisions on use of land in the community. At the stool level, 
there is a Land and Natural Resource Committee (LNRC), mandated to ensure 
the resourceful use of all natural resources, including land, in the paramount 
area. The LNRC is a ten-member committee responsible for land allocations, 
strategic planning on the use of land resources and advising chiefs on land 
issues. The LNRC is made up of a surveyor, a planner, lawyer, and six repre-
sentatives from the sub-stools or communities constituting the traditional 
areas. The LNRC is chaired by a sub-chief, who represents the TC. Other over-
sight committees also take care of other aspects of indigenous government 
structure in the customary area. These include: the Social and Welfare Com-
mittee, responsible for socio-economic welfare of community members; the 
Finance Committee, responsible for financial matters; and the Audit Commit-
tee, responsible for auditing all of the other committees. Some of the mem-
bers on these steering committees have been drawn from the representatives 
of the local councils and unit committees so that the community’s govern-
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mental structure can fit into the local government system (see Section 3.5.3). 
The steering committees work together with land allocation committees in 
the villages. 
Developments in land-use activities
In the early 1970s, cocoa farming and yam production were the main liveli-
hood activities in the customary area. Since the creation of the Jaman dis-
trict administration in 1989, there has been a large influx of migrants, result-
ing in high demand for land for housing and commercial activities. The de-
mand for land has meant that development activities have undergone a rap-
id transformation over the last 20 years. The government acquired large tracts 
of land from the stool for the construction of public and social amenities, par-
ticularly offices and housing facilities for government officials who work at 
the district headquarters. Cash cropping and other farming activities at the 
town’s periphery have been significantly reduced. Many people in the com-
munities now engage in petty trading, while a few others engage in cashew 
plantation and other subsistence farming activities. Until 2005, when the new 
paramount chief of the customary area was installed, land management ac-
tivities, particularly surveying and planning, were carried out by non-profes-
sionals. These resulted in haphazard land-use development activities. Over 
the last five years, land allocations have been based on land-use plans. These 




 5.3.2 Tamale skin land 
Location and demographic information 
Tamale is the administrative capital of the Northern Region of Ghana, and 
has been the fourth-largest urban settlement in the country since 1970. With 
a population of about 550,000 and a growth rate of 3.5%, it is one of the fast-
est-growing cities in Ghana (Ghana Statistical Service, 2005). Tamale serves as 
a hub for all administrative and commercial activity in the Northern region. 
Economic activities in Tamale revolve around farming and petty trading. Is-
lam is the predominant religion in the area. The inhabitants of Tamale and 
its surrounding villages are Dagombas, belonging to the Dagbon ethnic group. 
Four peri-urban communities in Tamale, namely Jisonayilli, Vittin, Wroshie 
and Kalpohin, were used as case studies.
Land tenure system 
The customary tenure system of Tamale and its environment is based on ab-
solute allodial ownership and Dagbon customary law. Land is controlled by 
subgroups or sub-families, which ensured that individuals in these families 
had access to land for various purposes. Individuals within subgroups have 
usufructuary rights, which allow farming, fishing, hunting, building and other 
uses on an unconditional basis, as long as communal interests remain unaf-
fected. These usufructuary rights can be inherited through the patrilineal sys-
tem, where land is inherited from father to the eldest son. Generally, women 
have use rights only on agricultural land, but they cannot own land, as they 
are excluded from land inheritance. Under this tenure system, immigrants – 
who are also known as settlers or strangers – who have no customary rights 
in land can acquire land without payment, usually by land gifting (Kasanga 
and Kotey, 2001). 
Like other customary areas in northern Ghana, the indigenous tenure sys-
tem underwent two periods of radical change. Between 1900 and 1979, control 
over land ownership was vested in the Governor of the Gold Coast. While land 
was legally owned by individuals and subgroups, the general modus operandi 
of the state was to take land for public purposes without compensation. How-
ever, in 1979, the Constitution of Ghana divested land from the state to cus-
tomary tribes, thereby allowing the latter full ownership (see Section 3.5.1). 
The state acquired large tracts of land for institutional (primary education 
and health), residential, agricultural and industrial uses. At present, differ-
ent arrangements exist for accessing land in peri-urban Tamale. Settlers have 
acquired land through several tenure arrangements for households, private 
schools, filling stations and farms, usually through leasehold. These lease-




Prior to colonisation, the indigenous communities of Dagbon had no struc-
tured kingdom or political system. Chiefs were neither owners nor custodi-
ans of the land. Land ownership rights resided in the tindamba (earth priest), 
who managed rituals for maintaining the sanctity of the land, and who was 
responsible for the allocation of land and the settlement of disputes. The tin-
damba acted as a link between the community and the spirits of ancestors. 
Chieftaincy was introduced by the colonial governments (Kasanga and Kotey, 
2001). Chiefs were appointed by the government as the spokesmen of the peo-
ple. In spite of the greater prestige that is enjoyed by the appointed chiefs, 
there has always been a clear distinction between the duties of a chief and 
those of a tindamba. By and large, the traditional rights of the latter over land 
have survived. With the promotion of TCs and chieftaincy institutions, the di-
rect control and management functions of the tindamba in the traditional 
system have been assumed by local chiefs, who now administer customary 
land rights on behalf of their communities.
In the current institutional arrangements, the tenure institutions of Tama-
le customary area exist as an organised body, constituted by the Gulkpe-Naa 
(the Divisional chief of Tamale), sub-chiefs/caretaker chiefs, and the council 
of elders (see Figure 5.2). The Gulkpe-Naa grants land for the endorsement of 
the Yaa-Naa, who is the overlord of the Dagbon Traditional kingdom. At the 
village level, the sub-chiefs, caretaker chiefs and councils of elders administer 
land on behalf of the Gulkpe-Naa. At the divisional level, there is a land allo-
cation committee that supervises all land allocations in local communities. 
Developments in land-use activities 
Since the 1990s, when the Rural Electrification Programme and the Northern 
Electrification Project were initiated, there has been significant demand for 
land for various purposes. Consequently, peri-urban Tamale has experienced 
rapid expansion and has witnessed many land-use developments and chang-
es. These have triggered changes in the land tenure system. As far as rural 
land use was concerned, the main source of employment shifted from sub-
sistence farming to residential and commercial activities. In all four peri-ur-
ban communities, land is allocated according to layout schemes prepared by 
the municipal TCPD. 
 5.3.3 Gbawe-Kwatei family land 
Location and demographic information
Gbawe was once an ancient farming village, located about 10 kilometres west 
of the centre of Accra, the capital of Ghana. Gbawe was previously part of 
a number of satellite communities around the centre of what was then the 
Gold Coast. The Gbawe-Kwatei family belong to the Ga ethnic group, which is 
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found in and around Accra. Gbawe is one of the most populated communities 
in Ghana, with a population of about 29,000 (Ghana Statistical Service, 2005).
Land tenure system 
The allodial title is vested in a family, whose ancestors were the hunters who 
first cultivated the Gbawe land six to seven centuries ago. The head of the 
family holds the allodial title in trust for the family members. Like the oth-
er customary areas, members of the family have usufructuary rights that per-
mit them to use part of the land, rights they can enjoy throughout their life-
times as long as they do not conflict with the wider interests of the family. 
Usufructuary rights can be transferred, but the level of freedom to do so de-
pends on who receives the land. Land transferred to the members of the fam-
ily, whether by grant, gift or by inheritance, is freehold, but does not require 
consent from the elders. The system of inheritance is patrilineal, which al-
lows children to inherit land directly from their fathers. A woman can also 
inherit from her father, but only during his lifetime. Land transfers to stran-
gers require the consent of the council of elders. Although freehold in family 
land is not prohibited, in Gbawe, settlers can only acquire land on leasehold. 
There are four main subgroups in Gbawe-Kwatei family: Ayama, Anyaa Mfuri, 
Twum-Tawiah and Odorkor. These groups hold the deed of gift and therefore 
operate as separate entities under the authority of the Gbawe-Kwatei fami-
ly, the allodial holders. Plots of land have been licensed toTiase and Kokroko 
sub-families. The government has also acquired large pieces of land for urban 
development. 
Tenure institutions
The tenure institution of Gbawe exists as an autonomous entity with four ba-
sic facilitating divisions: the Council of Elders (COE), the Land Board, the Land 
[ 112 ]
Allocation Committee (LAC) and the Customary Land Secretariat (CLS) (see 
Figure 5.3). These divisions handle all decisions concerning the use of land. 
The COE, which is the family’s highest decision-making body, is made up of 
39 chiefs and elders, including 11 women. The members of the COE are select-
ed from all the ‘royal gates’ of the Gbawe-Kwatei family. The COE is chaired 
by the family head, and is responsible for the final approval of all land trans-
actions. The Land Board is an advisory body which advices the COE, the LAC 
and the CLS on prudent land resource management. The Land Board is made 
up of eight members, including the family head (as chairman), a lawyer, land 
surveyor, land economist, planner, the administrator of the CLS and two prin-
cipal elders. The LAC is the technical wing of the institution, which is made 
up of nine people, including one woman. The main responsibility of the LAC 
is to implement the decisions made by the Land Board, and also to give the 
Land Board technical advice on land applications (Gyapong, 2009). The CLS 
records and maintains information on land transactions and collects ground 
rent. The CLS of Gbawe was among the first customary areas chosen as pilot 
areas for the LAP (see Section 3.6). 
[ 113 ]
Developments in land-use activities
Accra is one of the most populous (1.7 million people) and fastest-growing 
metropolises in Africa, with an annual growth rate of 4.3%. Many people have 
moved from the inner city to the periphery to escape overcrowded conditions 
and high rent levels. Like other peri-urban areas in Accra, Gbawe has expe-
rienced a high influx of migrants since the 1990s. This influx has resulted in 
the development of new housing areas and high demand for land in Gbawe. 
Land in Gbawe, which was originally forest and used for agricultural purpos-
es, has been converted into building plots. Farming activities are no longer 
carried out by the community. Portions of the land have been developed into 
salt ponds and quarry sites that serve as major occupations for the inhabit-
ants in the community. At present, the Gbawe-Kwatei family has about 10,000 
acres of land under its jurisdiction. The land has been schemed, demarcated, 
surveyed and a cadastral map has been prepared, which is used for land al-
locations. The pressure on land has led to contestation of the boundary be-
tween Gbawe-Kwatei family and its neighbours.
 5.4 Data collection methods
The data collection methods used in this study are based on Yin’s (1994: p. 80) 
tools for collecting data for case study research, including ‘documentation’, 
‘interviews’, ‘direct observation’ and ‘participation-observation’. Using these 
different tools to collect data from a variety of informants creates multiple 
sources of evidence, forming a source for triangulation and the assessment 
of information from different perspectives. Triangulation increases the reli-
ability of the data and the process of gathering it (Yin, 1994; Yin, 2003). The 
findings for each data source were checked in two ways. First, data from in-
dividual interviews were compared with those obtained from the focus group 
discussions and literature. Second, the results were also presented at differ-
ent occasions to experts in land tenure and administration in Ghana, and al-
so to some international experts.The data collection methods are described 
with respect to the three issues investigated in the field study: the dynamics 
of tenure, good land governance assessment, and IK and local capacity for LA. 
 5.4.1 Analysing the dynamics of tenure
The first field study constituted the land tenure diagnosis phase of the study, 
and aimed to deepen our understanding of the customary tenure systems in 
the study areas and how these have evolved over time. In this study, empha-
sis was laid on how land ownership, land-use rights, modes of transferring in-
terest in land, and land-use practices have changed over time. The study al-
so aimed to understand the impact of these changes on the tenure security 
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of landholders, and how the CTIs have evolved to meet these challenges. The 
data collection for the tenure diagnosis took place between September 2007 
and February 2008. 
The primary method used for collecting the case information was a series 
of in-depth interviews, based on the interview protocol shown in Appen-
dix A. The in-depth interviews were conducted with individuals and focus 
groups. These in-depth interviews with various interviewees offered suffi-
cient flexibility to allow the reeracher to approach several respondents dif-
ferently, while still covering the same areas of data collection (Yin, 1994). It 
gave the interviewees an opportunity to express their opinion, and allowed 
the researcher to use follow-up questions to deepen his understanding of the 
subject. In-depth interviews sought the opinions of several groups that have a 
stake and play diverse roles in customary LA. These include chiefs and elders, 
family heads, land allocation committee members, community members 
(indigenes and settlers) and experts from the LSAs in Ghana (see Appendix A, 
Tables A.1 and A.2). 
The focus group interviews involved chiefs and elders, land allocation 
committees, and the unit committees in the communities. The interviewees 
offered their observations on the historical evolution of tenure in the com-
munities, highlighting changing aspects of tenure, customary law and tenure 
institutions. The interviewees also gave their opinion on the reasons behind 
these observed changes. The focus group interviews were based on semi-
structured interview techniques. Ten focus group interviews were held in 
Japekrom, seven in Tamale and six in Gbawe. Interviews were also conduct-
ed with LSAs, namely: the Office of the Administrator of Stool Land (two), the 
Lands Commission (two), the TCPD (three), the Survey Department (three) and 
private professional institutions (two), to understand their interaction with 
CTIs (see Table A.3). The interviews with the LSAs sought their own views on 
the tenure changes, and were also intended to cross-check the information 
obtained from the interviews with local community members. 
Based on the initial analysis and findings from the in-depth interviews, 
appropriate questionnaires (open-ended and closed) were designed for the 
further gathering of quantitative data from a household survey. Four hun-
dred landholders were used for the household survey. The main criterion 
used to select the households and respondents was that the landholder had 
to have lived in the customary area for 20 years or more. One-hundred-and-
fifty landholders from Japekrom stool, 150 from Tamale skin and 100 from 
Gbawe-Kwatei family were involved in the household survey. Sixty per cent of 
the respondents were indigenes and 40% were settlers. The dominant groups 
of respondents were males (75%) and farmers (48%). The questionnaire was 
based on four main questions (see Appendix B, Section B.1): 
1. What changes can be observed in land tenure systems (land ownership, 
communal rights, use rights, and modes of transferring interest in land)? 
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2. What changes can be observed in the institutional arrangements for land 
acquisition and dispute resolution? 
3. How do these changes affect security of tenure and the social setting of the 
community?
4. What are the underlying causes of these changes? 
Secondary data source obtained from the literature, government documents, 
maps and existing research reports on the subject were used to support the 
analysis. 
 5.4.2 Assessing good land governance 
The second field study aimed to assess the extent to which CTIs meet good 
governance objectives in LA. The assessment was based on the good govern-
ance framework developed in Section 4.3.2. Drawing on the description of the 
dimensions in the governance assessment framework, relevant questions 
were put to stakeholders to seek empirical evidence. These questions were 
centred on the issues summarised in Table 5.1.
The field study was conducted in all three study areas between October 
2008 and January 2009. The data in Gbawe were collected by an MSc student 
who contributed to this research study. As in the first field study, both qual-
itative and quantitative tools were used to analyse the interactions between 
CTIs and land users in the land delivery processes. The same data collection 
tools and interviewees that were described in Section 5.4.1 were used in this 
analysis. In the qualitative analysis, several in-depth interviews were under-
taken with chiefs, elders, family heads, and members of the LACs in the study 
areas. The in-depth interviews focused on land allocation processes, mecha-
nisms for recording and maintaining land information, land conflict resolu-







Governance assessment question or determinant 
■ To what extent are community members represented, and how are they involved   
in the selection of the community’s leaders?
■ To what extent are community members involved in decision-making processes   
with regard to land use and management?
■ What is the level of collaboration and coordination with statutory land agencies   
   and other land professional institutions?
■ Is land accessible to all community members, men and women alike?
■ Is access to land information and dispute resolution handled in a   
    non-discriminatory manner?
■ Do indigenes and settlers have equal security of tenure?
■ To what extent do CTIs guarantee intergenerational equity?
■ How accessible are institutions and land information to community members  
   and the general public?
■ How open is the decision-making process to community members?
■ How clear are customary laws on land delivery to community members?
■ To what extent do CTIs report on their stewardship to community members?
■ How adequate is the financial accountability?
■ How clear is the land allocation process?
■ To what extent are conflict resolutions enforced?
■ How adequate are the human resources for land governance?
■ To what extent are customary laws implemented in the land delivery process?
■ How adequate are the mechanisms for providing clear and secure land rights? 
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tion and enforcement, and how the CTIs deal with tenure insecurity issues. 
Eight in-depth interviews were held in Japekrom, eight in Tamale and two 
in Gbawe. Interviews were also conducted with LSAs, namely: the Office of 
Administrator of Stool Land (three), the Lands Commission (four), the TCPD 
(two), the Survey Department (three), the LVB (one), the LTR (one), the LAP 
(one), and professional institutions (two), to understand their interaction with 
CTIs (Appendix B, Section B.3). 
In the quantitative analysis, a household survey was conducted, based on 
semi-structured interviews and open-ended questions. The household sur-
vey was used to obtain information about how the indigenes and settlers in 
the communities perceive the various aspects of land governance in custom-
ary land delivery processes. A detailed outline of the questionnaire is shown 
in Appendix B, Section B.2. In total, 450 landholders were randomly selected 
(95% confidence level with error margin of 5%): 170 from Japekrom stool land, 
180 from Tamale skin land and 100 from Gbawe-Kwatei family land. Two-
hundred-and-fifty (56%) of these were indigenes, 149 (33%) were females and 
120 (44%) farmers. It was considered especially important to ask women and 
farmers about their perceptions, because they are most likely to be victims of 
bad land governance in customary land delivery. 
 5.4.3 Assessing indigenous knowledge and local capacity 
The third field study aimed to: (1) identify the IK that local communities have 
on changes in the tenure system; (2) establish whether this knowledge can be 
represented on maps; and (3) explore how PGIS tools can enhance IK and lo-
cal capacity for LA. This field study was conducted in two peri-urban com-
munities in Tamale, namely Vittin and Jisonayilli. Due to the non-availability 
of high-resolution satellite images, it was not possible to carry out the patiti-
patory mapping (p-mapping) exercise in Japekrom customary area. Although 
high-resolution satellite images were available for Gbawe, due to the urban-
ised nature of the community, it was difficult to get people to participate in 
the p-mapping exercise. 
The field study was conducted between September 2008 and January 2009, 
with the help of a second MSc student. The MSc student conducted the field 
study in Vittin between September and November 2008. In this field study, 
the PGIS approach and tools outlined by Rambaldi, Manila, Kyem et al. were 
used (Rambaldi and Manila, 2003; Rambaldi, Kyem et al., 2006). The main PGIS 
activities included p-mapping, GPS surveys, training and feedback forums. 
The p-mapping tools were used to uncover IK on changes in land ownership, 
use rights and land-use types over the period between 1998 and 2008. They 
were used to reconstruct and map the tenure situation as of 2008 (the year the 
study was carried out) and the situation ten years previously (1998), using a 
high-resolution satellite image. In each community, two focal groups, consist-
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ing of elders and younger people and numbering about 20 each, were involved 
in the p-mapping exercises. The aim of distinguishing between the two groups 
was to use each group’s work to validate the other, and to verify whether IK 
is transferred through the generations. The GPS survey was used to verify the 
accuracy of the p-mapping, using selected reference features. At the feed-
back forums, a large section of the community validated the sketch maps and 
appraised the entire p-mapping process. A validation workshop with the LSAs 
was used to validate the maps and the p-mapping approach used. To exam-
ine the quality of IK, the maps created by the locals were compared with exist-
ing maps. To facilitate easy analysis and appraisal of the PGIS approach, the 
detailed procedures followed in the study will be presented in Chapter 8.
 5.5 Analysis and reporting
 5.5.1 Analysis of case study evidence
The analysis phase is the least-developed aspect of case study methodology, 
and hence the most difficult (Tellis, 1997). Various forms of presenting case 
study evidence have been suggested: matrices of arrays, flow charts, means 
and cross tabulations. These should be preceded by an analytical strategy, 
however. Yin presents two strategies for analysing case studies: relying on 
and analysing the evidence based on the theoretical preposition of the study; 
and developing the case description, which is a framework for organising the 
case study (Yin, 1994; Tellis, 1997). 
In Chapters 6 and 7, we will discuss the observations within each case area, 
across the cases and according to the perceptions of different groups, such 
as indigenes, settlers, women, men, and farmers. The distinction between 
the views of indigenes/farmers and settlers is important, because dynam-
ics in customary tenure tend to favour settlers at the expense of indigenous 
farmers. In addition, indigenous farmers and women tend to be most affect-
ed by bad governance. The views from the LSAs and the professional insti-
tutions are used to validate the views of the distinct groups. Data from each 
case need to be analysed separately and compared with other cases. These 
between-case analyses can be understood as a form of pattern-matching, 
and the ‘pattern-matching’ and ‘explanation-building’ analytical technique 
(Yin, 1994; p. 33) was therefore used. This analytical technique consists of the 
examination, categorisation, tabulation and recombination of the evidence, in 
order to address the questions and propositions under investigation. Quali-
tative and quantitative analytical procedures were used to present data. For 
the qualitative methods, descriptive analytical procedures involving critical 
examinations and explanations of the field study data were are used. 
Quantitative data analysis was used to describe the closed and open-end-
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ed questions. For the purpose of the data analysis, open-ended answers were 
subjected to content analysis (Neuendorf, 2002). Content analysis includes a 
careful examination of the interactions between the elements under inves-
tigation. The data was processed using a systematic coding scheme. By cod-
ing the data, pieces of information could be put together in a comparable and 
systematic manner, and arranged according to the various questions. Cross-
tabulations were used to represent the answers to closed questions. Cross-
tabulations were performed between the various aspects investigated and the 
respondent’s status in the community (indigene or settler) in order to estab-
lish whether there was any relationship. Again, the observed relationships 
were compared with other studies and existing research reports on the sub-
ject, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.
In the tenure diagnosis, where the aim was to understand trends in tenure, 
a comparative analysis of present and past tenure situations was undertak-
en. Data on the current and past situations obtained through interviews and 
existing documentation were used for the analysis. The interviews included 
retrospective data – information on how the tenure system used to be in the 
past. Retrospective data sources are considered to pose difficulties due to the 
‘remembrance of past’ (Henry et al., 1994: pp. 92-93), but existing documents 
helped us to triangulate the retrospective data.
 5.5.2 Case study reporting 
In multiple case study research design, there are two levels of reporting: first, 
the writing of case reports about the cases studied; and second, providing the 
overall report of the study. Yin (1994), however, points out that it is important 
to start with ‘parts’ of the report. The second aspect relates to the reporting 
of the cases studied in the research project. During the data collection phas-
es, several documents were written. In a similar way, at the end of the da-
ta collection phase, draft case reports were written based on all the informa-
tion available and outlines of the key issues investigated in each case. These 
allowed us to identify some gaps and, where possible, fill them in the subse-
quent studies. These reports also served an important role in validating the 
case study research. In particular, the reports also helped us to further im-
prove and refine the data collection process for the other cases. These reports 
were presented to different forums for comment.
The case reports and the main results of the study are presented in Chap-
ters 6, 7 and 8. The reports are structured along the lines of the specific 
research questions investigated during each case study. 
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 5.6 Limitations of the field study
The data collection methods in this study have been applied and used metic-
ulously. These methods proved useful, yet some limitations remain. 
First, for all qualitatative researches, the data collection approach based 
on interviews and focal group discussions represents the views and percep-
tions of selected groups of community members. Although respondents were 
carefully selected, their views are based on personal experiences, and may 
not reflect the views of every community member. The study also relies on 
experience from and the perspectives of selected groups of experts. Only the 
views of experts from the formal land sector agencies were sought. The views 
of many non-governmental agencies, state courts and the local governments 
involved were not obtained and incorporated into this study. Therefore, this 
field study lacks an analysis of the views of all stakeholders in customary LA. 
The second limitation concerns the language and communication barrier. 
In Tamale and some parts of Gbawe, the researcher was completely depend-
ent on a translator during the in-depth and household interviews and the 
coordination of the participatory mapping exercises. The translation of the 
questions and responses from the respondents’ native language into English 
is likely to have affected the results. A combination of methods – in-depth 
interviews, focus group discussions and documention – was used as a source 
of cross-validation of the information recieved from respondents.
The third limitation relates to the PGIS approach. Only one of the cus-
tomary areas – Tamale – was used for the p-mapping exercise. High-resolu-
tion satellite imagery was not available for Japekrom. Although a high-resolu-
tion image was available for Gbawe, meanwhile, it proved difficult to encour-
age people to participate in the p-mapping exercise. Most residents of Gbawe 
work in central Accra, and were therefore unavailable to participate in the 
p-mapping exercise. Although two study sites within the Tamale customary 
area were used as a multiple source of evidence, data limitations restricted 
the cross-validation of whether the p-mapping exercises could be used in the 
other customary areas. The results from the p-mappings may not be repre-
sentative for all three customary areas. Furthermore, it would have been bet-
ter to organise the validation workshop for the p-mapping exercise in Tama-
le, where the study had been conducted. However, due to resource limitations 
and the challenge of representing all of the LSAs, the workshop was held in 
Accra, which had the necessary facilities and would allow all of the LSAs to be 
fully represented. As a result, the analysis of the validation workshop may not 
represent the views of the Tamale LSAs who have personal experiences with 
the local communities, and on local specific issues in the studied areas. 
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 5.7 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has outlined the importance of case study research design to 
this study. The methods used to collect and analyse the data required to an-
swer the study questions were also elaborated. A case study approach is an 
appropriate methodology for the empirical investigation, due to the nature 
of the investigation. Using case study research allowed for the use of multi-
ple methods and procedures to collect data in each case, and to analyse them 
across the cases. The research was based on multiple cases, in the form of 
three cases selected to cover the three main tenure groups in Ghana. The field 
study was intended to collect empirical data on the three issues investigated 
in the study, including tenure dynamics, good land governance, and IK and lo-
cal capacity enhancement. 
Both qualitative and quantitative data collection methods were used for the 
study. In the first and second field studies, a qualitative method was used, 
in the form of in-depth interviews based on a semi-structured question-
naire. This technique was chosen to describe diverse humankind-to-land rela-
tionships and assess land governance in customary tenure institutions. The 
quantitative methods were based on household surveys. In the third field 
study, PGIS tools were used to assess the usability of IK for LA, and to assess 
the potential of these tools to enhance local capacity for LA. 
The next chapter discusses how the customary tenure systems in peri-
urban Ghana have evolved to deal with the changing needs of community 
members, demographic challenges, urbanisation and legislative influence. 
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 6 Dynamics of customary 
tenure in peri-urban 
Ghana 
 6.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the field study that examined the dynamics of tenure 
in three peri-urban customary areas in Ghana: Japekrom, Tamale and Gbawe. 
The aim is to analyse and highlight how customary tenure systems have 
changed over the years to meet the challenges posed by urbanisation, demo-
graphic change, socio-economic and land development changes, and changes 
to the legal and organisational frameworks for LA. Although there are impor-
tant differences between the tenure systems in the study areas, especially be-
tween the northern and southern Ghana, this chapter highlights some com-
monalities in the tenure dynamics that support the study’s overall argument. 
The nature and extent of the tenure changes, the factors that brought about 
these, and their consequences for LA form the core of the presented findings. 
Two major aspects of customary tenure dynamics are identified in this 
chapter: the dynamics of tenure arrangements, discussed in Section 6.2; and 
the dynamics of institutional arrangements for land delivery, discussed in 
Section 6.3. In the former, the discussion emphasises changes in the tenure 
rules, land ownership, land-use rights, land-use patterns and tenure practic-
es, and the mode of transferring rights in land. In the institutional framework 
for customary land delivery, the discussion centres on how institutions are 
responding to changing tenure practices and the changing needs of society. It 
discusses changes in the political structure of chieftaincy institutions, insti-
tutional arrangements for land management and the innovations introduced 
in the land allocation process. The chapter discusses the underlying causes of 
tenure dynamics in Section 6.4. In Section 6.5, the chapter ends with a discus-
sion of the implications of tenure changes for the design of an alternative LAS 
for peri-urban areas.
 6.2 Dynamics of tenure arrangements
 6.2.1 Changing tenure rules and social settings
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, customary tenure systems have developed 
along social lines (Ollenu, 1962). Land tenure practices in customary societies 
were intended to suppress individualism and encourage the placing of group 
interests above individual interests. These structures are based on custom-
ary rules. It has been argued that the introduction of a market economy leads 
to changes in tenure rules, particularly those that protect the integrity of the 
communal and social setting (Larbi, 1994; Cotula and Chauveau, 2007). In the 
field study, indigenes and settlers in customary areas were asked, ‘do you 
agree that the tenure rules governing the use of land in this customary area 
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are changing?’ (see Table 6.1).
The statistics in Table 6.1 illustrate that with the exception of Gbawe, a sig-
nificant proportion of indigenes and settlers perceived that the rules govern-
ing land tenure are changing. The informants claimed that many aspects of 
tenure rules had been modified by the customary authorities and communi-
ty members in response to the current economic demand for land. The LSAs 
who support this claim argue that many aspects of customary tenure cannot 
support modern land management.11 The contrasting response from Gbawe 
can probably be attributed to a number of prudent land management meas-
ures that have been taken by the family. Land has been distributed equally 
to family members, who can sublease or use it. The proceeds from the leases 
have been used for the public good. 
The indigenous and settler landholders were also asked, ‘which aspects of 
the customary tenure rules have changed significantly?’ (see Table 6.2).
Table 6.2 indicates that although a significant proportion of the landholders 
perceived that the rules governing access to land, land-use practices and dis-
pute resolution have been modified, most respondents from all of the study 
areas perceived that mainly the rules governing land transfers had been 
affected. The respondents claimed that the customary rules for transferring 
land are now unclear and constitute a huge source of tenure insecurity. They 
claim that the rules on inheritance and succession are becoming more indi-
vidualistic. In particular, the inheritance rules specifying who inherits land 
and what portion should be given to the extended family are not being fol-
lowed. Where pieces of land or proceeds from developed land were once given 
to the family or community to sustain the lineage, they are now being passed 
11 Interview with Regional Stool Lands Officer of Tamale.
Table 6.1 Perceptions of changes to tenure rules
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Table 6.2 Perceptions of aspects of customary rules that have changed 
significantly 
Response
Access to land (%)















































on to their own children.12 Concerning land-use practices, the respondents 
claim that certain traditional rules and customs that had protected the com-
munity and ensured the proper use of land resources are now seen as out-dat-
ed. In Japekrom and Tamale, the respondents claim that such tenure practices 
are being violated because they are perceived as having a negative impact on 
agricultural productivity.13 The indigenes and settlers also claim that the rules 
governing access to land no longer follow the tradition whereby one could 
access land through the elders of a family, but rather through the main chief 
of the town.14
Changing tenure rules and individualisation have weakened the social 
bonds of communities, creating social divisions in tenure groups. In the 
study areas, the intra-family land relationships that govern the way land 
rights are distributed and managed by the lineages and extended families 
have been greatly affected. Land held by patrilineal or matrilineal groups has 
succumbed to increasing fragmentation, and many plots are now too small 
to generate a reasonable return. Where there is lineage land for agriculture, 
family members cultivate and invest in this land privately. Individuals pro-
vide and restrict the land to their own offspring by writing wills that speci-
fy how their property, including their land, should be disposed of after their 
death.15 Farmers in Japekrom survey and document their farmlands as a form 
of security against possible invasion by other family members. The in-depth 
interviews indicate that in Japekrom and Tamale, chiefs are selling communal 
land to settlers without the knowledge of community members. On the other 
hand, community members invest in land that belongs to the entire commu-
nity so that they can claim it. With the cultivation of cash crops, farming has 
become more permanent and has entrenched an individual’s rights over the 
land that he/she was the first to cultivate. With no more fallow land, the pos-
sibility of land reverting to the community becomes remote (Simpson, 1976). 
The observations made on the three customary areas indicate that indi-
vidual interests are superseding communal interests, creating social divi-
sions. Similar observations concerning changing social settings are reported 
by Mathieu et al. and Berry (Mathieu et al., 2003; Berry, 2009). Amanor also 
reports a process of exclusion, deepening social divisions and class formation 
(Amanor, 2001). This has created tensions between different social groups: 
between the young and old; indigenous people and settlers; farmers and new 
investors; and between local actors and those from outside the village (Math-
ieu et al., 2003). 
12 Interview with Gyaasehene of Japekrom, December 2007.
13 Interviews in Basakrom, Japekrom (December 2007) and Vittin, Tamale (January 2008).
14 Interview in Kalpohin, Tamale, November 2007.
15 The person’s declaration of their intentions may be in writing or orally.
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 6.2.2 Changing allodial ownership and use rights
Although the permanent alienation of land is against customary practice 
(Section 3.4), increasing land development and the rising value of land in 
these areas have led to some chiefs making a kind of freehold grant, through 
the sale and gift of land. Until recently, the land gift system was commonly 
used in all three areas. Under this system, communities give land to individu-
als or groups who have supported the community in diverse ways, particular-
ly for the construction of schools. Land gifting is benevolent and permanent. 
Whether they occur between communities and individuals/groups or between 
friends and relatives, gifts cannot be reversed. In this way, a number of free-
hold interests have come to exist in customary areas. 
With increasing land values, all of the informal transactions and mecha-
nisms whereby settlers could obtain land for farming and building for free, or 
through tenancies, are being replaced with leasehold. Various forms of lease-
hold agreements (long- and short-term) can be found in all of the areas stud-
ied. Government interventions to regulate and prevent the permanent alien-
ation of customary land have also supported the introduction of leasehold in 
customary land transactions (Government of Ghana, 1973; 1992). The lease-
hold is granted either by the holder of the allodial title or by a customary 
freeholder. The lessee pays for the right to occupy the land, usually with an 
annual rent, and must respect covenants that specify the manner in which 
the land is to be used. The duration of the leasehold depends on whether 
the lessee is a citizen of Ghana or not, and/or the purpose of acquiring the 
land. While Ghanaians can acquire leasehold interests on residential plots 
for a maximum period of 99 years, non-Ghanaians have a maximum lease-
hold period of 50 years. For land acquired for commercial purposes, a maxi-
mum leasehold period of 50 years applies to both Ghanaians and non-Gha-
naians (Government of Ghana, 1992). Although current customary land allo-
cation processes in all of the areas studied require ‘allottees’ of customary 
land to register their land as leasehold, this concept appears to be foreign to 
some chiefs. Most of the chiefs that were interviewed in Tamale and Japekrom 
seemed not to understand the concept of leasehold. For example, when these 
chiefs were asked, ’for how long do you give land to settlers for building and 
for other development?’, the response was, ‘when land is allotted to peo-
ple, it is given to them forever’.16 The renting of land has also become com-
mon practice in peri-urban Tamale. Indigenes and settlers enter into various 
land rental arrangements, and lease their land for short periods to be used for 
commercial purposes. Such arrangements are made privately by the parties 
involved. 
16  Interview with Yipel-Naa of Jisonayilli (Tamale) and Kwadwokesekrom (Japekrom).
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It is generally assumed that statutory intervention and the high market val-
ue of land make land-users exercise full rights of ownership over land. This 
assumption is supported by the argument that colonial development policies 
converted ‘use’ into ‘ownership’, ‘users’ into ’owners’, and ‘rights as persons’ 
into ‘rights to specific pieces of land’ (Pottier, 2005: p. 60). The indigenes and 
settlers in the three customary areas were asked, ‘what rights do you hold in 
your land: use rights under communal ownership or ownership?’ (see Table 
6.3) 
Table 6.3 shows that most respondents who hold use rights perceived their 
landholding to be a form of ownership. These respondents thought that the 
principle of communal ownership applied to farmland and public places. 
Many indigenes in Japekrom are subsistence farmers who cultivate commu-
nal lands, and therefore perceive their farmland to be a community resource. 
This explains why a significant proportion (48%) of the indigenes in Japekrom, 
are of the opinion that their landholding is a use right. In Gbawe, meanwhile, 
the enforcement of customary rules explains why 56% of indigenes perceive 
their landholdings as use rights under communal ownership. The large sums 
of money (between GH¢1000-GH¢1500)/hectare)17 paid by landholders to allo-
dial owners as ‘drink money’18 for a plot of land may also account for the 
landholders’ general perception that they have ownership rights. This sum is 
equivalent to the market value of the land and therefore makes it difficult to 
draw a distinction between a sale and this form of transaction (Kasanga et al., 
1996).
 6.2.3 Changing usufructuary rights 
The current status of usufructuary rights
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, members of customary groups enjoy usu-
fructuary rights, which allow them to freely develop any virgin land or enter 
any vacant land without necessarily seeking the consent of the allodial title-
holder. In the pre-colonial era, the usufructuary estate-holders’ rights of use 
were secure, and their rights were only terminable upon abandonment or for-
feiture (Ollenu, 1962). Indigenes were secure in their usufructuary rights be-
cause these rights of occupation and use were recognised by the communi-
ty (Section 2.2). In all of the areas studied, there is no longer any unoccupied 
17  The exchange rate in December 2007 was 1 USD = Gh¢0.93.
18  The offering of ’drink money’ to traditional authorities is an established Ghanaian tradition. Drink money is 
customarily offered to all traditional authorities throughout the country as a form of courtesy.
Table 6.3 Landholders’ perceptions of their landholding type
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virgin land because all land has now been appropriated by families who own 
the usufructuary estate; and even if there is, group members can no longer 
appropriate it without approval of chiefs, and in some cases, Local Govern-
ment Authorities. As a consequence, usufructuary rights and their benefits 
have been curtailed. In Japekrom and Tamale, some indigenous members in-
dicated that they have to go through the same acquisition process as settlers, 
or pay for the land acquired if they wish to protect their rights. Both indige-
nous and settler landholders were asked, ‘did you pay for the land you hold?’ 
(see Table 6.4) 
Table 6.4 shows that a significant proportion of indigenous landholders in 
Japekrom and Tamale indicated that, they had paid for their land. However, 
most of the indigenes indicated that they had paid fees that were lower than 
those paid by settlers. In Gbawe, indigenes only pay for the cost of surveying 
and preparing the site plan for the acquired land.
Tenure security of usufructuary rights
As discussed in Chapter 3, the reasons for the insecurity of usufructuary 
rights in peri-urban customary areas are many, and the issue has been dis-
cussed extensively in the literature (Alden Wily and Hammond, 2001; Abudu-
lai, 2002). The loss of indigenous farmland to residential use is a major source 
of insecurity (Ubink, 2008a). This study therefore examined the extent to 
which indigenous members of the community face tenure insecurity by in-
vestigating the incidence of forced evictions. Indigenes were asked, ‘have you 
or any of your close relations been evicted from your land?’ (see Table 6.5) 
The statistics in Table 6.5 show that a significant proportion of the indi-
genes studied, or their close relatives, have been evicted from their land. Most 
of the indigenes that were forcibly evicted from their lands in Japekrom and 
Tamale are indigenous farmers, whose farmlands were converted for residen-
tial land use. In Gbawe, most indigenes lost their land as a result of compul-
sory acquisition by the state. As a result, these farmers use all sorts of mech-
anisms to protect their interests. For example, some indigenous members 
of Japekrom privately survey and even register their farmland at the Deeds 
Registry, without the knowledge of the committee responsible for land allo-
cation19. One consequence of the diminishing tenure security of usufructu-
ary rights has been disputes between indigenous farmers/families and chiefs. 
Usually these disputes revolve around who has the right to dispose of the 
land on which the indigenes have been farming. An example of such a dis-
pute is a case that went before the High Court in Sunyani, in which an indi-
19  Interview, Gyaasehene of Japekrom, December 2007.





































gene from Japekrom asked the court to prevent the paramount chief from 
imposing a customary punishment on him after he had disposed of his farm-
land to settlers for residential use without the chief’s consent20.
 6.2.4 Changing modes of transferring interest in land 
Traditionally, the mode of transferring land rights to community members 
have been gifting, inheritance and pledging (Sections 3.4 and 5.3). Land rights 
could also be transferred to non-members of a lineage through gifting, rent-
ing, sharecropping contracts (tenancies), customary mortgaging and land 
pledging. The right to transfer land using any of these mechanisms is rooted 
in local tradition and customary law, and reflects any given area’s socio-eco-
nomic situation. The shift from traditional to market land values and the in-
creasing commoditisation of land have led to land users violating these cus-
tomary restrictions. Landholders were asked, ‘do you have the right to sell, 
gift, lease or mortgage your interests in land?’ (see Table 6.6) 
Table 6.6 suggests that most landholders perceive that they can transfer 
their land free of any restriction through sale, leaving it to offspring (inher-
itance), land gifting, tenancy, customary mortgage and pledging. This clear-
ly indicates that the traditional notion of land being ‘an unbounded resource 
to be used, and not as a commodity to be sold or alienated’ (Pottier, 2005: 
p. 57), is no longer relevant. In Japekrom, for instance, the paramount chief 
complained bitterly about the haphazard sale of customary land. Indigenes 
of Japekrom prepare site plans for their farmlands, subdivide and sell them, 
without the consent of the chief or anybody in the family.21 One settler in 
Tamale voiced what is a typical view of his interest in the acquired land: ‘I 
20  Interview, Gyaasehene of Japekrom, December 2007.
21  Interview, Japekrom, December 2007.































Table 6.6 Right to transfer interests in land 
Land transfer
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have properly acquired the land from the chief, and the necessary custom-
ary obligations and rites have been performed. This land is therefore my bona 
fide property. I can sell or transfer my right to anybody if I so wish’.22
This finding conflicts with Bugri’s (2008) findings from Northern Ghana, 
where farmers confirmed that there were restrictions on their right to sell 
their land. This difference in findings might be explained by the fact that a 
significant proportion of respondents in this study had acquired their land for 
residential purposes. These landholders pay huge sums of money as ‘drink 
money’, and therefore generally assume complete legal power over their land. 
By contrast, strict adherence to customary rules governing land transfers in 
Gbawe might account for why 47% indigenes perceive that they have the right 
to sell their land.
Some of the changes observed in modes of transferring rights are also 
based on personal decisions by landholders. Although the respondents 
acknowledged that there are no restrictions on land pledging and custom-
ary mortgages, they mentioned that the possibility of acquiring credit from 
microfinance institutions no longer make land pledging and customary mort-
gages worthwhile.23 Another reason why landowners prefer not to take out 
customary mortgages is that they often lead to contractual disagreements 
and conflicts. A significant proportion of landholders in all of the areas stud-
ied perceived that there are no restrictions transferring their land rights to 
their own children (via inheritance). Landholders use the intestate succession 
law (PNDCL 111) to back this claim. This law allows the children of a deceased 
parent to benefit from his assets. In this case, landholders were unable to dis-
tinguish between private individual property and family property. 
 6.2.5 Changing land values and land-use patterns
As discussed in Section 2.2, prior to colonisation, customary land was valued 
for its religious, political and social significance, but not for its economic val-
ue. From a religious perspective, land transcends the material realm and as-
sumes a spiritual nature as the final resting place of one’s ancestors (Ezig-
balike et al., 1995). The possession of land was a source of prestige and so-
cial power. It was also believed that the more land a tribe had, the greater its 
strength. Indigenous land-use management practices were strictly based on 
these concepts. It has been argued that when customary land is commercial-
ised, it loses its communal and social value (Larbi et al., 2004). In this regard, 
the study has attempted to investigate whether the ways in which land is val-
ued by indigenes has changed. Indigenous landholders were asked, ‘how do 
22  Interview, Jisonayilli, January 2007.
23  Interview, Japekrom, December 2007.
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you value customary land today?’ (see Table 6.7). 
Table 6.7 shows that indigenes in all of the areas studied valued land more 
in terms of its economic significance than in terms of its spiritual or religious, 
political, or social and communal significance. It is possible that the interven-
tions made by the Gbawe family to sustain traditional social and communal 
values account for the opinion of the indigenes surveyed (83%). This change 
in traditional conceptions of land can be explained by the introduction of eco-
nomic concepts of land as a result of colonisation (Obioha, 2008). 
The field study also revealed significant changes in indigenous land-use 
practices and land-use patterns in the three areas. Subsistence farming based 
on food cropping, which used to be the main source of livelihood for many 
people, has been replaced by cash cropping. Agricultural lands have been 
transformed for residential use. The change of land use from agriculture to 
residential is also well observed in the the findings of the Institute of Social 
Statistics and Economic Research (ISSER) household land survey, which indi-
cates that in peri-urban areas in Ghana, land is increasingly being converted 
from agriculture to residential use, at an average rate of about 55% per annum 
(ISSER, 2005). As a result, farmers have to travel long distances to farm, a situ-
ation that has affected the livelihoods of many people. Unlike in pre-colonial 
times, when family heads could allocate lands to strangers to farm, it is now 
obligatory that all land use, including land for farming, is approved by the vil-
lage chief, and sometimes by the paramount chief. Statutory institutions have 
also placed restrictions on land use, including land for farming.24
 
 6.3 Dynamics of the institutional arrangements 
of customary tenure 
 6.3.1 Erosion of traditional political authority 
The political structure of customary institutions in the areas studied is based 
on kinship. Each lineage is a political unit with its own headman, who rep-
resents the lineage at a higher council (see Section 5.3). At each level of the 
hierarchy, the headman is morally and customarily responsible for planning 
24 Land use is restricted by regulations on building, farming, subdivision and the environment. According to the 
respondents, they are now prevented from farming in certain areas and even from erecting particular kinds of struc-
tures in certain places. They are also not permitted to start building within a number of years after land has been al-
located to them (interview with Gyaasetse, Gbawe-Kwatei family).









































and land management, defence, law and order, maintenance of amicable rela-
tions within the group and the maintenance of adequate communications be-
tween the ancestors and the living (Section 2.2). These responsibilities created 
close household units, allowing the head to easily and quickly solve any prob-
lems that may arise between them. Traditional custodians-chiefs and fami-
ly heads–therefore had dual lineage roles: those of political leader and land 
manager. 
New forms of governing customary land have eroded the political authori-
ty of the chief.25 As discussed in Chapter 3, various laws have been introduced 
to control chiefs’ powers over land. Some legislation has divided the admin-
istration of customary land between the government and traditional custodi-
ans (see Section 3.5). For example, the local government system has curtailed 
chiefs’ administrative power, and now they have to liaise with local govern-
ment authorities in order to plan and administer their communities. The only 
power that the chiefs have held on to is that of the possession of and allo-
cation of land and other property of the customary area, as defined by the 
Chieftaincy Act (1971). 
 6.3.2 Innovation in the institutional arrangements of cus-
tomary land delivery 
In spite of the erosion of traditional political authority, recent developments 
in the areas studied point to innovation in the institutional arrangements of 
customary land management. These represent an attempt by the tradition-
al authorities to reaffirm their control over their territories and resources. In 
all three areas, traditional authorities have set up structures for improving 
land management activities, including creating new procedures for acquir-
ing land, resolving conflicts, recording land transactions and information, and 
strengthening chieftaincy institutions. The innovations in the institutional ar-
rangements observed in the three areas studied are discussed below. 
Land acquisition processes 
In the past, when land was in abundance, indigenes acquired land by means 
of appropriation: they had the right to farm vacant land of any size that be-
longed to the family. However, in order to avoid clashes with individuals who 
already occupied the land, it became necessary for indigenes and settlers to 
ask for express grants of land from the head of the family. When land became 
scarce and the economic value of land increased, all land allocations, includ-
ing land for development and farming, had to pass not only through the vil-
25  The statutory arrangements have given chiefs more power over the usufructs (Alden Wily and Hammond, 
2001).
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lage chief, but also the paramount chief, who gave their final approval.
In the modern land acquisition processes, communities rely on the servic-
es of surveyors and other professionals for land allocation, which is carried 
out using private arrangements. Allocations are based on land-use planning 
schemes (rudimentary or statutorily approved).26 In all three areas, local land 
management committees have been established that have clearly defined 
roles (see Section 5.3). Such an arrangement dissociates the political role of 
chiefs from their land-related roles, both of which were previously handled by 
chiefs (stool/family lands) and family heads (family lands).
The new procedures for allocating land that have emerged in all of the areas 
studied require both indigenes and settlers to apply for land using specially-
designed application forms that specify the applicant’s personal details, the 
amount of land required and the intended use (see Appendix C, Figure C.2).27 
In all three areas, allocations for residential plots are based on well-designed 
layouts. The cadastral plans issued to allottees are endorsed by the head of 
the customary areas. The use of an ‘allocation note’, which is a one-page doc-
ument indicating that a piece of land has been allocated by the chief, has 
become common practice. The allocation note contains the terms in the con-
tract agreed by the allodial owner and the land user. In some customary are-
as, the allocation note commits the person to whom land has been allocated 
to commence development of the land within a specified period and to pay 
annual ground rent. The allocation note also contains the provision that non-
observance of the conditions stipulated in the contract could lead to the land 
being re-possessed by the grantor. The allocation note is signed by the chief 
(in the case of Japekrom and Tamale) or the family head (Gbawe). The allo-
cation note is subsequently used by landholders during the land registration 
process. In our study, indigenous and settler landholders were asked, ‘does 
the allocation note offer you a proof of title and enough tenure security?’ (see 
Table 6.8). 
Table 6.8 shows that both indigenes and settlers in the three study areas 
were of the opinion that the allocation note does serve as a proof of title to 
the acquired land, and offers them enough tenure security. Nevertheless, a 
significant proportion of settlers are of the opinion that the allocation note 
does not offer them enough security to guarantee their titles. These settlers 
claimed that their titles are only guaranteed when the land has been regis-
26  Land-use planning schemes are prepared by village chiefs, who either act alone or in collaboration with the 
DA. Even in rural areas, chiefs employ rudimentary means to prepare land-use plans. Sometimes land allocations 
start before land-use planning schemes have been approved.
27  The information on the forms is vetted and approved by the LACs before land is allocated. In some commu-
nities, two forms are used: the first form is vetted by the LAC, which makes recommendations to the paramount 
chief before the second form is issued.
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tered in the statutory system.28 The respondents also argued that their inabil-
ity to use allocation notes as guarantees to secure loans is a limitation. 
The writing and recording of land transactions 
Although most land transactions in rural customary areas (where people do 
not need documentation to guarantee their interests) continued to be oral, 
the desire of landholders to secure credit from financial institutions that re-
quire well-documented information has led to more customary land transac-
tions being written down. Spurred by the laws such as the Conveyancing De-
cree (1973) (NRCD, 175), which requires the transfer of any interest in land to 
be recorded in writing and signed by the parties involved, the writing of land 
transactions has spread to all customary areas. Interviews with respondents 
in the areas studied indicate that what were previously oral wills and pledges, 
have also become written transactions. 
Conflict resolution mechanisms
Conflicts over customary land in the three areas occur at various levels: be-
tween landusers, allodial titleholders, and in some cases, between landusers 
and allodial titleholders. The most common forms of land conflicts are those 
of ‘indeterminate boundary’ and the ‘double allocation’ of plots.29 Whatever 
form of conflict occurs in a customary area, it is the responsibility of the CTIs 
to exercise their judicial role through indigenous conflict resolution mech-
anisms. As discussed in Chapter 2, these mechanisms are rooted in African 
culture and history, and are in certain respects unique to each community. 
The customary courts rely on the goodwill of society to secure compliance. 
The process involves mediation and arbitration, based on customary law and 
local knowledge. The parties to the conflict are summoned to a common plat-
form (in the presence of the chief and in the field) to testify to solve the con-
flict amicably. Nowadays, in areas like Japekrom, land surveyors are called up-
on to conduct surveys for arbitration, and to demarcate when the conflict has 
been resolved. Allocation notes have also been used as tools for solving land 
conflicts (Interview with the Administrator, Gbawe-Kwatei Family Customary 
Land Secretariat). 
Proliferation of literate and educated chiefs
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the primary form of customary landhold-
28 Interviews with settler respondents in Gbawe and Tamale.
29 Indeterminate boundary’ refers to uncertainty surrounding the boundary of a parcel of land. Sometimes, the 
same piece of land is intentionally or unintentionally allocated to two or more people.












































ing is the family – the basic unit in a society based on lineage. Lineage de-
termines local identity, individual status, the inheritance of wealth and po-
litical office, and even basic relations within communities. Chiefs are elect-
ed within a lineage. The basic requirements for electing a chief include good 
character, knowledge of the relevant customs and the candidate’s acceptance 
by the entire community. The chief should have no disability that can hinder 
him to effectively carry out his work. However, a modern chief needs to have 
other qualities, and being educated is important. As customary authorities 
have to liaise with statutory institutions, it is a matter of practical necessity 
that chiefs are able to read and write. Recently, people from outside the royal 
family have been appointed chiefs, with the intention of tapping their knowl-
edge, skills or resources for the benefit of the community.30 In many commu-
nities, one finds sub-chiefs appointed to perform certain tasks in a commu-
nity, which was rarely the case in the pre-colonial era. For example, the Nko-
suohene (development chief) is a title created to honour someone who is not 
a member of a royal family, but who has been made responsible for the devel-
opment of a region. 
 6.4 Perceptions of the possible causes of tenure 
dynamics 
Chapter 2 argued that demographic, economic, institutional and social driv-
ers are responsible for changes in tenure relations in peri-urban areas. Fac-
tors such as urbanisation, increasing demand of land for housing (econom-
ic factors), colonisation and statutory interventions, the adoption of Christi-
anity and Islam (as opposed to traditional African religions) and the flexibil-
ity of customary law have been highlighted as major underlying causes. An-
other factor that emerged from the in-depth interviews is the proliferation of 
literate and educated chiefs. The impacts of each of these factors varies, de-
pending on the nature of the land development activities taking place in ur-
ban settings. For this study, landholders were asked, ‘which of the following 
are the major factors underlying tenure changes in this area?’ (see Table 6.9).
Table 6.9 shows that in all three areas, landholders perceived population 
growth, the increasing demand for land and the proximity of a settlement to 
an urban setting as the major factors underlying land tenure dynamics. Colo-
nisation and statutory interventions were also perceived to be a major cause. 
Although the landholders perceived the dynamics to have been caused by 
the proliferation of literate and educated chiefs, and religion (Christianity 
and Islam), in their opinion, the impact of these factors has not been as pro-
30 Interview with Bottin-Naa, Jisonayilli, Tamale, January 2008.
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nounced as that of other factors. For example, respondents from Gbawe and 
Japekrom were uncertain as to whether religion has had a major impact on 
tenure dynamics. However, 71% of respondents from Tamale perceived reli-
gion to be a major underlying tenure dynamics. The introduction of Christian-
ity and Islam has pushed out traditional customary practices and sanctions, 
which are considered old-fashioned and unworkable.31 For example, it is diffi-
cult to separate the Dagbon tenure system from Islamic doctrine, as is shown 
by the fact that women have been prevented from becoming involved in land 
issues. Also, 78% of respondents from Tamale perceived proliferation of liter-
ate and educated chiefs as a factor. These landholders argued that it contra-
dicts customary law to select a chief on the grounds of education. They com-
plained that these educated custodians ‘sometimes modify some of the indig-
enous tenure regulations to bring them into line with modern times’32.
 6.5 Concluding remarks
This chapter aimed to analyse and highlight how customary tenure systems 
in Ghana have changed in response to urbanisation, demographic change, so-
cio-economic pressures, and statutory interventions for administering land. 
The analysis of tenure focused primarily on the developments taking place in 
peri-urban Ghana. The analysis shows that customary tenure systems are in-
deed dynamic, and that the extent of the changes depends on the econom-
ic, social and spiritual significance of land at any given time. Although there 
are variations in the extent of change across the three study areas, the gener-
al trend shows changes in land ownership, land-use rights, modes of transfer-
ring interest in land, value attached to land and land use practices. 
Customary land practices are becoming increasingly individualised and 
commercialised. There has been a major shift towards the outright sale of 
land and land leasing for cash. A number of transformations in tenure rules 
support these new forms of tenure and the individualisation and commer-
cialisation of customary land rights. Tenure rules that previously prevent-
ed complete alienation and protected families within customary groups are 
31 Interview with Bottin-Naa, Vittin, Tamale, January 2008.
32 Interview in Jisonayilli, December 2007.
Table 6.9 Perceptions of the possible causes of land tenure dynamics
Factor
Population growth
Increasing demand for land
Proximity to an urban setting (urbanisation)
Colonisation and statutory intervention
Religion (Christianity and Islam)
Flexibility of customary law






















































being modified in line with individualist and commercial agendas. Commu-
nal rights are being changed to individual rights, while land-use rights are 
being replaced with ownership. Restrictions on the transfer of customary land 
rights are being violated for economic reasons. These transformations have 
also been observed in previous research studies (Juul and Lund, 2002; Cotu-
la, 2007; Obioha, 2008), which indicate a transition from community-based 
arrangements to individualised tenure arrangements.
The results also confirm earlier findings in literature, as discussed in Sec-
tion 2.2.2, which show that the evolution of tenure relations over the years 
has been associated with new trends and problems that constrain socio-eco-
nomic development in peri-urban areas. These problems are usually related 
to tenure insecurity and land conflicts, and include evictions, loss of usufruc-
tuary rights, injustices, loss of stewardship on the part of customary author-
ities, the manipulation of customary law, inter-family conflicts and struggles 
for land among the members of landowning groups (Cotula, 2007; Amanor, 
2008; Ubink, 2008a). In particular, usufructuary rights to customary land are 
not guaranteed under the current land development framework. 
More importantly, however, this study observed that the institution-
al arrangements for customary land delivery are dynamic. The flexibility in 
the customary tenure system has allowed CTIs to introduce several innova-
tions in the institutional arrangements for land allocation and the political 
chieftaincy institutions. These innovations in the CTIs occurred in response 
to the changing needs of their communities, and represent the CTIs’ attempt 
to re-assert control over their land resources. Oral transactions in customary 
land management are being replaced with written documentation. The use 
of professionals in land allocations and dispute resolution processes can be 
observed in all of the customary areas. 
The new challenges that are emerging can only be met using innovative 
systems, backed by an enhanced range of skills and institutions for undertak-
ing LA activities. Over the years, customary tenure systems have developed 
their own ways of adapting to these changing demands. The innovations that 
have been introduced in customary land delivery could be a starting point for 
finding appropriate LASs for customary areas. In the next chapter, the field 
study seeks to investigate whether customary tenure institutions can meet 
good governance objectives in LA. 
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 7 Customary tenure insti-
tutions and good land 
governance in peri-urban 
Ghana 
 7.1 Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 2, current trends in debates on secure land tenure 
and formalisation strategies indicate that customary tenure systems present 
the best option for accountable, low-cost and decentralised LA. However, 
Chapters 2, 3 and 6 show that customary tenure systems are dynamic and 
are usually influenced by demographic and socio-economic changes, urbani-
sation, land developments and statutory interventions. Although the dynam-
ics of tenure have led CTIs to innovate in the customary land delivery process 
(Section 6.3.2), the changes put tenure institutions under considerable strain. 
Consequently, customary land management is often marked by abuse of pow-
er, land grabbing, conflicts, evictions, tenure insecurity and a lack of account-
ability (see Section 2.2.2, Section 2.3.6 and Section 6.2.3). These observations 
raise the question as to how CTIs perform with regard to indicators of good 
land governance. 
This chapter presents the results of a field study that assessed the extent 
to which CTIs in peri-urban areas meet good governance objectives in LA. 
CTIs are used to describe a system of indigenous authority that is made up of 
chiefs, councils of elders and steering committees, which are responsible for 
regulating access to land, managing conflicts and maintaining land records. 
The assessment is based on the interaction between CTIs, community mem-
bers and statutory institutions. The five good governance dimensions devel-
oped in Section 5.4 were used to assess good land governance in three peri-
urban areas in Ghana, namely Japekrom, Tamale and Gbawe. The results of 
the study are presented in Section 7.2. The results are based on the questions 
outlined in Table 5.1, and are presented in the context of the five particular 
dimensions: participation, equity, transparency, accountability, and efficien-
cy and effectiveness. Section 7.3 discusses the findings in each of the gov-
ernance dimensions within each case and across all of the cases. Section 7.4 
draws conclusions on the governance assessment in the three customary are-
as, and highlights a number of measures that might be taken to improve gov-
ernance in customary land management. 
 
 7.2 Good land governance assessment 
 7.2.1 Participation 
This study addresses participation in terms of how community members are 
represented, the extent of their involvement in the selection of community 
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leaders, land allocation, dispute resolution and other decision-making pro-
cesses. The research also addresses the level of the CTIs’ collaboration and 
coordination with government land agencies, as well as with other profes-
sionals in the land delivery process.
Representation of members in tenure institutions 
As described in Section 5.3, the CTIs in the areas studied are composed of 
chiefs, councils of elders and steering committees, which facilitate the var-
ious aspects of land governance. Although some common features are to be 
found across all of the institutions, each steering committee is different, hav-
ing been set up in accordance with the needs and aspirations of each land-
owning group. In Tamale area, a few people from the royal family (mostly peo-
ple close to the sitting chief) manage the land delivery process. However, in 
Japekrom and Gbawe, the land management activities are controlled by land 
committees that have clearly-defined roles (Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.3.). These 
land committees serve as links between the CTIs and the general public. 
In all of the areas studied, the sub-families constituting the landown-
ing groups are fairly represented in the chieftaincy institutions and steer-
ing committees. Women are fairly represented in the institutional structure 
of Japekrom and Gbawe (see Section 5.3.). For example, the secretary of the 
LNRC of Japekrom is a woman.33 In Tamale area, however, there is no female 
representation in the committee or council of elders, because customary 
practices do not allow women to play an active role in land governance. 
To further investigate the issue of representation, the respondents were 
asked whether they had a say in who should represent them at the various 
organisational levels. Indigenes and settlers were asked, ‘to what extent are 
community members involved in the selection of community leaders?’ (see 
Table 7.1). 
Table 7.1 indicates that community members’ involvement in the selec-
tion of community leaders varies among indigenes and settlers across the 
study areas. Chiefs, family heads and councils of elders are elected accord-
ing to custom (mainly through kinship – see Section 5.3), and therefore 
their selection is restricted to kingmakers. Nevertheless, the nominations 
of chiefs in Japekrom and the family head of Gbawe have to be endorsed by 
indigenes, particularly those from ‘royal families’, hence the partial involve-
ment. In a similar way, all community members (indigenes and settlers) in 
Japekrom and Gbawe are required to endorse the members of the Land Com-
33 Interview with the Chairman, LNRC of Japekrom.






























Japekrom (stool) Tamale (skin) Gbawe (family)
Indigene Settler Indigene Settler Indigene Settler
S = significantly involved, P = partially involved and N = not involved
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mittees, who are usually nominated by the chiefs and elders, hence the par-
tial involvement. In Tamale area, however, community members do not play 
any active role in the appointment of chiefs and land committee members. 
The members of the local councils who are representatives of the communi-
ties in the Town and Area Councils and DAs (see Section 3.5.3) are elected in 
national elections, hence the significant involvement of community members 
in their selection.
Community members’ participation in decision-making processes 
As in all customary systems, all decisions concerning the use of land in all of 
the areas studied are vested in CTIs. The CTIs are responsible for taking deci-
sions on who should use which land, and what land resources should be used 
for what purposes. In all of the areas studied, regular and ad hoc meetings 
take place in which the chieftaincy and the steering committees take stock 
of their activities and make decisions. These meetings are held at least once 
every fortnight, or whenever the need arises.34 There are structures that allow 
community members to contribute to the decision-making processes, either 
through their representatives, any other member on the committee, or the 
chief/family head. In addition, the annual general meetings/assemblies pro-
vide opportunities for community members to contribute to decision-making 
processes. 
Indigenes and settlers were asked, ‘to what extent are community members 
involved in decision-making on the use of community resources, land alloca-
tion and dispute resolution?’ (see Table 7.2).
Table 7.2 shows divergent views among the indigenes and settlers from the 
three areas concerning the involvement of community members in decision-
making on the use of community resources. About 66% of indigenes and 59% 
of settlers in Japekrom perceived that community members are significant-
ly involved in decision-making on the use of community resources. Only 22% 
34 Interview with the Abusuapanin of Japekrom, chief of Vittin and chief linguist of Gbawe-Kwatei family.
Table 7.2 Community members’ participation in decision-making
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of indigenes in Tamale and fewer than 40% of respondents in Gbawe had the 
same view. Nevertheless, a significant proportion of respondents across all 
three areas were of the view that community members are partially involved 
in decision-making on the use of community resources. Significant propor-
tions of respondents in Tamale (41% of indigenes and 61%settlers) perceived 
that community members are not involved in decision-making on the use 
of community resources. The results also show that more respondents per-
ceived that community members are not involved in land allocation and dis-
pute resolution processes, which are restricted to the committee members 
who perform these tasks. The significant partial involvement of community 
members in allocation and dispute resolution in Gbawe and Japekrom is part-
ly explained by the structures of the customary land secretariat (Gbawe) and 
the LNRC (Japekrom), which allow community members to suggest or provide 
input into the decision-making process. 
Collaboration with LSAs and other professional institutions
The involvement of LSAs and professional organisations is generally based 
on collaboration, and differs across the areas studied. Whereas some insti-
tutions are mandated by law to collaborate with CTIs on land management, 
others are involved via private arrangements. For example, the Acts that es-
tablished the OASL (Act 481) and the LC (Act 143) allow these organisations to 
act in an advisory capacity with respect to the use of stool and skin lands (see 
Sections 3.5.2 and 3.5.3). At present, however, these two agencies do not have 
any formal responsibilities relating to the management of family lands, and 
their involvement is based on private arrangements. Japekrom and Gbawe re-
ly on the services of private surveyors and planners, who prepare base maps 
and land-use maps. These maps are usually approved by the Survey Depart-
ment and the TCPD. In Tamale, surveying and planning are executed by state 
institutions. In general, the LSAs and other private institutions are not direct-
ly involved in customary land allocation processes. Their involvement is pure-
ly advisory, with the exception of those private surveyors who provide techni-
cal services. 
 7.2.2 Equity 
With regard to equity, the field study investigated whether CTIs ensure that 
all community members (male and female) have equal access to land. It al-
so assessed whether or not access to land information, distribution, the utili-
sation of community resources, and dispute resolution are handled in a non-
discriminatory manner, and examined the extent to which CTIs provide equal 
security of tenure to indigenes and settlers. Measures taken to ensure that fu-
ture generations have equal access to land were also examined.
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Community members and land access 
Land in the areas studied belongs to the sub-families that make up the land-
holding group. In essence, access to land is a right, and is inheritable along 
the family line. Individual members invariably have access to a plot of land 
from their leaders. Equitable access to land has become an issue of major de-
bate in customary tenure systems (Ikejiofor, 2006; Amanor, 2009). Indigenes 
and settlers were asked, ‘do you agree or disagree with the statement that “in 
reality, all community members have equal access to land”?’ (see Table 7.3). 
It is clear from Table 7.3 that with the exception of Tamale, the indigenes 
and settlers were of the opinion that all community members have equal 
access to land. Although all members of communities have equal access to 
land, land is not equally distributed among community members.35 Where-
as land for farming can be equally accessed by all community members, 
the same cannot be said of land for housing. Land for farming is distribut-
ed among sub-families, whose leaders ensure that group members receive 
their share. The quantity of land one can access depends on family size and 
the amount of land owned and controlled by the subgroup.36 In general, when 
land changes from farming to residential use, it falls under the control of the 
community leaders and may be treated as a ‘negotiable instrument’. Accord-
ing to a respondent in Tamale, ‘such lands are allocated to those who can 
afford to pay for the land. Indigenes may have to apply for such land, just like 
settlers’. 
Indigenous members of the customary areas were also asked if women and 
men have equal access to land. The result is presented in terms of gender (see 
Table 7.4). 
Table 7.4 suggests that with the exception of Tamale, indigenous male 
and female respondents were of the opinion that men and women have 
35 Interview with the Gyaasehene of Japekrom, December 2008.
36 Interview with the Ankobeahene of Japekrom, December 2008.
Table 7.3 Community members and equal access to land 
Response
Strongly agree or agree (%)
Neither agree nor disagree (%)







































Table 7.4 Equal access to land by gender 
Response
Strongly agree or agree (%)
Neither agree nor disagree (%)








































equal access to land. Japekrom’s matrilineal inheritance system (see Section 
5.3.1) gives men and women access to land. Although the tenure system of 
Gbawe is based on patrilineal inheritance, women have equal access to land, 
and their interests are included in the distribution of land. In Gbawe, land is 
made available to all sub-families who are responsible for allocating land to 
their members, including women.37 The results show that only 52% of indig-
enous male respondents and 45% of indigenous female respondents in Tam-
ale strongly agree or agree that women and men have equal access to land. 
This low response is explained by the area’s strong adherence to a patriline-
al system of inheritance and a cultural system that forbids women from hold-
ing land in their own right. The respondents of Tamale who strongly agree or 
agree that women and men do have equal access to land claimed that under 
the present arrangements, access to residential land depends on the land 
user’s ability to pay for the land, and women with money can access land just 
like men.
Discrimination in access to information and dispute resolution 
Indigenes and settlers were asked ‘do you agree or disagree with the state-
ment that “all community members and the general public have equal access 
to land information”?’; and ‘are all land users given the same opportunity to 
present and defend their claims during dispute resolution?’ (see Table 7.5). 
Table 7.5 shows that with the exception of Tamale, most respondents agree 
that community members have equal access to land information. Only about 
half of the indigenes and settlers in Tamale shared this same view. The signif-
icant number of indigenes and settlers in Tamale who strongly disagree, disa-
gree, or neither agree nor disagree claim that it difficult to find out who is the 
appropriate person to contact for land information. Nevertheless, in Gbawe, 
the respondents indicated that one sometimes has to pay for land informa-
tion. In a similar way, the findings indicate that there is no discrimination in 
the disputes resolution mechanism. According to the respondents, the par-
ties to a dispute are given equal opportunities to present and defend their 
claims, and both have the right to appeal if they are not satisfied with the rul-
ing. However, a significant proportion of indigenes and settlers in Tamale who 
37 Interview with the chief linguist of Gbawe family, October 2008.
Table 7.5 Equal access to information and dispute resolution
Response
Access to information
Strongly agree or agree (%)
Neither agree nor disagree (%) 
Disagree or strongly disagree (%)
Subtotal
Dispute resolution 
Strongly agree or agree (%)
Neither agree nor disagree (%)
































































disagree strongly, disagree or remain neutral indicate that the dispute resolu-
tion mechanism is unfair. 
Tenure security of indigenes and settlers
The ability of modern CTIs to provide equal tenure security for community 
members has been debated at length in the literature. Community members 
were asked whether they agree or disagree with the statement that ‘CTIs pro-
vide equal tenure security for both indigenes and settlers?’ (see Table 7.6).
Table 7.6 shows divergent views on the part of indigenes and settlers in the 
three customary areas. With the exception of Gbawe, there are significant dif-
ferences between the views of indigenes and settlers in Japekrom and Tamale. 
While 77% and 67% of indigenes in Japekrom and Tamale respectively strong-
ly agree or agree that CTIs provide equal tenure security for indigenes and 
settlers, only 54% and 52% of settlers in the respective customary areas have 
the same view. The settlers claim that current practices offer better protec-
tion for indigenous community members than for settlers. To the LSAs tenure 
security for indigenes or settlers depends on the level of urbanisation. The LA 
professionals were of the opinion that settlers have higher levels of tenure 
security in highly urbanised areas, whereas indigenes have higher levels of 
tenure security in rural areas.38 They argue that because settlers in peri-urban 
and urban areas pay a lump sum for their acquisitions, they receive more pro-
tection from CTIs.
Intergenerational equity 
To further investigate equity, the study examined whether CTIs have ade-
quate mechanisms to protect the rights of future generations to their ances-
tral land. The results from all of the customary areas indicate that measures 
have been taken to ensure that indigenous members of future generations 
can still access the land. For example, it was observed that although land gift-
ing is accepted in customary tenure systems, the practice has ceased to exist. 
In all of the areas studied, the highest individual interest one can acquire in 
land is that of leasehold. Leasehold arrangements have even been adopted in 
Gbawe, where tenure arrangements do not forbid the creation of freehold in-
terest in family land. In an interview, an elder from Gbawe claimed that ‘such 
arrangements are made to ensure that future unborn generations are not de-
prived of their ancestral land’. These arrangements are supported by the Con-
stitution of Ghana (1992), which does not permit the creation of freehold in 
stool and skin lands. 
38 Interviews with TCPD, Survey Department and LC in Tamale, Sunyani and Accra.
Table 7.6 Equal tenure security for indigenes and settlers
Response
Strongly agree or agree (%)
Neither agree nor disagree (%) 








































 7.2.3 Transparency 
With respect to transparency, the field study addressed the following key is-
sues: the extent to which the institutions in charge of land allocation and 
land information are accessible to community members; the extent to which 
decision-making processes are open to community members; and the clarity 
of customary law.
Access to institutions and land information
One of the key pillars of transparency in land governance is that of the acces-
sibility of information and the institutions in charge (FAO, 2007). In all of the 
areas studied, access to tenure institutions appeared to be good. The institu-
tional structures of the customary institutions and their location within com-
munities made them readily accessible to community members. Community 
members experienced no difficulties interacting with chiefs, TCs, councils of 
elders or any of the locally-established land committees. Community mem-
bers can access ownership data, data on unallocated land, cadastral plans 
and land-use plans from CTIs. However, the CTIs place restrictions on infor-
mation relating to judicial judgements. Investigating further, the study asked 
indigenes and settlers about their impressions of the accessibility of land in-
formation from CTIs (Table 7.7). 
Table 7.7 indicates that access to land information appears to be good. The 
30% of settlers in Tamale who indicated that access to land information is 
satisfactory claimed that they had had difficulty identifying the right person 
to contact for the land information. The LSAs agree with this claim. The head 
of the OASL in Tamale expressed a typical view when he commented that, 
‘though land information is readily available, they are disorganised, making it 
difficult to access them. In some customary areas, one may find inconsisten-
cies in the information because [the records have] been kept by different peo-
ple’. Furthermore, the absence of a Yaa-Naa as a result of a prolonged chief-
tancy dispute between two royal gates of Dagbon, has effect on access to land 
information in Tamale. According to the Regional Lands Officer, the absence 
of a Yaa-Naa has made it difficult to complete lease documents since he is 
the final authority in the land delivery in Tamale and Dagbon traditional are-
as. Apart from Gbawe, where the CLS keeps information on ownership, tradi-
tional and statutory judgements and ground rents, the quality of the informa-
tion kept by the Japekrom and Tamale CTIs is questionable. 
Publishing land-related information has never been a responsibility of the 
CTIs. Information on customary land management currently enters the pub-


























































lic domain when tenure institutions notify people about claims regarding 
boundaries, judicial judgements and rent information.
Openness of decision-making in land delivery processes
As discussed in Section 7.2.1, although there are structures that do allow 
community members to contribute to decision-making processes, in practice, 
decisions regarding the use of land are mostly restricted to people who have 
been entrusted to make these decisions. Indigenes and settlers were asked, 
‘is decision-making on the use of land open to all community members?’ (see 
Table 7.8). 
Table 7.8 shows that in general, indigenes and settlers perceive that deci-
sion-making processes are open to community members across all three are-
as. The significant proportion of indigenes and settlers in Tamale and Gbawe 
who indicated that decision-making is not open to all community members 
claimed that community members are occasionally asked to provide input. 
They claim that most often, community members are only informed about 
decisions once they have been made. This claim is supported by the LSAs, 
who indicate that decision-making on the use of land is usually restricted to 
chiefs/family heads, elders and facilitating groups.39
Familiarity with and clarity of customary laws 
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the laws regulating customary tenure sys-
tems are neither written nor recoded. Community members become familiar 
with laws by word of mouth as they are passed on from generation to gener-
ation. According to the CTIs, this practice makes the customary laws clear to 
the community members. A typical view to support this claim was given by 
an elder of Gbawe, who claimed that all members of the community were by 
definition aware of the rules regarding land delivery process (Gyapong, 2009). 
Indigenes and settlers in the communities were asked, ‘are you familiar with 
the customary laws regulating land management in this area and are they 
39 Interview with OASL (Accra) and LC (Tamale) in October 2008 and December 2008 respectively.
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clear to you?’ (see Table 7.9).
Table 7.9 shows that with the exception of Tamale, the majority of indi-
genes and settlers felt that they are familiar with the customary laws reg-
ulating land management, and that these laws are comprehensible. A typi-
cal explanation for misgivings on this point in Tamale was offered by an 
indigene from Jisonayilli, who stated that ‘the new procedures for acquir-
ing land require land users to interact with customary and statutory institu-
tions. It is therefore unclear whether the acquisition process follows custom-
ary or statutory laws’. In peri-urban Tamale, modern land acquisition proce-
dures require land users to submit their allocation notes as evidence of allo-
cation to the TCPD. The TCPD then issues a cadastral plan for the acquired 
land – a process that community members often describe as ‘opening a file’. 
In Japekrom and Gbawe, land users only interact with statutory institutions 
when they want to formally register their land. The significant proportion of 
the settlers in Japekrom and Gbawe who remained neutral claimed that not 
every aspect of customary law is clear to them. 
 7.2.4 Accountability
With regard to accountability, the field study looked at the extent to which 
CTIs report on their stewardship to community members, and extent to 
which there is financial accountability. 
Reporting of stewardship 
In all the communities, there are various structures in place that enable CTIs 
to report on their stewardship to community members. Weekly meetings, an-
nual gatherings and other specially-arranged meetings are used as feedback 
sessions, during which the CTIs inform, explain and substantiate their ac-
tivities. In practice, however, the level of utilisation of these structures dif-
fers across the three areas. Indigenes and settlers were asked, ‘how often 
do chiefs and steering committees report on their stewardship to communi-
ty members?’ The response from the community members is shown in Table 
7.10. 
Table 7.10 indicates that the majority of respondents from Japekrom were 
of the opinion that community leaders report on their stewardship to com-
munity members once every year. The respondents claim that these meet-
ings are usually held during the annual munufie festival. In Tamale, few 
respondents claimed that meetings are held once a year and the majority of 
respondents felt that such meetings are rarely held. In Gbawe, the majority of 
Table 7.10 Reporting on stewardship to community members 
Response
Quarterly or less (%)
Twice yearly (%) 
Once yearly (%)
Less than once per year (%)




















































respondents indicated that these meetings are held once a year, or less than 
once a year. 
Financial accountability 
In the past, land could be acquired without any monetary consideration. The 
requirement was that land users present a ‘customary drink’ to acknowledge 
that they had been given land. The customary drink in the Ghanaian tradi-
tion symbolises one’s acceptance and appreciation of a land transaction. In 
the past, traditional drinks, cola nuts or some token monetary payment were 
usually presented. Over time, as the economic value of land has increased, 
the presentation of a traditional ‘customary drink’ was replaced with money, 
usually referred to as ‘drink money’. As observed in this study (Section 6.2.3) 
and also reported by Kasanga and Kotey (Kasanga and Kotey, 2001), in some 
areas, it is difficult to distinguish between the land price and drink mon-
ey, and the latter can be exorbitant. In a situation in which lump-sum ‘drink 
money’ has replaced the customary drink and when even indigenous mem-
bers of communities pay for their land (Section 6.2.3), financial accountability 
has become an issue of major concern in customary land delivery. 
When landholders were asked if they were given any evidence of payment, 
all the respondents confirmed that they had received a receipt of payment 
that had reflected the amount paid. The investigation revealed weak account-
ing procedures in all the study areas, however. In particular, receipts are not 
given for all land transactions. Furthermore, the customary authorities claim 
that drink money is a customary obligation and therefore cannot be account-
ed for. A similar observation was made by Ubink and Quan (2008: p. 200), who 
assert that some chiefs perceive that drink money is not the purchase value 
of land but rather ‘an acknowledgement of the ownership of the land, to show 
allegiance towards the chief, and for customary pouring of libation on the 
ground to seek the blessings of the gods’. Indigenes and settlers were asked, 
‘do you agree or disagree that all forms of revenue received from customary 
transactions should be accounted for?’ (see Table 7.11). 
Most indigenes and settlers in Japekrom and Gbawe strongly agree or agree 
that all forms of transaction should be accounted for, citing the lump-sum 
drink money they pay for acquiring land as an example. The respondents of 
Tamale who expressed a different opinion argue that such revenues are cus-
tomary and must be treated in that respect. 
The indigenes and settlers were also asked, ‘how often do the customary 
authorities present financial statements on dividends that accrue from land 
allocations to community members?’ (see Table 7.12).
Table 7.12 shows that practice relating to the declaration of financial state-
ments on dividends accrued from the use of land appears to be good in 
Table 7.11 Accounting of revenue from informal transactions
Response
Strongly agree or agree (%)
Neither agree nor disagree (%)








































Japekrom and Gbawe. The majority of respondents in Japekrom and Gbawe 
thought that financial statements are presented to community members on 
an annual basis. However, in Tamale, a majority of indigenes and settlers 
were of the view that financial statements are never presented to communi-
ty members. 
 7.2.5 Efficiency and effectiveness
Although some of the issues addressed in the sections on participation, equi-
ty, transparency and accountability covered efficiency and effectiveness, this 
section looks further at efficiency and effectiveness in the sense of: clarity of 
procedures for accessing land; dispute resolution and enforcement; the ade-
quacy of human resources for land governance; the extent to which custom-
ary laws are implemented in land delivery processes; and the mechanisms for 
providing certainty and security of land rights. 
Clarity of procedures for accessing land
Two clearly-defined procedures exist for accessing land in the three areas 
studied. These vary with respect to land usage (farming or housing), and al-
so vary slightly for indigenes and settlers. The procedure for accessing land 
for farming is simple, and is usually handled by the head of the sub-family/
household. Indigenes are only required to notify the head of the family about 
their intention to use the vacant land. Settlers have to be introduced by some-
one in the community who knows them (usually the house owner), who is 
willing to guarantee his/her land use of the land.40 The arrangement for ac-
cessing farmland has changed in recent years, as there is no more vacant 
land. Nowadays, individual households take control of the areas that they 
have been farming. The head of the sub-family is only called upon when there 
is a dispute over boundaries. Settlers can also acquire farmland based on con-
tractual agreements with the indigenous members of communities. Accord-
ing to an elder from Japekrom, ‘money does not feature in this type of land al-
location, unless the land is required for commercial farming. In that case, the 
applicant follows the same procedures laid down for acquiring land for hous-
ing purposes’. 
Accessing land for residential purposes, however, follows a strict procedure 
40 Interview with Abusuapanin of Japekrom stool, December 2008.
Table 7.12 Frequency of presentation of financial statements 
Response
Quarterly or less (%)
Twice yearly (%) 
Once yearly (%)
Less than once per year (%)




















































that consists of well-defined steps: 
1.  Client applies for land by completing and filing an ‘application form’ with   
     the Land Committee;
2.  Land Committee receives application and makes recommendation to Chief 
     or Family Head;
3.  Chief/Family Head approves the allocation;
4.  Client pays drink money (fee); 
5.  Land Committee allocates site and prepares site plan; 
6.  Chief/Family head endorses site plan and issue an allocation note. 
Depending on the institutional set-up in the customary area concerned, 
this procedure can pass through different sub-units of the steering commit-
tee involved in the approval process (Gyapong, 2009). However, on average, 
the allocation process for housing in all of the customary areas ranges from 
four to seven steps in total. Indigenes and settlers were asked, ‘how long did 
it take you to complete the land acquisition process?’ (see Table 7.13).
Table 7.13 suggests that acquiring land from CTIs usually takes less than 
three months. Only in Gbawe did a significant proportion (31%) of settlers 
take 3-6 months to acquire their land. The settlers of Gbawe explained that, 
due to the high incidence of land disputes in Accra and its surroundings, they 
had used the statutory institutions to conduct searches to establish whether 
the land had already been acquired by someone else, before entering into the 
transaction. This explains why the process took longer in Gbawe. 
The indigenes and settlers were also asked, ‘how satisfied are you with the 
current customary land acquisition process?’ (see Table 7.14).
Despite the clarity and short duration of the land allocation process, Table 
7.14 suggests that with the exception of Gbawe, a significant proportion of 
indigenes and settlers were ’somewhat satisfied’ or ‘dissatisfied’ with the 
land acquisition process. Even in Gbawe, a significant proportion of settlers 
were ‘somewhat satisfied’ or ‘dissatisfied’ with the process. The indigenes 
and settlers who were ‘somewhat satisfied’ or ‘dissatisfied’ with the land 
acquisition processes complained that land transactions had become finan-
cial transactions. An Assistant Lands Officer at the LC in Tamale expressed a 
view that was typical of the LSAs:
The inconsistencies in the land acquisition procedures, disjointed and fragmented pieces 
of information, are major problems in the land acquisition process. Sometimes the ten-
sion between main chiefs and sub-chiefs who do the allocations creates the problem of 
Table 7.13 Time taken for land acquisition
Time































































identifying the right person to transact land with.41
Land dispute resolution and enforcement
As discussed in Section 6.3, the main sources of disputes in the communi-
ties studied include uncertainty of boundaries and the allocation of the same 
piece of land to more than one person. Most of these disputes are solved by 
CTIs. In all of the areas studied, land disputes are resolved over two sittings. 
In the first sitting, the parties are allowed to present their cases, supported 
by their witnesses. Based on this evidence, the disputes are solved during the 
second sitting and finally settled in the field. As indicated by one respondent 
from Tamale, ‘land disputes are resolved within one week, as long as the par-
ties involved are available’. The customary dispute resolution mechanism is 
based on arbitration, and in most cases, one party is relocated. Indigenes and 
settlers were asked, ‘how would you describe the effectiveness of the custom-
ary land dispute resolution mechanism?’ (see Table 7.15). 
Table 7.15 shows that more than 70% of the indigenes in all the communi-
ties perceived the customary land dispute resolution mechanism to be ‘very 
effective or effective’. Only an average number of settlers had the same view. 
A significant proportion of indigenes and settlers perceived the land dispute 
resolution mechanism to be somewhat effective. The responses from the 
LSAs indicate that customary dispute resolution mechanisms are effective, 
and they are being adopted as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism 
as part of land reform at the national level.42
Landholders in the areas studied have various reasons for relying on the 
state courts or customary systems for dispute resolution. The indigenes and 
settlers were asked, ‘which mechanism do you prefer to use for land dispute 
resolution: customary or state courts?’ (see Table 7.16).
Table 7.16 indicates that most respondents, irrespective of their commu-
41 Interview with Assistant Lands Officer, LC, Tamale, December 2008.
42 Interview with Assistant Lands Officer, LC, Tamale, December 2008.











































Table 7.15 Effectiveness of the customary land dispute resolution mechanism 
Response










































nity status, prefer customary dispute resolution mechanisms to state courts 
for solving land-related conflicts. Comparing this result to Tables 7.5 and 7.15, 
it can be concluded that although indigenes feel less protected, and settlers 
thought that customary dispute resolution is only ‘somewhat effective’, both 
groups prefer the customary dispute resolution mechanism to state courts. 
The reasons for this include the high cost of and bureaucratic processes 
involved in statutory court procedures. The accessibility of the CTIs and the 
institutions’ ability to enforce their rulings and decisions were other reasons 
given by the respondents. The respondents claim that chiefs have more pow-
er to enforce their rulings than the state courts, which have to rely on the 
police and other institutions. Nevertheless, a significant proportion of indi-
genes prefer state courts to customary mechanisms. These indigenes claim 
that the indigenous dispute resolution mechanism has become non-trans-
parent in its arbitration methods, and tends to favour settlers.43 In Japekrom, 
some land disputes have been taken to the state courts as a result of the ina-
bility of the parties to reach agreement. 
Adequacy of human resources
As discussed in Section 7.2.1, customary systems rely on local capacity for 
land delivery activities, much of which appears inadequate. The communities 
have brought in different mechanisms for improving human resource capaci-
ty for land delivery. While in Gbawe, private land surveyors, planners and law-
yers have been contracted to provide technical services, the Japekrom stool 
relies on voluntary services provided by professionals who are citizens of the 
area. The situation is different in Tamale, where no member of any land com-
mittee has any technical knowledge on any aspect of the land delivery pro-
cess. Although the local committees in the Tamale area are in charge of allo-
cating land, the technical services are executed by the municipal authority.
Implementation of customary law in land delivery processes 
Indigenes and settlers were asked about the extent to which customary laws 
are implemented in the land delivery process (see Table 7.17). 
Our assessment of the extent to which customary laws are implemented 
in land delivery processes produced mixed results. While more than 70% of 
indigenes from all the study areas were of the view that customary laws are 
implemented well, only about an average of settlers shared the same view. 
43 Interview with indigenes of Kalpohini, Tamale, January 2008.





































Mechanisms for providing certainty and security of land rights
Until recently, when land became scarce and customary land attained mon-
etary value, customary communities did not recognise the need to record in-
formation on land transactions. In current land delivery processes (see Sec-
tion 6.3.2), efforts have been made to improve land information storage and 
maintenance. Different mechanisms are used to record and store land infor-
mation in all three areas. Gbawe has a computerised system for recording 
and disseminating land information. In Japekrom and Tamale, however, land 
records are kept in files or log books. These contain the reference numbers of 
the plots allocated, the names of the allottees and the dates on which land 
was allocated. 
In Section 6.2.3 (Table 6.5), it was observed that significant numbers of 
indigenous community members have been forcibly evicted from their land. 
To further investigate the mechanisms for providing security of land rights, 
the study examined the adequacy of compensation given to those who had 
lost their land. Indigenes and settlers who had lost their land when it was 
converted from agricultural to residential land use, or had been subject to 
compulsory acquisition by the state, were asked if they had received adequate 
compensation (see Table 7.18).
Table 7.18 shows that in general, both indigenes and settlers had lost land 
as a result of the conversion of agricultural land believed that they had been 
inadequately compensated. For instance, farmers in Japekrom who lost their 
land claimed that they had been given a few of the urban plots that had been 
created, or had been asked to relocate their farm. According to these farm-
ers, in most cases, they were required to make new land arrangements them-
selves. Indigenes from Tamale who had received compensation complained 
about the lack of transparency and equity in the compensation process. These 
findings are confirmed by other studies in Ghana, in which farmers who lost 
usufructuary rights due to residential development found that these were 
only compensated with the payment of the value of the crops they had lost, 
or were given alternative land, or a percentage of the plot that had been sur-























































































rendered (Kasanga et al., 1996; Alden Wily and Hammond, 2001). Many of 
these famers ended up being landless. 
 7.3 Summary and discussion of findings 
This chapter has assessed the extent to which CTIs in peri-urban areas meet 
good governance requirements in LA. The assesement was related to partici-
pation, equity, transparency, accountability, efficiency and effectiveness.
Participation
Involving actors and building consensus in land delivery decision-making 
processes are important for local communities, and are major factors contrib-
uting to the success of community-based land management systems (Sjaas-
tad and Cousins, 2009). Participation in decision-making processes in cus-
tomary areas is generally based on representation. In all of the areas studied, 
subgroups consisting of land-owning groups are well represented in steering 
committees. Community members do not participate directly in the decision-
making process. Only selected members of the steering committees take de-
cisions on the use of land. However, there are structures that ensure commu-
nity members participate in the decision-making process and in land govern-
ance. Over the years, these structures have ensured that CTIs are accountable 
to local communities (Kasanga and Kotey, 2001; Toulmin, 2009). 
The study indicates that the structures that ensure community participa-
tion are used well in Japekrom and Gbawe, but not in Tamale. The decision-
making process in Tamale reveals exclusion similar to that found in other 
areas in Africa (Amanor, 2001; Peters, 2004). The structures also allow outsid-
ers, including land professionals, to contribute to the decision-making pro-
cess. The CTIs in Japekrom and Gbawe have private contractual arrangements 
with LSAs and other professional institutions to provide technical servic-
es and advice. This finding contrasts to Mugyenyi’s (1988) finding that deci-
sion-making in customary systems in Swaziland are controlled by conserva-
tive elderly individuals who are not receptive to modernisation or the intro-
duction of new ideas and techniques relating to the use of land.
Equity 
The study is inconclusive concerning equity in access to land, information, 
tenure security and the delivery of justice in the three study areas. All com-
munity members have equal access to land, but land is not equally distribut-
ed among community members. The land acquisition processes in some cus-
tomary areas reveals some unfairness on the part of indigenes. In Japekrom 
and Tamale, indigenes may have to apply for residential land just like settlers, 
although they do not pay as much drink money as settlers. Ubink (2007: p. 
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59) reveals similar inequalities in her study on peri-urban Kumasi in Ghana, 
where some chiefs use the power vested in them to discriminate against indi-
genes. Ubink asserts that some chiefs have the opinion that ‘land belongs to 
the royal family, since it was members of the royal family who fought for the 
land’and that land can be taken from community members when necessary. 
The idea that women do not have the same access to land rights as men 
does not appear to be universally applicable. Such assertions tend to be based 
on hypothetical models and are generalised to cover all customary land-
holding practices (Amanor, 2001). This study found that women in Japekrom 
and Gbawe had full rights to agricultural and residential land, unlike wom-
en in Tamale. However, women in Tamale who have money can access land. 
Although in African patrilineal land tenure practice, women are not enti-
tled to land in their own right (Ikejiofor, 2006), in Gbawe, residential land has 
been distributed to group members, including women. This result confirms 
the argument made by other scholars (e.g. Gyekye, 1997) that women’s access 
to land has improved as a result of factors such as migration, education and 
economic change in rural communities. The recognition of women’s rights 
to land has also been influenced by Ghana’s intestate succession law (PND-
CL 111), which allows a woman to inherit their husband’s property, including 
land. In a free land market, women who have adequate financial resources 
can purchase land without any restrictions. However, the recognition of wom-
en’s land rights tends to become less pronounced as one moves from urban 
centres to the hinterland, where culture and social norms tend to be strong 
(Kasanga and Kotey, 2001). 
Transparency
The investigation reveals mixed results in terms of the accessibility and 
openness of decision-making processes in the three communities. While at 
first sight, the results suggest that tenure institutions and information are ac-
cessible to community members, the findings are different in the sudy are-
as. The setup of the land and steering committees in Japekrom and Gbawe 
makes the institutions accessible to community members. Access to land 
information is virtually unrestricted in all the communities, and is free of 
charge in almost all the study areas; the only limits relate to privacy issues. 
Nevertheless, in Japekrom and Tamale, some information may be distorted. 
The evidence from the study suggests that although in all the customary are-
as, there is some level of interaction between CTIs and community members, 
decision-making in Tamale is not open to community members. The ‘annual 
community gathering’ is one important means of making all activities known 
to community members, including the declaration of proceeds from land re-
sources and the use of dividends. This approach promotes free access to land 
information and decision-making, which in turn promotes transparency. 
However, not every aspect of the decision-making process is made known to 
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community members. In particular, some CTIs allocate land without inform-
ing community members. This confirms other reports on Ghana, which indi-
cate a lack of transparency in land delivery processes in many peri-urban are-
as (Berry, 2002; Aryeetey, Ayee et al., 2007; Amanor, 2008). 
The findings of this study seem to depart from the claim that urbanisation 
and pressure fro the land market are undermining transparency in custom-
ary land delivery (Kasanga and Kotey, 2001; Toulmin, 2009). Although Gbawe 
is the most urbanised of the study areas, the institutional structures in place 
seem to promote transparency more than in the other areas. The example 
from Gbawe indicates that transparency in customary land delivery in fact 
benefits from the land market. When customary land attains economic value 
and transactions in land increase, while at the same time, interactions with 
government institutions increase, CTIs have little option but to make their 
activities transparent to community members, prospective buyers and profes-
sional organisations. 
Accountability
The results from the three cases clearly indicate that customary tenure sys-
tems can, in theory, promote accountability. The structures on which CTIs are 
built – feedback sessions, regular and ad hoc meetings and other platforms 
– promote transparency and accountability. In terms of stewardship, the re-
sults from Japekrom and Gbawe seem satisfactory. However, as in other stud-
ies in Ghana (Kasanga and Kotey, 2001; Ubink, 2008a), the results from Tam-
ale indicate that some CTIs no longer act as if they occupy a fiduciary posi-
tion, but instead behave as if they own the communal land. CTIs in Tama-
le do not make their activities transparent to community members, and they 
hardly provide any account of their stewardship to community members. 
Even in Japekrom and Gbawe, where the results seem to be satisfactory, CTIs 
sometimes take unilateral decisions regarding the use of land. The absence of 
stewardship breaks the strong kinship ties within local communities (Clem-
ent and Amezaga, 2009).
Accounting for the monies that accrue from land transactions seems to be 
weak in all of the communities. Even in communities where CTIs account 
for land transactions, it takes about a year to present an unaudited financial 
statement to community members. As with the observations made in peri-
urban Kumasi (Ubink and Quan, 2008), some chiefs avoid accountability on 
the pretext that the monies they receive are merely ‘drink money’. In this 
study, community members disagreed with the chiefs, on the grounds that 
the lump sum they had paid for the land transaction could not be referred 
to as ‘drink money’. Like other areas in Ghana, the value of ‘drink mon-
ey’ is equivalent to the market value of the land (Kasanga and Kotey, 2001). 
Accountability in customary land delivery diminishes when structures that 
hold chiefs accountable collapse (Toulmin, 2009). Nevertheless, some efforts 
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are being made to improve accountability. For example, in Japekrom, an over-
sight committee regularly audits the activities of the committees. In a simi-
lar way, in Gbawe area, a distinction is made between the customary drink 
and other forms of payment. No receipt (or any form of evidence) is given for 
a ‘customary drink’. 
Efficiency and effectiveness 
This study reveals some inefficiency in customary mechanisms for securing 
rights to land in modern peri-urban areas, thereby confirming the findings 
of (Alden Wily and Hammond, 2001). The investigation revealed some forced 
evictions in all three study areas. Even when land losers were compensated, 
they were not given adequate compensation. The study also indicates that 
there are weak mechanisms for recording land information and inequity in 
the distribution of land. In a similar way, although the allocation of land re-
sources and dispute resolution are based on customary law, the influence of 
statutory law has affected the implementation of this law in all the study ar-
eas. 
Yet, the study indicates that CTIs acknowledge the enormous challenge of 
providing tenure security to all land users. Various efforts have been made to 
improve efficiency in land delivery. The innovative use of well-designed land 
acquisition forms, the creation of land allocation committees, the use of pro-
fessional services and the adoption of different means of maintaining land 
information are efforts that are intended to improve efficiency in custom-
ary land management. Innovations introduced in the recording of land infor-
mation can reduce the incompleteness and distortion in land information 
observed in many customary areas. These efforts can increase transparen-
cy in the land delivery process, improve the accessibility of land information, 
and can reduce the possibility of allocating the same piece of land to different 
people. It is also important for efficient land delivery, because the ‘ability to 
enforce rights depends on the ease with which rights holders can access the 
required institutions and information’ (Deininger, 2003: p. 33). Some proactive 
CTIs, like those in Gbawe, recognise the enduring importance of improving 
and protecting the interests of vulnerable groups. The Gbawe family requires 
indigenes to prove they have the means to commence building before land is 
allocated to them. This decision aims to prevent indigenous members of the 
family from reselling the plots allocated to them and becoming landless.
Still, under customary land delivery, the procedures for accessing land are 
clear, straightforward and take much less time than acquisition using stat-
utory institutions. For example, in Ghana, the process for government lease 
acquisition can involve 14 stages, can take from six months to ten years or 
more to complete, and there is no guarantee that the applicant will be allocat-
ed a plot (Kasanga and Kotey, 2001). Furthermore, dispute resolution mecha-
nisms seem to be more effective. The majority of respondents prefer the cus-
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tomary dispute resolution mechanism to statutory law courts. The custom-
ary dispute resolution mechanism is cheap, accessible and timely. Unlike 
statutory court systems, whose decisions, even if they are final, are very dif-
ficult to enforce in practice (Cotula, 2007), the traditional authorities appear 
to offer effective dispute resolution (Burns, 2007). Examples from Ghana indi-
cate that their decisions are respected and implemented accordingly (Kas-
anga and Kotey, 2001). Given the high costs, bureaucracy and delays in for-
mal court procedures, and the fact that it would offer a more down-to-earth, 
local means of handling emerging disputes, the customary dispute resolution 
mechanism could become an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanism 
to ease the workload of courts and troubled formal judicial systems (FAO, 
2007). 
Table 7.19 shows a summary of the results for each community with regard 
to the five dimensions investigated. The table makes inferences from the 
information obtained from the variables for each dimension investigated, and 
qualifies them as good, bad or neither good nor bad. Based on this informa-
tion, the final results for each of the governance dimensions and the level of 
governance for the areas studied are qualified. 
 7.4 Concluding remarks 
This chapter investigated whether customary tenure institutions in peri-ur-
ban Ghana meet good governance objectives in LA. The assessment was 
based on five dimensions: participation, equity, transparency, accountabili-
ty, and efficiency and effectiveness. The assessment of the three customary 
areas indicates a mix of similarities and differences in the individual varia-
bles investigated under each governance dimension, and local variations in 
land governance dimensions. More importantly, however, drawing from the 
evidence from the customary areas, one can make a number of general ob-
servations (Table 7.19). On the one hand, comparing the five governance di-
mensions, one can conclude that participation and equity in customary land 
delivery appear to be good, transparency appears to be satisfactory, but ac-
countability and efficiency and effectiveness appear to be weak. Comparing 
land governance across the customary areas, one can generally conclude that 
governance in the CTIs in Tamale is weak, whereas in Japekrom and Gbawe, 
land governance appears to be satisfactory, with Gbawe exhibiting elements 
of good governance. This confirms the observation made in the literature 



































Study area Final result
Gbawe 
(family)
Key: good (v), bad (x), neither good nor bad (-)
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that Gbawe is an example of ‘progressive practice in customary management’ 
(Ubink and Quan, 2008: p. 206).
Despite the local variations in the governance dimensions and the overall 
performance of governance across the study areas, it can be concluded that 
CTIs potentially meet good governance objectives in LA. The structure on 
which CTIs are built – feedback sessions, regular and ad hoc meetings and 
other platforms – promote participation, equity, and accessibility, which pro-
mote transparency and accountability in decision-making processes. The ten-
ure institutions also enjoy broad legitimacy among community members. 
The interviewees suggested that CTIs are legitimate institutions in the sense 
that they provide: easy access to institutions and land information, clear and 
understandable procedures for accessing land, and effective land dispute res-
olution mechanisms and enforceable rulings; and they indicated a prefer-
ence for customary conflict resolution mechanisms. Gaining access to land 
records and understanding the processes involved is essential for protecting 
the rights of land users (Toulmin, 2009). 
Nevertheless, various measures can be taken to improve the weaker dimen-
sions, in order to improve the ability of CTIs to govern land justly. To reduce 
the abuse of power by some chiefs, there is a need to promote voting in 
the election of land committee members. In addition, the quality of deci-
sion-making and transparency in customary land delivery can be improved 
through interactive participation, by which all people participate in joint 
analysis, leading to an action plan on the use of land. Greater levels of partic-
ipation by community members will ensure that individual and group inter-
ests will be better taken care of. This will also improve the transparency and 
accountability of the system, and hence lead to better land governance. The 
autonomous nature of customary institutions, which prevents external finan-
cial auditing, has the potential to breed corruption and the abuse of power. 
Therefore, policies that will make CTIs more accountable to their communi-
ties, especially those that force CTIs to submit their financial statements to 
external auditors, are highly desirable. 
The next chapter investigates how the use of PGIS could enhance IK, as well 
as local capacity for LA.
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 8 Indigenous knowledge 
and local capacity for 
land administration 
 8.1 Introduction
In Chapter 7, it was observed that current skills and resources in customary 
areas fall short of the requirements for LA. Many CTIs lack the capacity to un-
dertake proper data collection and document land information. The capaci-
ty problems highlighted above are one of the greatest constraints on the suc-
cessful and efficient implementation of LASs that are adapted to local institu-
tional frameworks of customary tenure. As discussed in Section 4.3.3, IK un-
derpins access to land rights and decision-making processes in customary 
land management. IK can therefore function as a knowledge base for LA in 
customary areas. The potential of using PGIS as pro-poor tools to uncover IK 
and build local capacity for LA forms the main subject of this chapter. 
The chapter has two objectives: (1) to identify the IK that is possessed by 
local communities with regard to changes in tenure systems in communities, 
and whether this knowledge can be represented on maps; and (2) to explore 
the usability of PGIS and the resulting maps for identifying underlying rights 
to customary land and supporting LA. Two peri-urban areas in Tamale, Vittin 
and Jisonayilli, were used as case studies. Apart from diversity and changes in 
tenure, the availability of high-resolution data for the p-mapping exercise and 
willingness of locals to cooperate were the main criteria used to select these 
communities.
The presentation of the case findings is based on the steps outlined in Sec-
tion 5.4.3. First, the PGIS approach is presented in Section 8.2. Second, the 
results of the p-mapping exercise are presented and analysed in Section 8.3. 
In each case, counter maps (scale and sketch maps) showing how the elders 
and young people perceived changes in ownership, land-use rights and land-
use types between 1998 and 2008, are presented. The results of feedback 
forums, follow-up community forums, the GPS surveys and the outcome of 
the validation workshop with the LSAs are also discussed. In Section 8.4, an 
appraisal of the PGIS approach and IK is outlined in terms of outputs and 
processes. The appraisal is based on the transfer of IK, the accuracy and rep-
resentativeness of the maps, and the usefulness of the maps for communi-
ties and for LA. The appraisal also covers the usability of PGIS tools for local 
capacity enhancement (participation and empowerment). The chapter ends 
with some concluding remarks in Section 8.5. 
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 8.2 The participatory GIS approach
 
 8.2.1 P-mapping
Data and preparatory work
A Digital Globe Quick Bird satellite image recorded in February 2008, adopt-
ed from Google Earth, was used for the p-mapping exercises. After geo-ref-
erencing using the WGS84, UTM Zone 30N reference system, the image was 
overlaid with a coordinate grid, and the photomap was printed in tiles of A0 
size at a scale of 1:2500 (see Figure 8.1). This scale enables objects to be easily 
identified. Printing at higher scales would cause too much blurring and would 
obstruct image interpretation by the human eye. To verify the p-mapping ex-
ercises, two types of map were acquired: (i) a 1:50,000 topographic map from 
1967, compiled from aerial photographs taken in November 1960 and March 
1962; and (ii) a town sheet at a scale of 1:2,500, created in 1997. A GPS (Sil-
va navigator), which identifies coordinates with an accuracy of 10 metres (if 
no use is made of any GNSS infrastructure), was used to measure reference 
points to check the maps created during the p-mapping exercise. In each vil-
lage, a table large enough to accommodate the photomaps was constructed. 
The p-mapping approach adopted in this study can be subdivided into eight 
stages, which are described in the subsections below.
Figure 8.1 Photomap of Vittin
[ 161 ]
1. Approaching the community – Several meetings were organised to seek per-
mission from chiefs to work in their communities, to explain the objectives of 
the study, its relevance and the researcher’s expectations concerning the role 
to be played by inhabitants. The photomaps were displayed and the p-map-
ping exercise was explained (Figure 8.2). An observational walk around the 
study area was conducted to obtain first-hand information about the commu-
nity’s boundaries and current tenure situation.
2. Focal groups – In each of the two communities, two focal groups were se-
lected for the p-mapping exercise. One group consisted of 20 elders (aged 50 
and above), and the other of 20 younger people (aged between 25 and 49). The 
selection of the participants was made using snowball sampling techniques 
(Mack et al., 2005). The researcher did not influence the selection of the parti-
cipants. Chiefs and community members used their social networks and local 
knowledge to select people who could participate in the p-mapping exercise. 
The selection criteria included: knowledge of the community’s tenure system, 
length of stay in the community, and availability and willingness to partici-
pate. Furthermore, as a group, the participants represent a broad spectrum of 
stakeholders, including the council of elders, family heads, chiefs, the Land 
Town Development Committee (LTDC), indigenes and settlers who had lived 
in the community for more than 20 years. 
3. Training – Community members selected two individuals, one from each 
focal group, for training. The selection criteria included the ability to read and 
write and the ability to act as an interpreter; in other words, they had to have 
mastery of both English and the local language. After being briefed on the ob-
jectives of the study and their own roles, the trainees were taught the basics 
of p-mapping. Next, they were trained in image interpretation, including pho-
tomap orientation, the identification of features on maps and the use of map-
ping tools. They were also given some information about the ethics of PGIS 
and taught how to carry out GPS measurements. 
4. Sketch- and scale mapping – Overseen by the trainees and facilitated by the 
researchers, two one-day p-mapping exercises were conducted separately for 
the two focal groups in each community. To start with, participants created 
sketch maps to show their familiarity with their environment and to get to 
know the p-mapping tools and photomaps. On A0 sheets, each group drew 
the community boundary, the land controlled by the subgroups, farmland, 
residential areas, historical sites, main road networks and other features. 
Next, participants produced scale maps on transparencies, which were supe-





rimposed on the photomap. Using pictograms and coloured pens, the parti-
cipants drew the boundary of the community, boundaries of land owned by 
subgroups, land ownership, use rights and land-use types for the present day 
(2008) and the year 1998 (see Figure 8.3). Each group produced six maps. 
5. Feedback forum – For each community, the results of the p-mapping exercise 
were displayed during a feedback forum. During this forum, all other commu-
nity members were able to validate the scale-maps and suggest additions and 
corrections. The evaluation focused in particular on the level of participation 
and the extent of the match between the maps produced by the elders and by 
the younger people. Fifty-two community members in Vittin and 58 in Jiso-
nayilli participated in the feedback forum.
6. Transects and GPS survey – Based on the information from the p-mapping 
exercise, transects were designed to capture selected features, including 
roads, boundary points, rivers and shrines, using GPS. The survey aimed to ve-
rify the ability of locals to interpret the photomap and ascertain whether the 
maps reflected the actual state of the terrain. 
7. Data Processing – After completion, the researchers processed the scale 
maps in a GIS (ArcGIS 9.3). The transparencies were scanned, geo-referenced, 
digitised and printed in tiles on the same scale as the photomap (1:2500).
8. Follow-up community forum – During a second forum, which was attended by 
community members, chiefs, elders and members of land allocation commit-
tees, inventories were made of how the PGIS exercise had been perceived as a 
whole. Community members assessed the usefulness of the map tiles and the 
usability of the p-mapping tools, including their possible role in formal LA ac-
tivities. The discussions were facilitated by the researchers, assisted by a local 





maps, sketch and scale maps, and a documentary video of the exercise to the 
communities. Seventy-two community members in Vittin and 65 in Jisonayilli 
participated in the follow-up forum. 
 8.2.2 Validation workshop
The results of the p-mapping exercises in Vittin and Jisonayilli were present-
ed at a validation workshop, attended by representatives from all of the LSAs, 
namely: the LC, the Survey Department, the LTR, the OASL, the LVB and the 
TCPD. Also present were representatives from the Accra Metropolitan Assem-
bly, the Land Administration Project Unit (LAPU) and other private land or-
ganisations. The aim of the validation workshop was to discuss the useful-
ness of the sketch and scale maps, and the applicability of the PGIS tools for 
LA. First, the PGIS approach adopted in the study was explained, the sketch 
and scale maps were exhibited and the documentary video of the exercise 
was screened. During the main part of the workshop, participants discussed 
the feasibility of scale maps as input for LA and how PGIS tools can support 
the LA process in Ghana. Next, the participants completed a questionnaire. 
The workshop ended with a discussion session. 
 8.3 Results and analysis
 8.3.1 Sketch mapping
The sketch maps produced by the elders, who were asked by the researchers 
to map important features of their communities, show that locals are familiar 
with their environment, although the types of features mapped differed (Figure 
8.4). Residents of Vittin valued the registration of subgroups, while those in Jiso-
nayilli emphasised the new cemetery and local schools. This is probably due to 
differences in the timescale of urbanisation, which started around one decade 
ago in Vittin, but has already been underway in Jisonayilli for over 20 years. 
[ 164 ]
 
 8.3.2 Scale mapping
Subgroups
As discussed in Section 5.3.2, customary land in peri-urban Tamale is con-
trolled by subgroups or families, who manage the land on behalf of the 
chiefs. The boundaries of the land controlled by subgroups are not physical-
ly marked in the terrain, but follow natural features such as rivers, gullies and 
hills. In Vittin, nine subgroups were recognised by the elders group and 11 by 
the group of younger people (Figure 8.5a, b). There are minimal differences be-
tween the maps produced by the two groups, and these differences generally 
occur where the boundaries do not follow natural features. The younger group 
mapped areas controlled by caretaker chiefs, hence the resulting difference 
in the number of subgroups. In Jisonayilli, six subgroups were recognised by 
virtually all of the community members involved (Figure 8.5c, d). Although 
land acquisition by the state tends to reduce the amount of land controlled by 
some subgroups, the boundaries have remained unchanged.
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Land ownership
In all of the communities, both the elders and the younger groups identified 
three types of land ownership: allodial (communal), state (public) and individ-
ual. In Vittin, the communal land includes the cemetery, the market, the dam, 
the shrine and the church. The estate residential area, public schools and oth-
er public areas are perceived as state land. All private houses and commercial 
areas owned by private persons or groups are classified as individual lands. 
The spatial extent of the perceived changes in land ownership over the last 
decade are mapped in Figure 8.6 and quantified in Table 8.1. The scale maps 
of Vittin show a significant decrease in the amount of communal land and a 
significant increase in the amount of individual land over the ten-year period.
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The residents of Jisonayilli perceived communal land to be communally 
owned and used, and that this included schools, clinic, the refuse dump, the 
shrine, the church, the mosque, the market, reserve land and the cemetery. 
Individual lands are those acquired by individuals and corporate bodies. State 
lands are those perceived to be legally acquired by the state, and include res-
idential areas for the Northern Region Rural Integrated Programme (NORRIP) 
and the VRA. Despite being controlled by the government, schools and pub-
lic areas were classified as communal, since ownership of these is still vested 
in the community. The spatial extent of the perceived changes in land owner-
ship during the last decade were mapped in Figure 8.7 and quantified in Table 
8.2. The government has acquired a large portion (42%) of land in Jisonayilli. 





































































Communal land has increased slightly, reflecting the conversion of land into 
a cemetery in the late 1990s. 
Land-use rights
Five main land-use rights were identified: public, collective, usufructuary, 
leasehold and gift. Although rights such as short and long-term leasehold, 
freehold and licens can be identified for state-acquired lands, depending 
on the kind of instrument used for acquisition, this study refers to all such 
rights as public. Collective rights include burial and trading rights. Usufructu-
ary rights can be categorised as building, fishing and farming rights. Although 
a gift is actually a form of freehold right, in the framework of this study, it 
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is considered to be a use right. The scale maps produced by the elders and 
groups of younger people showed a decrease in usufructuary rights (about 
90%), while leasehold (which did not exist in 1998) had significantly increased 
by the same percentage in 2008. The differences in public rights, leasehold 
and gift over the ten-year period were marginal. The spatial extent of the per-
ceived changes in land-use rights over the last decade were mapped in Figure 
8.8 and quantified in Table 8.3. 
In Jisonayilli, four types of land-use rights were identified: public, collective, 
usufructuary and leasehold. For both the elders and the younger groups, pub-
lic rights covered about 42% of rights in 1998 and in 2008. Collective rights 
increased by 2% over the ten-year period, while leasehold decreased by the 






























































Year Public (%) Usufructuary (%)

















same percentage, due to the conversion of residential land into a cemetery 
(as mentioned earlier). No farming tenancies were indicated. The spatial 
extent of the perceived changes in land-use rights over the last decade were 
mapped in Figure 8.9 and quantified in Table 8.4. 
Land-use types
Six types of land use were distinguished by the two communities: 




■ public space: markets, schools, roads, the public cemetery, public toilets, 
the refuse dump, recreational areas and similar locations
■ residential: land occupied by dwellings or earmarked for this purpose
■ spiritual: shrines and other spiritual or historical features.
In Vittin, there were no significant differences between sketch maps pro-
duced by the younger group and the elders. The amount of agricultural land 
has decreased significantly over the decade, while residential land-use in-














































creased significantly by almost the same percentage. There were marginal or 
no changes in other land-use types. The changes in land-use types over the 
last decade have been mapped in Figure 8.10. 
There were few differences between the maps produced by the younger 
groups and the elders in Jisonayilli. The amount of land for agricultural use 
has decreased significantly, with a corresponding increase in residential use. 
Some lands are used for commercial purposes. There is no forest in Jisonayil-
li. The amount of public space increased slightly over the period, due to the 
requirement that the amount of land for public amenities be increased. Figure 
8.11 shows community members’ perceptions of land-use patterns in Jiso-
nayilli for 1998 and 2008.
 8.3.3 The feedback forum 
The purpose of the feedback forum was to allow those community mem-
bers who had not participated in the p-mapping exercise to validate the scale 
maps. In Vittin, both the younger groups and elders identified land controlled 
by subgroups. The young people detailed all land allocated to caretaker chiefs, 
hence their identification of 11 subgroups. The elders emphasised the accu-










































rate mapping of the boundary of the community, but they did not detail land 
allocated to caretaker chiefs within subgroups. Both the young people and the 
elders identified the three types of land ownership. There were disagreements 
as to which lands had been given as gifts. The elders indicated two spiritual 
sites, whereas the young people only indicated one; and the forest was only 
indicated by the young people. 
In Jisonayilli, both the young people and the elders identified the bounda-
ry of the community and all areas controlled by subgroups. The elders did not 
indicate part of the state land, and neither the young people nor the elders 
identified land that had been given as a gift.
 8.3.4 The GPS survey 
A plot of GPS points on the scale maps shows that a vast majority of the loca-
tions of features measured by GPS coincided with locations on the map (Fig-
ure 8.12). The deviations can be attributed to the elders, who found it difficult 
to identify the smaller features on the photomap. Overall, it is clear that the 
participants know their environment well and can easily identify features on 
photomaps. 




























 8.3.5  The follow-up community forum 
At this forum, community members appraised the output and the PGIS pro-
cesses that had been used in the study. In both communities, the elders were 
amazed that they could represent their knowledge of the history of the land 
tenure system on paper, and recognised that this could play a valuable role in 
transferring knowledge to future generations. The exercise enabled younger 
people to learn from the elders. Some appreciated having had an opportuni-
ty to learn about GPS and map-reading, both skills that can be developed with 
little or no support from professionals. Participants in the forum recognised 
that these skills would enable them to become more equal partners in the LA 
process, and that the scale maps are valuable for solving conflicts on bounda-
ries and ownership. 
 8.3.6  The validation workshop 
This workshop aimed to validate the output maps and appraise the utility 
and usefulness of the scale maps and the PGIS approach for LA. At the work-
shop, it was generally acknowledged that the scale maps could be used for 
resolving land conflicts, among other things. The scale maps showing the 
trends in ownership changes, land-use rights and land-use types are also im-
portant for orientation, reconnaissance and the planning of adjudication. Fur-
thermore, the maps can provide officials with information about the tenure 
situation in a particular place, before they start mapping and land-use plan-
ning. During the workshop, representatives from the Survey Department ex-
pressed their concern that the quality of the scale maps did not meet the ac-
curacy standards stipulated by Ghana’s Survey Regulations for cadastral map-
ping and land title registration. With regard to the p-mapping process, all par-
ticipants acknowledged that the process could be adopted for land adjudi-
cation in customary areas, when historical information is needed to provide 
certainty regarding customary boundaries and rights. Nevertheless, holding 
the workshop in Accra instead of Tamale could have affected the analysis in 
the workshop. For example, the experiences of the staff of the LSAs in Tamale 
and their interactions with the indigenous people place them in a position to 
evaluate the representativeness and usefulness of the scale maps better than 
those in Accra. 
 8.4 Appraising indigenous knowledge and PGIS
The benefit of PGISs can be divided into two types: those related to output 
and those related to process (Minang and McCall, 2006). With respect to out-
put, our appraisal of PGISs paid attention to the transfer of IK, how the maps 
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reflect the terrain and their usefulness to the community and for LA. The 
process was appraised with respect to the ability of locals to use PGIS tools 
(usability) and to participation and empowerment.
 8.4.1 Dynamics of tenure
The results of the p-mapping exercise show that IK on land ownership, land-
use rights and land-use types can be represented spatially. The scale maps 
show a significant change in the spatial extent of land ownership, land-use 
rights and land-use patterns, confirming the findings in Sections 6.2.2, 6.2.3 
and 6.25. Like other areas in Ghana (Section 3.3), in all the communities, state 
ownership has been carved out of communal land. For example, Jisonayil-
li has lost almost half of its land to the state. Furthermore, there has been a 
significant shift from collective land-use rights to individual land-use rights 
(see Figures 8.8 and 8.9). Individual land acquired through leasehold agree-
ment increased significantly over the decade. Land use went under a signifi-
cant shift from farming to residential development (see Figures 8.10 and 8.11). 
The scale maps confirm the increasing individualisation of collective rights 
observed in Chapter 6, and reported in other studies (Mends and De Meijere, 
2006). The scale maps also confirm Pottier’s (2005: p. 60) assertion that ‘coloni-
al development policy converts “use” into “ownership”, “users” into “owners”. 
Comparing the scale maps (Figure 8.6 with Figure 8.8, and Figure 8.7 with Fig-
ure 8.9), one can conclude that land given to individuals on leasehold is con-
ceived as individual land.
 8.4.2 Transfer of indigenous knowledge 
In the two communities, it was established that IK on tenure is not formal-
ly recorded. Instead, such information is stored through continuous practice 
and memorisation. Younger generations learn from older ones via processes 
of observation, oral narration, storytelling and discourse. The results of the 
exercises indicate that IK is not lost, but instead transferred from generation 
to generation. There are small differences between how the young and old 
perceive their environment, and the elders were more knowledgeable than 
the younger groups. This became evident during the p-mapping exercise. The 
younger people found it difficult to sketch the boundaries of the subgroup, 
particularly those that did not follow any natural features. It took them long-
er than the elders, because they had to debate for some time before they were 
able to start sketching. 
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 8.4.3 Accuracy of the maps
The GPS survey (Figure 8.12) indicates that IK reflects reality, and that local 
communities have a rich knowledge of their environment. The town sheet of 
1997 shows a level of urbanisation that is similar to that on the scale maps 
created by locals, representing the situation in 1998. The land-use map of 
2008 indicates that Vittin is a predominantly residential area. Scale maps 
showing land ownership could be compared with records from the LC, which 
indicated that a larger portion of the land is communally owned. The locals 
were also ignorant of the fact that the government had acquired land for mili-
tary purposes (Figure 8.13). 
The absence of military land on the scale maps may be due to a lack of 
communication between the Yaa-Naa who signs transfer agreements with the 
government and the chief of Vittin; or the knowledge may have been lost over 
time. The absence of a Yaa-Naa did not allow us to verify this information. 
Indeed, IK weakens over time; some participants found it difficult to recon-
struct the tenure situation that had existed ten years previously. This corre-
sponds with the observation made by Minang and McCall (2006), that defi-
ciencies in the way that information is stored and communicated are a key 
weakness of IK. IK can be incomplete, meaning that local experience should 
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be used as a starting point to complement scientific and other technical 
knowledge. 
 8.4.4 Usefulness of the maps 
The scale maps (Figures 8.6, 8.7, 8.8 and 8.9) provide an overview of rights 
to ownership and use on customary land. The maps clearly show the hier-
archy of complex rights and interests associated with the ownership, control 
and use of customary land, confirming claims made by Österberg and Larbi 
(Österberg, 2002; Larbi, 2006). The maps also show that customary land rights, 
which are only documented in local memory, can be revealed along histori-
cal time lines (Lamptey, 2009). The validation workshop for the LSAs and the 
follow-up forum with the locals revealed that the maps created using PGIS 
tools are appropriate for several, but not all, LA purposes. Boundary repre-
sentation using the p-mapping approach was not up to cadastral mapping 
standards. This limitation raises the argument about the purpose of maps 
discussed in (Alcorn, 2000). Since maps are made for different purposes, this 
limitation does not necessary mean that the sketch maps are not useful. Ac-
curate boundaries are one of the many characteristics of a map, are impor-
tant for specific purposes (including LA) and may require the use of technical 
tools. An obvious solution would be to identify and delineate general bound-
aries using p-mapping, after which professional land surveyors could meas-
ure the boundaries accurately using tools (if necessary). More importantly 
however, this so-called ‘accuracy standard limitation’ emphasises the need to 
have flexible survey and mapping standards for peri-urban areas (see Section 
4.2.1).
Many land disputes pending in statutory law courts lack vital information 
regarding tenure (Kasanga and Kotey, 2001). Indeed, the resolution of these 
disputes is hindered by the absence of information on root titles in customary 
land. P-mapping using PGIS would provide this information. Scale maps could 
also act as a key source of information for dispute resolution.
 8.4.5 Usability of PGIS tools
The PGIS tools appeared to be readily accessible, understandable and usa-
ble, all essential features given local skill and education levels. When the re-
searchers first approached the communities, the locals were immediately 
able to identify features such as schools, dams and the chief‘s palace on the 
photomap. In Vittin, the locals soon realised that the photomap did not cover 
the entire community. These examples show that locals are capable of read-
ing and interpreting photomaps. They do not require special skills, as is the 
case for interpreting standard maps. The use of simple map symbols, such as 
rectangles for dwellings, makes the p-mapping exercise easier to follow. Us-
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ing a PGIS is thus not only a usable method for mapping indigenous lands, as 
Anderson and Chapin et al. have shown (Anderson, 2000; Chapin et al., 2005), 
but also for mapping the multiplicity of rights in customary land.
 8.4.6 Participation and empowerment
This study has demonstrated that locals can independently and actively par-
ticipate in LA activities. There was high participation by community members 
in the p-mapping process. Contrary to the argument made by Mosse (2001), 
that some members of communities can be marginalised during p-mapping, 
in the case areas, all locals were invited to contribute, and those participat-
ing were actively involved. This reflects the notion that the practice of PGIS 
promotes interactive participation of stakeholders in generating indigenous 
information (McCall, 2003; Kyem, 2004). P-mapping using easily accessible 
tools, that is, inexpensive geo-data collection tools, can encourage locals to 
document their own knowledge relating to tenure. The exercises made them 
aware of the need to regularly record IK on land tenure, before it disappeared 
from collective memory. The learning aspects of participating in joint activi-
ties are a further aspect of empowerment, as is the ability to master modern 
geo-information technology, such as GPS.
 8.5 Concluding remarks
This chapter described a case study investigation that explored the poten-
tial of PGIS for uncovering IK and enhancing local capacity for LA. The locals 
proved to be knowledgeable about the changes that had occurred in the land 
tenure systems in their communities over the past ten years. Given that lo-
cals are well informed about local conditions, it would be counterproductive 
to overlook this knowledge when developing mechanisms to record and se-
cure rights, particularly if the measures proposed are not suitable for the lo-
cal conditions and aspirations. PGIS proved to be useful tool for uncovering 
IK.
The PGIS tools also promote interactive participation by community mem-
bers and promote empowerment. Both literates and illiterates can use PGIS 
tools. The community members were able to interpret photomaps, trans-
fer their spatial knowledge to sketch and scale maps and use widely-avail-
able geo-information technology, such as hand-held GPS devices. PGIS tools 
helped the locals to document their knowledge of the history of their land. 
The maps created could be of significant importance in the identification of 
underlying rights in customary land. In this way, locals can be involved in the 
process to identify and document land rights. The locals demonstrated their 
ability to carry out the PGIS approach independently. They chose participants 
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and trainees, decided on when to undertake the p-mapping, and facilitated 
the entire mapping processes. The ability to use PGIS tools with little profes-
sional support clearly indicates that local communities can use such tools to 
carry out day-to-day tenure documentation activities, and are thus in a posi-
tion to administer their own land with little support. This method could act 
as a paradigm for creating PGIS strategies for uncovering IK, so as to identify 
underlying rights in customary lands and enhance local capacity for LA.   
  Based on the results of the case studies described in this and the two pre-
ceding chapters, the next chapter discusses the strategies required to adapt 
LA to local institutional frameworks of customary tenure, and to meet the LA 
requirements defined in Chapter 4.
[ 178 ]
[ 179 ]
 9 Strategies for designing 
land administration 
systems for peri-urban 
areas 
 9.1 Introduction 
The aim of this study is to contribute to improving tenure security in peri-ur-
ban customary areas. In Chapter 4, six requirements for designing effective 
and sustainable LASs for peri-urban customary areas were identified and an-
alysed. These were namely: adaptability, flexibility, upgradeability, affordabili-
ty, legitimacy and good land governance. A framework was developed to ana-
lyse these requirements in peri-urban customary areas in Ghana, focusing on 
three key issues (described in Chapters 6, 7 and 8). In Chapter 6, the discussion 
focused on the dynamics of tenure and dynamics in customary institution-
al frameworks for land delivery. In Chapter 7, customary tenure institutions 
(CTIs) were assessed from a good land governance perspective. In Chapter 8, 
the potential of PGIS to enhance IK and local capacity for LA was addressed. 
Comparing the three issues investigated across the three customary areas, it 
is clear that the cases show some similarities and differences, and thus with 
regard to the potential of CTIs to meet LAS requirements. In this chapter, we 
look at the similarities and differences identified, and how these can be relat-
ed to the development of strategies for designing alternative LASs for peri-ur-
ban customary areas. The main objective of this chapter is to show how LASs 
based on the institutional framework of customary tenure offer an alternative 
approach to achieving the LAS requirements identified in Section 4.2. 
First, Section 9.2 conceptualises how one might design an LAS that is 
adapted to the institutional framework of customary tenure. The concep-
tual framework draws on the lessons learnt in the field study (Chapters 6, 7 
and 8), formalisation strategies, trends in international land policy and the 
reforms discussed in Chapter 2. In Section 9.3, the conceptual framework for 
implementing the LAS is presented. The framework focuses on three aspects: 
organisational structure (Section 9.3.1); tenure models (Section 9.3.2); and 
institutional arrangements (Section 9.3.3). These strategies discuss the key 
areas that need to be improved and the options available to implement them. 
The chapter looks at potential challenges to the implementation of such an 
LAS in Section 9.4, and some concluding remarks are offered in Section 9.5. 
 9.2 Conceptualising land administration sys-
tems for peri-urban customary areas
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of the field study. In 
addition, a number of more general observations can be made, based on the 
comparative analysis of the three elements investigated. In this section, we 
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reflect on the conclusions drawn from the three field studies, so as to analyse 
the feasibility of adapting LASs to the tenure systems and institutional frame-
works of customary land delivery. 
First, the analysis of how customary tenure systems in peri-urban Ghana 
have responded to the changing needs of peri-urban dwellers shows that a 
number of transformations have led to new forms of tenure and the individ-
ualisation of land rights. These new forms of tenure can only be supported 
by innovative institutional arrangements. The study indicates that customary 
tenure systems have their own mechanisms for adapting to change (Section 
6.3). For example, innovations introduced in customary land delivery process-
es, such as the writing of land transactions and the establishments of new 
land committees, are responses to new challenges (Section 6.3.2). As previ-
ously noted, flexibility and fluidity are inherent characteristics of custom-
ary tenure systems (Bruce, 1988; Berry, 1993; Juul and Lund, 2002; Deininger, 
2003), which allow the institutions to adapt to change. The flexibility of cus-
tomary tenure systems will inevitably allow for the use of innovative proce-
dures to adapt LASs to local conditions. It is therefore important to allow cus-
tomary tenure systems to evolve naturally to suit prevailing conditions, with-
out any interference. 
Second, the study’s findings indicate that the structures on which CTIs are 
built – feedback sessions, regular and ad hoc meetings – promote participa-
tion, equity, and accessibility, which promotes transparency and accounta-
bility in decision-making processes. These structures and the broad legitima-
cy enjoyed by institutions among community members mean that the insti-
tutions potentially meet good governance objectives in LA. Furthermore, the 
study indicates that CTIs are legitimate and credible institutions for admin-
istering land in customary areas. Legitimacy and credibility in customary 
tenure systems is based on institutions that have played long historical and 
social roles. These institutions also offer low-cost and effective conflict res-
olution mechanisms (Section 7.4). In addition, the legitimacy of the CTIs and 
the role played by these institutions in LA are also recognised by the consti-
tution and other legal provisions in Ghana (Sections 3.2). Nevertheless, the 
study reveals bad governance in customary land delivery in areas related to 
transparency, equity, accountability and efficiency (Section 7.3). It is therefore 
important that mechanisms for improving land governance should be aimed 
at these dimensions, in order to improve the ability of CTIs to govern land 
justly. Measures that promote ‘popular participation’ in the selection of land 
committee members, reporting of stewardship, financial accountability and 
community participation in decision-making would be desirable (see Section 
7.4). 
Third, this study confirms claims in the literature that current skills and 
human resources in customary areas are not adequate for the provision of 
effective data collection and maintenance (Section 7.2.5). Only Gbawe-Kwa-
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tei has a few members of staff who can collect ground rents and manage land 
information. These communities also have inadequate financial resourc-
es with which to hire professional services. The present system, in which 
the CTIs rely on goodwill professional services, seems inadequate (Sections 
5.3, Section 7.2.1, 7.2.5). Enhancing the capacity of local communities will be 
essential, and is an important precondition for adapting LASs to customary 
institutional frameworks. There is a need to provide simple and user-friendly 
tools that will improve the ability of local institutions to collect, record, main-
tain and disseminate information on tenure. 
In Chapter 8, we saw that a PGIS is a potential LA tool, in its capacity as a 
pro-poor land tool to elicit IK and enhance local capacity for LA, as shown 
by the p-mapping exercises (Section 8.4.3). The data obtained from IK could 
be used for many purposes and to develop a knowledge base for LA in cus-
tomary areas (see Section 8.4.4). Although IK becomes weaker over time (also 
reported in Minang and McCall, 2006) and can therefore be incomplete, it can 
be used as a starting point and to complement scientific, technical and oth-
er knowledge. The outcomes of the case study also confirm that the PGIS 
approach can add value to IK. The ability to use PGIS tools with little profes-
sional support clearly indicates that local communities can use them to car-
ry out day-to-day LA activities. The use of PGIS tools to empower local com-
munities is both innovative and pro-poor, and could therefore form an impor-
tant part of the study of building local capacity for LA in developing countries. 
Furthermore, it may not be sufficient to rely on the capacities of local insti-
tutions, and it will be essential to have partners to assist local communities 
with land management. National (statutory) institutions have to provide stra-
tegic planning, guidelines and professional services in order to improve effi-
ciency and effectiveness in land delivery (see Section 9.3.1). 
Reflecting on the field study, it is clear that providing security of tenure 
and an effective framework for administering tenure relations do not require 
sophisticated rules, processes and institutions (see Section 4.3.2 and Sec-
tion 5.6). Adapting LASs to the institutional framework of customary tenure 
is more pragmatic than building new institutions and regulations to govern 
established structures (Deininger, 2003). Adapting LASs to customary frame-
works could bring them naturally in line with the evolution of tenure forms. 
In adapting LASs to customary institutional frameworks, it would be possi-
ble to use simple, flexible and low-cost tools that provide for interactive par-
ticipation by community members in decision-making processes. In this way, 
LASs could satisfy the adaptability, flexibility, upgradeability, legitimacy, pro-
poor and good governance requirements defined in Section 4.2. Nevertheless, 
LASs adapted to the customary institutional frameworks can only be imple-
mented if the three enabling conditions presented in Figure 9.1 are satisfied.
In Section 9.3, I present an alternative strategy for implementing the LAS 
requirements identified in Section 4.2.
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 9.3 Framework for implementing land admini-
stration systems in customary areas 
As explained in Chapters 1 and 2, the special characteristics of customary 
tenure systems mean that conventional LAS tools cannot be used to deal with 
tenure security problems in peri-urban areas. The adaptation of LASs to lo-
cal institutional frameworks would seem to be a workable option for LA in 
peri-urban areas. Based on the results of the field studies in the three cus-
tomary areas (Chapters 6, 7 and 8), and the lessons drawn from the formalisa-
tion concepts and strategies outlined in Chapter 2, an innovative LAS model 
that seeks to create a framework for such an approach is presented in Figure 
9.2. The LAS model outlines the organisational, technical and administrative 
considerations that are needed to adapt a LAS to local conditions. 
 9.3.1 Organisational framework
The existence of functional institutional synergy is a necessary condition 
for implementing LA activities. While institutions directly involved in LAS 
implementation need to fulfil specialised responsibilities, more important-
ly, there should also be facilitating institutions to ensure that LA activities 
are carried out based on laid down guidelines and standards. The facilitat-
ing institutions are required to monitor, evaluate, coordinate, negotiate and 
manage these activities. Accordingly, the organisational framework for im-
plementing LA activities has been organised at two levels: those of strategy 
and implementation. 
The strategic level
The successful implementation of LAS objectives requires planning at the 
strategic level. At the strategic level, LSAs and the district/municipal author-
ities (see Section 3.5.3), together with customary tenure institutions, devel-
op the framework for implementing LA activities, including strategic plan-
ning, the formulation of implementation guidelines for LA operational activ-
ities, local capacity enhancement, and monitoring and evaluation (see Fig-
Figure 9.1 Conceptual framework for designing land administration systems adapted to the 
















ure 9.2). Strategic planning should emphasise medium- and long-term de-
velopment needs for implementing LA activities in customary areas, includ-
ing the establishment of workable land committees and the formulation of 
conditions for upgrading tenure. Implementation guidelines should empha-
sise standards for demarcation and surveying, land registration, conflict res-
olution, and land-use planning and control. These standards should allow lo-
cal communities to use various pro-poor tools to collect and maintain data. 
Strategies for enhancing local capacity should address mechanisms for build-
ing human resources and the capacity of CTIs. Local capacity enhancement 
strategies should also include investigating which procedures and tools might 
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help customary institutions to undertake LA activities. Strategies for monitor-
ing and evaluating LA activities should focus on good governance in CTIs, and 
also ensure that up-to-date and reliable land records are kept.
The successful planning, monitoring and evaluation of LA activities in cus-
tomary areas is heavily reliant on the understanding and co-operation of all 
stakeholders. Therefore, strategies must be based on consensus, and deci-
sions on their content should involve input from multi-disciplinary expert 
groups and the public. These forms of participation are necessary for reach-
ing consensus, which in turn prepares the ground for future cooperation by 
administrative departments in planning the needs of local communities. 
Local community participation at the strategic level should also be consid-
ered. As the case studies indicate, there is both the capacity and desire with-
in communities to participate in planning and land management (see Sec-
tions 6.3.2 and 8.2.5). All decision-making at the strategic level should be open 
to local communities. Involving community members in the decision-mak-
ing process may give them sense of ownership, help them to accept the pro-
cess, and secure a better understanding of the process (Dorner, 1972; Deinin-
ger, 2003; Hessel et al., 2009). 
The implementation level
At the local level, communities carry out key LA activities that are based 
on the strategy described above, with assistance from LSAs. These activi-
ties, which include demarcation, surveying, tenure inventory, recording land 
transactions, and conflict resolution, are built into the institutional frame-
work of customary tenure and implemented at the local level (see Section 
9.3.3). Lessons from Uganda and Botswana indicate that such systems are 
likely to be hampered by limited human resource capacity, which can over-
stretch local institutions (Nkwae and Dumba, 2009), especially at village level. 
Technical assistance from LSAs is needed to breach the resource gap. A useful 
model is offered by the innovative arrangements for customary land delivery 
in Japekrom, where some of the members of land committees have been se-
lected from unit committees (Section 5.3.1). Adopting such a structure could 
help communities to deal with shortages of personnel at the village level and 
ensure that both local communities and the local government authorities are 
aware of the activities of customary institutions. 
 9.3.2 Tenure models 
As outlined in Section 4.2.3, LASs that are designed for peri-urban areas 
should be able to protect a broad range of interests in customary land (UN-
HABITAT, 2004;2008; Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi, 2009), and should be adapt-
able to the dynamics of tenure. Based on the lessons drawn from the liter-
ature analysis and the field studies (Chapter 6), three types of tenure have 
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been proposed to satisfy these conditions: rural and agricultural; peri-urban; 
and urban areas. The proposed tenure types have been organised according 
to three phases, and can be upgraded from one type to another. The proposed 
tenure models are similar to the flexible land tenure system used in Namibia, 
where two forms of upgradeable tenure are available in informal areas, in ad-
dition to freehold tenure (Section 2.3.5). The basic difference is that in the Na-
mibian case, formal institutions manage the implementation of the flexible 
tenure system. In the proposed tenure models, however, the entire system is 
built on the framework of customary land delivery and implemented by CTIs. 
The content of the rights and the strategy required to secure the tenure types 
are elaborated below.
Phase I tenure 
This tenure type is applicable in areas where customary tenure systems are 
stable, particularly in rural, agricultural or less-developed areas, where there 
has been little or no change in tenure practice. Here, the security of group 
ownership is paramount. It is possible to secure group rights, because at this 
level, customary areas have clearly defined memberships and effective mech-
anisms for internal management and enforcement (Deininger, 2003). In Gha-
na, for example, strategies adopted at this level should focus on the identi-
fication, delineation and mapping of the boundaries of stool, skin and clan/
family lands (see Section 7.3.2). At the same time, an inventory should be 
made of all existing locally-recognised rights, including sub-allodial rights, 
usufructuary rights and other secondary rights pertaining to the group. It 
might also be important to make an inventory of all the laws regulating ten-
ure practices in each customary area. This information is needed to provide a 
rational base for planning customary areas and for further upgrading tenure 
to the subsequent phases. 
Phase II tenure 
Phase II tenure is applicable in peri-urban areas where there is economic 
pressure on land. The aim of Phase II tenure is to secure individuals’ short-
term and long-term interests in land, including: all kinds of usufructuary 
rights, rights acquired by strangers or settlers, and all other forms of custom-
ary land transactions. At this level, care should be taken to avoid modifying 
tenure relations. Tenure relations should be recorded as they exist, as recog-
nised by customary practices in the area. A certificate should be provided as 
evidence of an individual’s right to use land.
Rights secured in this phase should be transferable through customary 
mortgages, leases, sub-leases, inheritance (including matrimonial transfers), 
renting and any other form of transaction permitted by customary law. These 
transfer rights should be subject to the restrictions on the customary law, 
particularly those that prevent the complete alienation of customary land. It 
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may be important to give attention to the location of parcels in relation to 
proposed infrastructure, services and undertake environmental evaluations. 
For example, when land is allocated for permanent structures like buildings, 
land-use planning controls should be enforced, if and when necessary. Such 
controls may not be needed for temporal structures. These conditions are also 
attached to ‘starter titles’ in Namibia’s flexible tenure system (Christensen, 
2005). 
Phase III tenure 
Phase III tenure is applicable in urbanised areas where there is a high level of 
demand for individual rights. At this stage, the aim should be to secure indi-
vidual rights and issue titles. As discussed in Section 4.2.3, the point of up-
grading tenure is not to make some rights more secured than others; instead, 
at this stage, it is assumed that the tenure system has evolved to the extent 
that the bundle of rights in the customary land has been naturally weak-
ened. In this case, upgrading rights would not have a negative impact on oth-
er rights in the bundle, and would not affect the social structure of custom-
ary areas. 
During this phase, the individual rights acquired and recorded in Phase 
II can be upgraded to titles. Titles can also be directly issued to new alloca-
tions. However, LA processes leading to the issuance of titles should provide 
clarity on the rights in a cost-effective way (see Section 4.2.4). At this stage, 
all of the benefits of ownership could be allowed. However, in order to pro-
tect group rights and to secure allodial ownership, the issuance of freehold 
ownership should be avoided. A distinction should also be made between the 
highest rights that can be attained and registered by indigenes and settlers. 
For example, in order to secure allodial ownership on the part of customary 
groups and to ensure that future generations can also access their ancestral 
land, it is important that proprietary rights for settlers are recorded as lease-
hold (see Section 2.3.5). The leasehold concept is supported by the Constitu-
tion of Ghana (1992), which prevents the creation of freehold titles in custom-
ary land (see Section 3.5.2 and Section 6.2.2). In Phase III, which is close to the 
end of the formalisation processes, restrictions on sub-divisions and land-use 
planning should be enforced when it is realistic to do so.
 9.3.3 Institutional arrangements 
A successful implementation of LA activities is based on well-defined institu-
tional arrangements. Based on the case study findings and lessons from liter-
ature, in the following paragraphs, I describe a number of administrative and 
technical procedures that should be followed to allow communities to real-
ise the objective of securing rights at each phase of the tenure models, as de-
scribed above. 
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Inventory of land rights, rights holders and customary laws 
Efficient LASs for customary areas require relevant information systems that 
support the identification, recording and securing of individual and group 
rights in land. The tenure inventory undertaken during Phase I has two ob-
jectives: first, since customary laws in most communities are not recorded, it 
is imperative that inventories of these laws are made. One of the major prob-
lems identified in this study is that changes in tenure rules are leading to 
greater individualisation (see Section 6.2.1). The reason for making an inven-
tory of customary laws is not to undermine the fluidity of the laws, but to 
make them more accessible to community members and outsiders. The more 
that customary law is accessible to land users, the less it may be subject to 
manipulation. Accessible customary law may also improve transparency in 
customary land delivery. Experts could assist customary areas with recording 
and codifying all the customary laws regulating access to land. Participatory 
Rural Appraisal (PRA) tools, such as interviews, storytelling, focal group dis-
cussions (Rambaldi, Kyem et al., 2006) and the p-mapping approach used in 
this study (see Section 5.4.3) could be used to extract tenure information from 
stakeholders in customary areas. Second, it is important to record informa-
tion about right-holders in, so as to identify the legitimate members of cus-
tomary areas. This repository of right-holders and customary laws can pro-
vide an important source of information for decision-making and for solving 
land-related conflicts.
Land allocations
In Chapter 6 and in the literature (Ubink, 2008a; Toulmin, 2009), it has been 
observed that growing demand for residential land has resulted in chaotic 
land allocation processes. Some chiefs and family heads have taken unilater-
al decisions to lease farmlands cultivated by indigenous farmers to strangers/
settlers, while some farmers lease their farmland privately (see Section 6.2.3). 
Such actions often result in conflicting claims, haphazard land development, 
forced evictions, and tension between indigenous members and their lead-
ers (see Chapters 6 and 7). Considering that customary land is owned by sub-
groups/families, but is managed by chiefs and family heads, this raises the 
question of who should be involved in allocating residential land. 
The process for allocating land should follow the two clearly-defined pro-
cedures that apply to accessing land in all three customary areas: allocation 
of farmland and allocation residential land (Section 7.2.5). In the former, and 
for agricultural areas (Phase I), heads of household can continue performing 
their function of allocating farmlands and solving tenure problems within the 
subgroup. However, in Phase II and Phase III, the allocation of residential land 
should be handled by established land committees. For example, the innova-
tive institutional structures in Japekrom and Gbawe, in which land commit-
tees are responsible for allocating land (Section 5.3), could be extended to 
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other areas. However, it is crucial to ensure that the various groups are rep-
resented in the land committees, and that community members can select 
members of the land committees (Section 7.2.1). More importantly, land allo-
cation procedures must be clear and simple, and should follow due process, 
as defined by the customary laws of the area. The simple and well-designed 
application forms that are used in the three customary areas studies (Section 
6.3.2) offer a good example; using such measures prevents chiefs from manip-
ulating land allocation processes, and also improves transparency and equity 
in land allocation processes. 
In many peri-urban customary areas, people live in fear of being evicted 
from the lands they occupy because these lands are located on waterways, in 
reserve lands or in other public spaces. In order to prevent such occurrence 
and haphazard development, the allocation of residential land in Phase II and 
Phase III should follow a well-designed and realistic layout plan. 
Demarcation, surveying and mapping 
Well-defined boundaries are necessary for securing land rights (Deininger, 
2003). Procedures for identifying and mapping land therefore form a crucial 
part of LA processes. Considering the differences between the tenure models 
(see Section 9.3.2), no single approach can be prescribed for demarcating, sur-
veying and mapping. In addition to conventional methods, such as GPS, The-
odolites, and photogrammetric methods (aerial photos), image-based meth-
ods, such as high-resolution satellite imagery (HRSI), can be used for survey-
ing and mapping. These techniques have their advantages and disadvantag-
es, and the objective of the exercise and the cost (but not necessarily the need 
for strict accuracy) should be taken into account when selecting a method. As 
suggested in Sections 4.2.1 and 8.4.4, it is difficult to adhere to strict stand-
ards when surveying and mapping in peri-urban customary areas. The notion 
that that parcels to be formally recorded or registered can only be surveyed 
using fixed boundaries should not be applied in this context. Furthermore, 
since the overall objective of designing the LASs in customary areas relates 
to issues of cost and local capacity, flexible tools that require less technical 
expertise and that can empower locals are particularly desirable. Although I 
have not given detailed technical requirements for demarcating, surveying 
and mapping boundaries and land rights for each phase of the tenure model, 
I make a number of suggests in the following paragraphs. 
It is crucial to have effective methods for demarcating, surveying and map-
ping the outer boundaries of the stools, skins and families in Phase I. This is 
because, like in many other African countries, land conflicts among custom-
ary groups in Ghana have always been related to the uncertainty of bounda-
ries and conflicting claims to territorial lands. These boundary conflicts have 
long histories and are rooted in heritage and culture (Aryeetey, Ayee et al., 
2007). It is therefore important to map the outer boundaries of stools, skins 
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and families well. Systematic demarcation and the clear definition of groups’ 
external boundaries could prevent encroachment (Deininger, 2003; IIED, 2006), 
and has the potential to end protracted boundary disputes. For the demar-
cation of the boundaries of stools, skins and families, non-technical map-
ping tools such as PRA and participatory sketch-mapping could be used. The 
former will uncover the historical evidences behind these boundaries before 
marking them. The p-mapping approach outlined in Section 8.2 could be used 
to pre-mark the agreed-upon boundaries. After the boundaries have been 
identified and demarcated, experts can survey these boundaries using tech-
nical tools. 
For Phase II tenure, strict adherence to technical requirements for survey-
ing individuals’ occupation of and rights to land should be avoided. Flex-
ible technical standards for cadastral surveys are required, to allow various 
surveying techniques and data types to be used to describe boundaries (see 
Section 4.2.1). Individuals’ land occupation and rights can be mapped using 
handheld GPSs or sketch maps, or can be identified using satellite image-
ry, orthophotos or similar technology. For Phase III tenure, the survey meth-
od adopted should improve the quality of the represented boundary. However, 
to reduce costs, a general boundary concept is appropriate for surveying and 
mapping individual rights (see Section 4.2.3). 
Recording and registering land rights and transactions
Different procedures are adopted for the recording of land rights in the three 
tenure types. In Phase I, where land relations are mostly based on kinship or 
a combination of kinship and territoriality, for stools, skins and families, it 
is logical to record allodial ownership in the name of the group. Recording 
or registering land in the name of the group could secure the latter against 
outside encroachment (Deininger, 2003; Fitzpatrick, 2005). Informal or formal 
procedures may be needed for recording or registering allodial ownership. 
For example, a combination of adjudication processes and traditional mech-
anisms for identifying and solving boundary disputes will be needed before 
ownership can finally be recorded in a legal register. These steps are neces-
sary to prevent the recurrence of conflicting claims relating to the boundaries 
of the groups.
In Phase II tenure, existing individual land rights and new land transactions 
should be recorded in local land registers. CTIs should be responsible for the 
recording and issuing of certificates that give proof of these rights. Although 
the provision of titles for individual rights to land has been criticised for pro-
moting the breakdown of social and inter-family relations (Cotula, 2007), this 
study clearly indicates that provision of certificates as evidence of allocation 
and access to land rights is necessary in peri-urban areas (see Section 6.3.2). 
It may not only be necessary to record individuals’ when there is considera-
ble tenure insecurity within the group (Fitzpatrick, 2005), but also when oth-
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er customary transactions which are legitimate in customary tenure systems 
are made. However, it is important to analyse processes leading to the issu-
ance of these certificates on the basis of their appropriateness for local condi-
tions, because evidence suggests that the registration of individual rights can 
lead to crystallisation of submerged conflicts, exclude subsidiary right-hold-
ers, and lead to manipulation by opportunistic group members and elites (Fitz-
patrick, 2005; Benjaminsen et al., 2009). 
Evidence from this study clearly indicates that providing security of ten-
ure does not necessarily require the issuance of formal land titles and use of 
sophisticated tools (Section 6.3.2). In many circumstances, the use of simple 
and well-defined procedures to record land rights within a group can make 
a significant difference (Deininger, 2003). It may not be necessary to record 
land information in complex and sophisticated registers during Phase II. For 
instance, land tenure information can be recorded in logbooks and spread 
sheets that link allocated parcels to the particulars of right-holders. Many of 
the case study communities have adopted simple land information recording 
systems (Section 7.2.5). The allocation note, which has become widespread in 
customary areas in Ghana (see Section 6.3.2 and 7.2.3), can function as a cer-
tificate in Phase II, provided that the processes leading to the issuing of allo-
cation notes reduces uncertainty surrounding land rights (which seems to be 
the case in many customary areas). 
The recording of land rights in Phase III should focus on two objectives: (1) 
the upgrading of the certificate issued to protect individual rights in Phase II; 
and (2) the issuing of new titles to land. With regard to the former, the pro-
cedures for recording these rights should aim at improving the process to 
ensure clarity in the rights secured in Phase II. Whether new transactions are 
being recorded or registered, or rights are being upgraded, there should be no 
deliberate simplification of land rights. All existing rights, including all forms 
of customary transaction, should be recorded as they exist, so as to avoid 
creating primary right-holders and weaker groups of unrecorded secondary 
right-holders (Benjaminsen et al., 2009). Nevertheless, the kinds of rights that 
can be recorded at this stage of the tenure model should be determined by 
customary and national law. 
In Phase III, the procedures for recording land rights and issuing titles 
should be simple and run in parallel to existing land registration systems. 
CTIs should receive various forms of assistance in carrying out their task of 
recording rights and resolving conflicts. Land rights and transactions can 
be recorded using simple forms for documentation and the making of con-
tractual agreements. Using simple procedures for recording land transac-
tions may help locals with a minimum level of legal technical knowledge to 
undertake such activities. This is important, because experience from Botswa-
na indicates that the Certificate of Rights (COR) failed to reach its objectives 
due to a shortage of technical expertise to carry out the certification activi-
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ties (Durand-Lasserve, 2006). Such arrangements would seem feasible, as the 
attempts by local communities in Niger, Lithuania and Ethiopia to carry out 
simple forms of registration, with some assistance, yielded positive results 
(Deininger, 2003; IIED, 2006; Deininger et al., 2008; Toulmin, 2009).
Maintenance and auditing of land records and registers
Maintaining comprehensive, up-to-date and reliable land records is a central 
requirement for LASs. In peri-urban customary areas, maintaining up-to-date 
land records will depend on the location of the land register in question and 
on cooperation from local community members and land committees. Since 
it is proposed that LA activities should be implemented at the community or 
village level, it would be ideal to maintain land records at the community lev-
el. This could encourage the recording of changes relating to rights, bounda-
ries and transfers. However, the need to maintain effective land records could 
put communities with inadequate human and financial resources under con-
siderable strain. 
Looking at the different types of customary institutional structure in Gha-
na, two types of land register can be proposed. For family lands, one central 
land record/register could be maintained at the seat of the head of the fam-
ily, where most land transactions are approved and recorded. In a similar 
way, for stools and skins that exist as paramount areas, it would be ideal to 
maintain one central register at the seat of the paramount chief, where most 
land transactions are recorded (see Section 5.3). However, for stools and skins 
that exist as confederations that are constituted by a hierarchy of paramount 
areas, in addition to the main land register maintained in each paramount 
area, a second register containing copies of these main land registers should 
be kept at the seat of the confederation. The inventory of land rights, right-
holders and information about the lineage groups recorded during Phase I, 
and the daily land transactions recorded during Phases II and III, should be 
recorded and maintained in the central register. It may also be necessary to 
check and edit these records, to ensure that changes reported by local com-
munities are recorded appropriately. This should be decided at the strategic 
level (see Section 9.3.1).
Adjudication and resolution of land-related conflicts 
The successful implementation of LASs at the local level will be dependent on 
having effective institutions and processes for solving land-related conflicts. 
Several land conflict resolution mechanisms are available, and the choice of 
a particular mechanism will be based on several factors. First, since land con-
flict resolution relates to ascertaining ownership and rights, the mechanism 
should be linked to institutions that are knowledgeable about the tenure sys-
tem and have the social and legal legitimacy to implement their decisions. 
When institutions lack knowledge and legitimacy, this has consequences for 
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the effectiveness of conflict resolution. Second, the process should be under-
standable, transparent, accessible and inexpensive. When the institutions 
in charge of solving conflicts are inaccessible, land users pay a high price to 
achieve justice (FAO, 2007). 
As discussed in Section 3.5.3, the state law courts in Ghana have proved to 
be inefficient when dealing with land conflicts due to of lack of reliable infor-
mation, some of which is difficult to obtain (Kasanga and Kotey, 2001). Even 
when information is available, court decisions have little effect on land dis-
putes beyond the specific case involved (Ubink and Quan, 2008). Meanwhile, 
some land-related conflicts that had proved impossible to resolve in the state 
courts have been resolved using customary conflict resolution mechanisms. 
For example, in 1999, the Asantehene (King of the Asante Nation) of Ghana 
authorised all land disputes in the Kumasi Traditional council area to be with-
drawn from the regular courts and put before traditional institutions. This 
order was obeyed, and within a month, several protracted land disputes were 
settled (Kasanga and Kotey, 2001).
Given these factors and the increasing occurrence of land-related conflict 
in customary areas, ADR mechanisms would seem to offer an appropriate 
solution for peri-urban customary areas. ADR mechanisms rely on mediation 
and arbitration (Herrera and Da Passano, 2006), which are inherent to custom-
ary conflict resolution. Customary conflict resolution processes are based on 
consensus-building, where discussions are open, information is shared and 
clarity sought. The field study also indicates that many people still rely on or 
prefer to use customary conflict resolution, because it is faster, less expen-
sive, and effective (see Section 7.2.5). These factors, in addition to their broad 
legitimacy, give CTIs an advantageous position in adjudication and resolv-
ing land conflicts. In particular, when customary land delivery is managed 
by committees, such institutions can be advantageous for landowners in that 
they can provide a contact point for adjudication and justice delivery. Never-
theless, providing mechanisms for recording the proceedings and results of 
customary arbitration processes can improve land conflict resolution in these 
areas.
Of course, customary conflict resolution should not be the only way forward 
when solving conflicts in peri-urban areas. The state courts can be used to 
support customary conflict resolution, particularly in situations where land 
users fear or lose trust in indigenous institutions. 
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 9.4 Challenges of adaptating land administra-
tion to the institutional frameworks of cus-
tomary tenure
The implementation of the LAS models proposed above may encounter sev-
eral challenges. This section highlights some critical factors that need to be 
considered in order to ensure the successful implementation of the proposed 
LAS models.
Chieftaincy and land-related conflicts 
Although there are many different types of land-related conflicts in custom-
ary areas (Aryeetey, Ayee et al., 2007), those that have the potential to frus-
trate the successful implementation of the proposed LAS models are conflicts 
that relate to conflicting claims to territorial land and boundaries. Such con-
flicts often arise as a result of ‘ownership and sovereignty over a particular 
group of people’ (Aryeetey, Ayee et al., 2007: p. 36). The history of land bound-
ary disputes in Ghana is one of long delays and backlogs in courts (Kasan-
ga and Kotey, 2001). There are protracted chieftaincy disputes, most of which 
occur as a result of competing claims over the legitimacy of elected chiefs. 
These unresolved conflicts have the potential to undermine the objective of 
adapting LASs to the institutional framework of customary land delivery. 
The effective resolution of chieftaincy and territorial conflicts that are root-
ed in the social-cultural and historical development of tenure institutions 
will require the use of innovative and unconventional tools. As discussed in 
Section 9.3.3, the ADR system could be useful in this respect. The use of the 
p-mapping approach discussed in Section 8.2.1 could also help to resolve con-
flicts. In the p-mapping approach, stakeholders in the customary areas can be 
brought together to identify traditional boundaries and solve disputes accord-
ingly. 
Abuse by customary authorities 
As observed in this study (see Section 7.3) and in the literature (Amanor, 2008; 
Ubink, 2008a), in some peri-urban communities, chiefs have assumed de fac-
to ownership of communal land, and have become less transparent and ac-
countable in their handling of land transactions. Empowering chiefs and tra-
ditional authorities to administer customary land runs the risk of allowing 
powerful chiefs and elders to abuse the system. Furthermore, some tradition-
al rulers might use their enhanced knowledge to evict farmers and other vul-
nerable groups who had obtained land through customary arrangements. In-
tegrating principles of good land governance into the LA framework in these 
areas could reduce this risk of abuse. The measures that have been outlined 
in Sections 7.4 and 9.2 can improve good land governance, and particularly 
levels of equity, transparency and accountability. 
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Community perceptions 
Throughout this study, participation by community members in LA activities 
has been cited as a critical success factor. It must be noted that the imple-
mentation of the proposed LAS strategy will not be feasible if local commu-
nities do not have a sense of ownership and are not willing to cooperate. The 
strategy may lack feasibility if the local communities feel that they are not 
ready to adapt to the new changes. The greatest challenge will be to build the 
confidence of the vulnerable groups in customary areas, such as indigenous 
farmers and women, who might have lost trust in CTIs to provide equitable 
land delivery services. Customary areas such as Gbawe-Kwatei family, which 
have engaged in good customary tenure practices, can be used as a point of 
departure to encourage locals who have lost interest in indigenous institu-
tions. 
Devolution of land administration activities to customary authorities
The implementation of LASs that are adapted to the institutional framework 
of customary tenure requires the transfer of many LA activities and functions 
to CTIs. The critical question is whether public land sector institutions will 
be willing to hand over LA activities to CTIs. Ubink (2008a: p. 42) asserts that 
LSAs tend to hinder the functioning of local land management institutions, 
usually with the ‘conviction that the state has a legitimate role to protect its 
citizens from mismanagement and bad governance in customary systems’ – 
these are, after all, the reasons why LSAs were established. This perception on 
the part of LSAs attends to result in a ‘power play’ between formal and cus-
tomary tenure institutions. For the successful implementation of a LAS based 
on the institutional framework of customary tenure, LSAs should not view 
CTIs as competitors, but rather as partners who perform some aspects of LA 
activities. The LSAs should co-operate with and assist the CTIs. 
Managing customary and statutory laws
As elaborated in Section 3.5, Ghana has a comprehensive legal framework 
consisting several statutory laws and institutions that regulate the admin-
istration of customary land. Some of these statutory laws conflict with each 
other and with customary laws and practices. One of the critical challenges, 
with regard to the implementation of the proposed LAS models, is how to im-
plement the models in the existing legal framework. In particular, we need 
to look carefully at the issue of the extent to which statutory and customary 
laws should be used. 
While it is acknowledged that not every aspect of customary law can be 
applied in the proposed tenure model, some of the statutory laws also need 
to be revised to allow for the efficient implementation of the proposed mod-
els. For example, as discussed in Sections 3.3 and 3.5.2, statutory laws require 
the allocation of stool and skin land to be preceded by the granting of con-
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currence by the LC. One of the main reasons for granting concurrence is to 
ensure that customary areas are developed in accordance with an area’s 
development plans. This arrangement has been violated in many customary 
areas. In the proposed organisational arrangement, in which LSAs collabo-
rate with and assist customary areas in planning and executing LA activities, 
there may not be a need to grant concurrence prior to land allocations. 
Lack of human and financial capacity within customary institutions 
In this study, it has become evident that while some customary areas (Gbawe 
family land) clearly have the potential to manage their lands, Japekrom and 
Tamale and several customary areas lack the necessary human and financial 
resources to effectively manage the land. Major bottlenecks could occur be-
cause CTIs do not have the capacity to carry out technical functions such as 
land surveying, registration and land-use planning or the financial capacity to 
employ land professionals to executive these tasks, particularly in Phase III. It 
would thus be necessary to adopt measures to build the capacity of local in-
stitutions. This study has shown that the use of PGISs can enhance local ca-
pacity for land documentation (Chapter 8).
Variable customary practices and information systems development
There are as many customary laws as the number of tribes, and complex ten-
ure arrangements and institutions exist across Ghana. Given this diversity of 
customs, rules and institutions, the challenge is how to design common rules 
and standards to regulate LASs uniformly across all customary areas. The 
rules for administering land in each of these areas must be designed to suit 
local situations. Furthermore, access to land information is highly relevant for 
effective decision-making (Elwood, 2006; UN-HABITAT, 2007).
In the proposed system, information is kept at the local level, where most 
operational activities take place. For effective decision-making and adminis-
tration by central government, these localised systems need to be integrat-
ed for strategic planning and policy purposes. Similarly, different data types 
with varying standards, captured using different techniques, have to be inte-
grated. From an information systems perspective, trying to integrate all of the 
local systems and maintaining them in a single information system will be 
complex, time-consuming and prone to consistency and completeness errors 
(De Vries, 2004). The Social Tenure Domain Model (STDM) is an initiative by 
UN-HABITAT, together with GLTN, ITC and FIG, which supports all forms of 
land rights, social tenure relations, and overlapping claims to land (UN-HAB-
ITAT, 2004; Augustinus et al., 2006; Van Oosterom et al., 2006; Lemmen et al., 
2009). The STDM is designed to be implemented as a single user system, or 
implemented as a distributed set of (geo-)information systems (Lemmen et 
al., 2007). Although it has not yet been fully tested, the ability of the STDM 
to link different kinds of social information to spatial data, and to operate in 
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a distributed information system environment, make it a promising tool for 
dealing with these technical challenges. 
 9.5 Concluding remarks 
The purpose of this chapter was to provide strategies for designing LASs that 
are adaptable to tenure dynamics and local institutional frameworks. These 
strategies have been analysed in detail, focusing on organisational structures, 
tenure models and institutional arrangements. These models and arrange-
ments offer various ways to secure a continuum of rights, undertake survey-
ing and mapping, demarcate boundaries and resolve conflicts.
It has been argued that adapting LAS to an institutional framework for 
customary land delivery is feasible, and constitutes a pragmatic approach 
to securing tenure in customary areas. CTIs are built on structures that can 
meet good governance objectives. The flexibility in customary tenure sys-
tems has allowed CTIs to introduce several innovations in response to chang-
ing needs. The case studies illustrate that local communities have the ability 
to adapt flexible and innovative tools, which empower them to carry out LA 
activities. This potential on the part of local communities, and the legitimacy 
enjoyed by CTIs mean that they can meet the requirements for administering 
land in peri-urban areas. Nevertheless, it has also been shown that good gov-
ernance, IK and local community capacity are necessary to ensure the suc-
cessful design and implementation of LASs that are based on the institutional 
framework of customary tenure (Figure 9.1). 
The chapter also conceptualised a framework for implementing LA based 
on customary institutional frameworks. The conceptual model is a hybrid sys-
tem, built on strategies based on LAS concepts and the framework of custom-
ary land delivery. On the one hand, the underlying logic of the procedures for 
demarcating, mapping and recording land rights is clearly based on conven-
tional LA principles. These activities are carried out using the customary ten-
ure institutional framework. On the other hand, customary oral transactions 
and indigenous practices are replaced with written transactions, without nec-
essarily changing tenure structures. The conceptual models are based on cus-
tomary land delivery processes, with technical and strategic support from the 
LSAs. The framework covers tenure types, administrative processes involved 
and the new institutions required to implement the model. Three tenure 
types, which secure group rights in Phase I and individual rights in Phases II 
and III, were proposed. The chapter also suggested a number of technical solu-
tions that might be required to achieve the LA objective. With a view to local 
capacity in customary areas, the technical options suggested emphasise sim-
ple, flexible and innovative tools. The use of these innovative tools is essential 
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to be able to draw on local capacity and IK in the LA process. Throughout the 
chapter, community members’ participation in LA activities has been high-
lighted as essential for the effective implementation of the strategies. Final-
ly, the chapter has made a number of recommendations to highlight the major 
challenges affecting the implementation of LASs that are adapted to the insti-
tutional framework of customary tenure. 
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 10 Conclusion 
 10.1 Introduction 
In the introduction to this thesis, the major issues affecting the securing of 
rights and effective administration of land in peri-urban customary areas, 
and the move towards adapting LA to local conditions, were discussed. The 
debate on securing tenure in customary areas has undergone a paradigm 
shift from formalisation strategies based on replacement or market-led mod-
els, to the integration of informal and customary rights in LASs. As discussed 
in Chapter 2, this trend can be found in international policies and many LAS 
initiatives across Sub-Saharan Africa. Following this trend, the decentrali-
sation of LA functions and the general adaptation of LA to local institutions 
have provoked significant interest on the part of scholars of anthropology and 
LA. This study contributes to research in this field.
In this study, the analysis of existing theory on formalisation strate-
gies, the development of the theoretical framework, and the field studies all 
addressed the research question: ‘how can LASs in peri-urban areas be adapt-
ed to the tenure and institutional framework of customary tenure systems?’ 
By focusing on this general research question, this study aimed to contrib-
ute to knowledge on LA reform, and in particular, to add to knowledge relat-
ing to the design of alternative LASs for customary areas. By analysing cases 
in three peri-urban customary areas – namely, Japekrom, Tamale and Gbawe – 
this study has helped to fill the existing knowledge gaps. 
The main research question was broken down into a number of sub-ques-
tions. In this concluding chapter, I provide a summary of the findings with 
regard to the research objectives, the challenges and the questions for-
mulated in Chapter 1. The chapter opens with an outline of the answers to 
the research questions. I then offer a general conclusion, which is based on 
the answers to the research questions. Next, the chapter discusses how the 
findings of this study contribute to literature. Finally, suggestions for future 
research are presented, based on a discussion of the limitations of the study.
 10.2 Conclusions
 10.2.1 Formalisation and land administration
Question 1: What lessons can be learnt from the analysis of the formalisation theories, 
and to what extent can these be applied to the design of LASs in peri-urban areas?
This question was answered in Chapter 2. The formalisation of land rights 
in customary areas in Sub-Saharan Africa is a subject that dates back to the 
modernisation of agriculture, but it remains relevant today. A number of les-
sons were drawn from the discussion of the literature in Chapter 2. The move 
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towards formalising customary land has been driven by dissatisfaction with 
CTIs in the management of land. Second, the literature on the formalisation 
of rights in customary land is centred on two arguments: economic and so-
cial. The economic arguments are generally embedded in neo-classical eco-
nomic theory (Hardin, 1968), and emphasise the need for improved agricul-
tural productivity, the promotion of the property market and the security of 
property rights. These arguments can be found in replacement theories, De 
Soto’s model and the multiple tenure theory. Social arguments are based on 
the assumption that property markets fail to secure land for the large major-
ity of people (Cotula, 2005), and create social problems in customary areas. 
These particular arguments lie behind adaptation theories. 
In general, the debate on formalising customary land tends to narrow down 
to: 
■ whether tenure security should be provided with property titles or alterna-
tive, more unconventional approaches;
■ whether de facto tenure should be integrated into the formal system 
through land ownership based on the replacement of property rights (mar-
ket-based models) or approaches that emphasise social and economic inte-
gration and the security of the commons; and 
■ whether LA should be based on state-led or locally-based institutions. 
Whether one pursues land reform on the basis of economic or social objec-
tives, the approach should be tailored to the economic, social, environmen-
tal and political setting in question. The nature of customary tenure system 
may require formalisation strategies that shift the focus away from conven-
tional methods based on replacement, the market objectives and state insti-
tutions, towards the use of innovative approaches that can be adapted to lo-
cal conditions. 
Questions 2: What is the nature of the existing legal framework for administering 
land in Ghana, and to what extent does the framework support the administration of 
customary land at the local level?
This question was answered in Chapter 3. Ghana has a comprehensive land 
policy (Deininger, 2003) and a broad regulatory framework governing custom-
ary land and related sectors. The legal framework recognises customary laws 
and institutions in the administration of land. Several laws and institutions 
restrict the power of customary institutions and control their activities. Some 
of these restrictions include concurrence of land transactions, revenue collec-
tion and disbursements. The comprehensiveness of the legal framework for 
administering land has resulted in bureaucracy and delays, overlapping insti-
tutional responsibilities, uncertainty of tenure security, conflicting statutory 
regulations and laws, and injustices in the state acquisition of customary land.
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Both the colonial and post-colonial policy frameworks for administering 
land have followed the trend towards replacement and market-based mod-
els, rather than adaptation to existing customary practices. State land man-
agement mechanisms have been the main instrument for pursuing the pro-
cess of formalising land rights. Efforts to reform land tenure and administra-
tion have introduced property rights models, which promote the individuali-
sation of rights in customary land. Although the new LA policy direction sup-
ports the decentralisation of LA to the local level, there seems to be a lack of 
commitment to this goal. The main policy direction is still towards extending 
land title registration nationwide. 
 10.2.2 Requirements and framework for designing LA for 
peri-urban areas
Question 3: What are the requirements for the design of LASs in peri-urban custo-
mary areas?
This question was answered in Chapter 4. Peri-urban customary areas have 
distinct characteristics. Formalising rights and designing LASs in order to 
meet all of the diverse needs of the people and to create a suitable institu-
tional framework that can effectively administer the local land rights associ-
ated with it is complex undertaking. Alternative and innovative LASs are thus 
needed in order to respond to this particular challenge. Based upon the liter-
ature review discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, six key requirements were drawn 
up as crucial for designing effective LASs for peri-urban areas. These include: 
■ Adaptability: institutional, technical and organisational arrangements for 
administering land have to be able to adapt to socio-economic pressure, 
tenure changes and the local institutional framework of customary land 
delivery. 
■ Flexibility: flexible technical, institutional and legal arrangements are need-
ed to allow different laws, institutional arrangements and technical stand-
ards to be used to secure procedures for administering land that can be 
adapted to the different types of rights that exist in customary land. 
■ Upgradeability: securing rights in customary land should be done in grad-
ual manner. Tenure should be upgraded over time. Upgradeability requires 
measures that secure temporary or partial rights in customary land, and 
may be upgraded to full titles at a later time.
■ Affordability and pro-poor objectives: procedures of administering land and 
securing rights should be cheap, comprehensible and free of technical and 
legal implications so that they can be affordable for all groups of persons. 
■ Institutional legitimacy and credibility: institutions in charge of adminis-
tering land should not only have the legal power, but must have local and 
social legitimacy to implement all decisions relating to land. 
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■ Good land governance: land governance must emphasise active participa-
tion by community members in decision-making on the use of their land, in 
order to enhance equity, transparency, accountability and efficiency in the 
land delivery process (see further below).
Question 4: What are the requirements for assessing good land governance in custo-
mary tenure institutions?
In Chapter 4, the framework for assessing good governance in CTIs was devel-
oped, based on the key issues and problems associated with customary land 
management in peri-urban areas and the literature on governance in gener-
al and on LA in particular, as discussed in Chapter 2. Acknowledging that oth-
er qualities may also be important, a list of five governance dimensions were 
identified that are considered essential for any complete assessment of land 
governance in CTIs. These include: 
■ Participation: Participation is addressed in terms of representation and 
membership composition in the decision-making process. The assessment 
of participation should emphasise: the extent to which community mem-
bers are represented; involvement of community members in the selection 
of community leaders and in decision-making processes; and the level of 
collaboration and coordination with statutory land agencies and other pro-
fessional land institutions.
■ Equity: Equity requires measures that ensure non-discriminatory access to 
land, information and justice delivery. Equity is addressed in terms of: equi-
table access to land for all community members, male and female; non-dis-
criminatory access to land information and dispute resolution; equal tenure 
security for indigenes and settlers; and measures that guarantee intergen-
erational equity.
■ Transparency: Transparency should be addressed in terms of: the accessi-
bility of institutions and land information to community members and the 
general public; the openness of decision-making processes to community 
members; and the clarity of customary laws on land delivery to community 
members.
■ Accountability: Accountability addresses the extent to which customary 
tenure institutions report on their stewardship to community members: 
the extent to which they report on what they have been entrusted to do, 
respond to questions, explain actions and provide evidence of their per-
formance. Adequate financial accountability in customary institutions is 
also important. 
■ Efficiency and effectiveness: Efficiency and effectiveness are related to all 
the other dimensions and thus play a special role in the assessment of 
governance. Efficiency and effectiveness in customary land administration 
should be addressed in terms of: the clarity of the land allocation process; 
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the adequacy of human resource capacity for land administration; govern-
ance; the extent to which customary laws are implemented in the land 
delivery process; and the adequacy of available mechanisms for providing 
certainty and security of land rights.
 10.2.3 Dynamics of customary tenure systems 
Question 5: Which aspects of Ghana’s customary tenure are dynamic and how do the 
customary tenure institutional arrangements adapt to these dynamics?
This question was answered in Chapter 6. From the field study of three peri-
urban areas in Ghana, it appears that customary tenure arrangements in peri-
urban Ghana remain quite strong. However, they are undoubtedly subject to 
demographic and economic pressures, which are forcing changes in land ten-
ure relations. Two aspects of land tenure dynamics were distinguished. First, 
in tenurial arrangements, dynamism relates to changing allodial ownership, 
usufructuary rights; changing social and intra-family relations; changing ten-
ure rules; and changing modes of transferring interest in land, land value and 
land-use practices. State ownership and common-law freehold have emerged 
from allodial ownership. The general trend in tenure relations observed in the 
study is towards privitisation of customary land rights. The trend also shows 
that the security of usufructuary rights and other secondary rights are un-
der threat, as these rights are being replaced with leasehold arrangements. 
The changing tenure relations often result in overlapping and multiple rights 
consisting of several interlocking individual and collective rights. These over-
lapping rights lead to struggles for land, forced evictions, land contestations, 
haphazard developments, land speculation and informal land markets. 
Second, the dynamics of the institutional framework of customary land 
delivery indicate that the political authority of CTIs is being eroded. Via legis-
lation, the state has instituted a number of measures that obviate or restrict 
the activities of CTIs in the administration and management of their land. On 
the other hand, however, the dynamics of institutional arrangements reveal 
several innovations in customary land management. The creation of land 
committees, new processes for allocating, recording and disseminating land 
information, and the use of allocation notes are all innovations that have 
been introduced by the CTIs in response to the changing needs of community 
members, and as a way of reasserting their territorial control over land. Insti-
tutional dynamics further allow the introduction of new chieftaincy systems, 
where people from outside the royal family are conferred as chiefs with the 
intention of tapping their knowledge, skills and resources for the good of the 
community. 
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 10.2.4 Customary tenure institutions and land governance
Question 6: To what extent do the customary tenure institutions in peri-urban Ghana 
meet good governance objectives in LA?
The results of the three cases are described in Chapter 7. This thesis has pre-
sented an overview of the individual variables investigated under each gov-
ernance dimension for the cases and the main conclusion for each govern-
ance dimension. The results show variations in land governance across the 
study areas. In general, it can be concluded that land governance in Tamale is 
weak, whereas it is satisfactory in Japekrom and Gbawe, with Gbawe display-
ing elements of good land governance. The evidence from the cases, though 
limited, also points to a number of general conclusions relating to the assess-
ment of land governance in CTIs. Participation and equity appear to be good, 
transparency appears to be satisfactory, but accountability, efficiency and ef-
fectiveness appear to be weak. 
As already suggested in Chapter 7, although CTIs in peri-urban areas raise 
some important land governance concerns, they are built on structures that 
promote participation, equity, transparency and accountability, and thus 
potentially meet good governance objectives in LA. The consultations, delib-
erations and negotiations, feedback sessions, and the weekly, regular, annu-
al and ad hoc meetings all help to make the institutions accountable to com-
munity members and also improve transparency in decision-making pro-
cesses. Nevertheless, transparency diminishes when the structures that make 
institutions accountable break down. Therefore, measures that are intend-
ed to improve transparency, accountability, and efficiency and effective-
ness can help CTIs to manage land justly. Promoting elections of land com-
mittee members and the interactive participation of community members in 
all aspects of the decision-making process will reduce exclusion and increase 
transparency and accountability. The study indicates that some CTIs lack the 
knowledge, skills, and technical and financial resources to accommodate cur-
rent demand in these areas. Therefore, proactive capacity building measures 
are needed to improve efficiency and effectiveness in the land delivery pro-
cess. 
 10.2.5 Indigenous knowledge (IK) and local capacity for 
land administration
Question 7: To what extent can the PGIS approach enhance IK and local capacity for 
LA?
This question was answered in Chapter 8. The relevant study was conducted 
in two peri-urban areas in Tamale skin lands. The study found that PGIS and 
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p-mapping processes enhance IK and local capacity for LA. Three positive as-
pects of the tools were outlined: the creation of a repository of knowledge to 
uncover underlying rights, participation and empowerment. Locals proved to 
be knowledgeable about the changes occurring in the land tenure systems in 
their communities. This knowledge is a source of data on which communi-
ties with limited human and financial resources capacities can draw to meet 
land information needs for land tenure administration. The PGIS approach 
was found to add value to IK in ways that could not have been achieved using 
conventional tools. In itself, PGIS is a capacity-building and empowering tool. 
It builds local capacity by improving dialogue, and enabling locals to develop 
skills in geo-information technology. The community members were able to 
interpret photomaps, transfer their spatial knowledge onto sketch and scale 
maps and to use hand-held GPS devices. PGIS tools helped the locals to regis-
ter and visualise their knowledge of ownership, use rights and land use, and 
the maps created can play an important role in LA. The PGIS method devel-
oped offers a model for creating strategies for uncovering IK, identifying un-
derlying rights in customary land and improving LA in developing countries. 
The study has shown that a PGIS is a reliable and effective vehicle for sup-
porting and strengthening community participation in LA. Being able to use 
PGIS with little professional support also empowers local community mem-
bers’ participation in decision-making on land use and administration. Adap-
tation to local cultures will always be necessary. 
 10.2.6 Strategies for designing land administration sys-
tems for customary areas
Question 8: To what extent do customary tenure institutions in Ghana meet the LAS 
requirements for peri-urban areas?
This question was answered in Chapter 9. The literature review in Chapters 2 
and 3 and the field study suggest that new and innovative arrangements for 
administering land are needed to handle the complexities of tenure effective-
ly, and secure collective and individual rights in customary land. Such LA ar-
rangements should be adaptable to the changing needs of people, tenure and 
local situations; offer flexible legal, technical and institutional arrangements; 
be capable of ensuring tenure upgradeability; should be affordable and have 
pro-poor objectives; built on legal and social legitimate institutions; and meet 
good land governance objectives in LA. 
In the three cases, focusing on the LAS requirements defined in Chap-
ter 4, it appears that CTIs potentially meet the requirements for administer-
ing land in peri-urban areas. In Chapters 6 and 7, the findings pointed to ten-
ure insecurity in the form of forced evictions, a lack of transparency, a lack of 
accountability and inefficient measures to ensure tenure security. However, it 
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was evident that CTIs have realised the need to improve tenure security for 
community members. The writing of customary transactions, the use of allo-
cation notes for land allocations and the establishment of land committees 
with clearly-defined structures are innovations that support this argument. 
These innovations have been facilitated by the dynamics of customary ten-
ure systems, which allow for the creation of innovative institutional arrange-
ments with an enhanced range of skills and institutions to support new 
forms of tenure. Although the capacity of local communities to administer 
land seems to be inadequate, the study indicates that when tools to enhance 
IK are made available, local capacity can be improved. This was shown by the 
results of the p-mapping exercise, described in Chapter 8. Further, the CTIs 
have simple and low-cost mechanisms for accessing land and resolving con-
flicts. These systems make land delivery affordable to everybody. More impor-
tantly, the structures on which customary tenure systems are built and the 
broad legal and social legitimacy they enjoy make these institutions poten-
tially able to meet LAS requirements if they receive the right kind of support.
Question 9: What strategies are needed to design and effectively implement LASs in 
customary areas?
The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 suggests that designing effective LASs 
for customary areas implies making trade-offs between different goals: pro-
viding individual titles for economic development versus protecting social in-
tegration and the security of the commons. These two objectives are crucial 
and have been considered at length in the design of LAS strategies. 
The framework for adapting LASs to institutional arrangements for cus-
tomary tenure is structured around a number of organisational, technical 
and administrative procedures that are needed in order to adapt LASs to local 
conditions and to secure three tenure types (see conceptual framework in Fig-
ure 9.2). The conceptual models comprise a hybrid system that draws on prin-
ciples of LA and customary land delivery processes. The underlying logic of 
the procedures for demarcating, mapping and recording land rights is drawn 
from the LASs, while implementation is based on customary tenure institu-
tional arrangements. The framework of the proposed LAS consists of two lev-
els: those of strategy and implementation. At the strategic level, LSAs and 
local councils act as facilitating institutions that monitor, evaluate, coordi-
nate, negotiate and manage the development of LA activities. These strategic 
planning activities are based on consensus-building that involves all stake-
holders in customary land. At the implementation level, three forms of ten-
ure are proposed. The three-phase tenure system allows group and individu-
al rights to be secured at different stages. Phase I tenure is applicable to are-
as where customary tenure systems are in a stable condition, and focuses on 
securing group ownership and producing an inventory of tenure information. 
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Phase II tenure is applicable to peri-urban areas, and aims to secure all indi-
vidual occupations and customary land transactions and issue certificates 
showing these rights. Phase III tenure, which comes at the end of the tenure 
formalisation process and is applicable in urban areas, aims to provide titles 
to individual rights. 
At the implementation level, CTIs are assisted in carrying out LA func-
tions and activities, including land tenure inventory, land allocation, survey-
ing and mapping land registration and recording, and dispute resolution. Vari-
ous alternative institutional arrangements are available for implementing LA 
strategies. These alternative strategies place emphasise the use of flexible, 
unconventional and pro-poor tools that can help customary areas to carry out 
LA activities.
Question 10: What are the challenges for adapting LASs to the institutional frame-
work of customary tenure?
The process of adapting LASs to the institutional framework of customary 
tenure systems may encounter several challenges, which were outlined in 
Section 9.4. They include:
■ Chieftaincy conflicts and unresolved tribal boundary conflicts: conflicts 
that relate to the ownership and sovereignty of a particular group, or con-
flicts over the legitimacy of the leader of the group, can be solved using 
innovative tools like PGIS.
■ Abuse of power by the customary authorities: customary authorities can 
capitalise on their power to undermine the members of communities by 
dispossessing farmers, the urban poor and other vulnerable groups. Improv-
ing good land governance, especially with methods that enhance transpar-
ency, accountability, efficiency and effectiveness, will help. 
■ Community perception: local communities need to be encouraged to put 
their confidence in CTIs to take up the new LA activities.
■ Devolution of LAS activities to CTIs: power struggles may arise between 
LSAs and CTIs, as LSAs may not be willing to transfer LA activities to CTIs. 
LSAs need to recognise CTIs as partners in the administration of land.
■ Managing customary laws and the statutory laws: some statutory laws that 
conflict with the objectives of the proposed model may need to be modified.
■ Lack of human and financial resourced in customary institutions: pro-
grammes aimed at building capacity are needed. 
■ Integrating diverse tenure forms and all locally-based systems into a single 
information system: from an information systems perspective, this can be a 
complex undertaking. The use of STDM might help with this technical prob-
lem.
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 10.2.7 Overall conclusions 
The main research question is: 
‘How can land administration systems in peri-urban areas be adapted to the tenure 
and institutional framework of customary tenure systems?’
The overall conclusion of this study is that customary tenure institutions 
have their own mechanisms to adapt to societal change, and a desirable solu-
tion would therefore be to adapt LA to the institutional framework of custom-
ary tenure. In view of the fact that customary tenure systems have evolved 
over time in response to specific conditions, the framework of customary 
land delivery can be adopted for LA, as long as CTIs receive sufficient support 
to undertake LA functions. 
CTIs are built on structures that promote transparent, equitable and 
accountable land delivery. Moreover, throughout this study, we saw that CTIs 
have demonstrated their willingness and potential to administer land effi-
ciently. The innovations that have been introduced in the land delivery pro-
cess indicate that CTIs are willing to face the challenge of securing tenure. 
These factors and the ability of local communities to use PGIS tools to doc-
ument land tenure information demonstrate that indigenous institutions 
have the potential to administer their land with little need for profession-
al support. This conclusion is supported by several examples from the liter-
ature, which indicate that when local communities have received support, 
they have successfully carried out land registration activities (Deininger et al., 
2008; Toulmin, 2009). Land administrators can take advantage of the several 
innovations that have been introduced in customary land delivery to deliv-
er low-cost and flexible LA services in peri-urban areas. However, for LA to 
be successful in customary areas, there is a need for mechanisms that can 
be institutionalised to improve land governance and local capacity. Non-con-
ventional and flexible technical tools, such as PGIS, offer local communities 
opportunities to record tenure information and to participate fully in deci-
sion-making regarding land use. 
 10.3 Contribution to the literature on land admi-
nistration reform 
Over past decades, the need for an alternative formalisation strategy to ad-
dress tenure security problems in customary areas has been acknowledged 
in land reform activities and debates. It is generally recognised that flexi-
ble tenure is needed to secure a continuum of rights in customary areas, and 
that adapting LAS to the local level is a desirable way of implementing this 
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objective. However, less attention has been given to the investigation of dy-
namics of tenure, good land governance and indigenous knowledge, as im-
portant issues that can contribute solutions to these problems. In this study, 
an attempt has been made to address these issues by incorporating concepts 
from formalisation theory, good governance and PGIS to develop conceptual 
models for adapting LASs to the institutional framework of customary ten-
ure. While the conceptual models developed for peri-urban Ghana cannot 
be exported wholesale to other countries, lessons can be learnt from them. 
Throughout the thesis, the literature on other African countries and, occa-
sionally, on other continents, has been studied, so as to analyse the theories 
and add to the body of empirical knowledge. Many countries, especially with-
in Sub-Saharan Africa, are confronted with similar problems relating to cus-
tomary tenure dynamics: land contestations and conflicts, weak governance 
in customary land delivery, and the lack of appropriate LASs to deal with 
peri-urban problems. The findings, conclusions and recommendations drawn 
from this study therefore have relevance beyond the three study areas and 
Ghana.
The study covers theory and practice in order to develop a flexible and low-
cost form of LA that is rooted in local community participation and institu-
tions, to secure a broad range of interests in land. The research presented in 
this thesis has drawn on existing studies and debates on LA reform. Gener-
al theories and insights from these studies and debates have been applied 
to gain a better understanding of LA reform in customary areas. By doing so, 
more knowledge has been gained on land tenure reform, formalisation theo-
ries, customary tenure systems, land governance, IK and on LA reform in gen-
eral. As I explain in the following paragraphs, a number of conclusions from 
this study may be of particular relevance to the literature on LA. 
The study provides new insights into formalisation strategies for custom-
ary tenure in peri-urban areas. Based on the analysis of the case findings, the 
study concludes that securing tenure in peri-urban customary areas may not 
require sophisticated rules, processes and tools. CTIs have their own ways of 
dealing with the dynamics of tenure and can therefore be adapted for LA, pro-
vided they are supported in the right way. When simple tools are provided to 
enhance land governance, improve IK and local capacity, LASs can success-
fully be adapted to the institutional framework of customary tenure.
Since the declaration of the Millennium Development Goals, governance 
has not only occupied a central place in the development discourse, but has 
also been considered a crucial element of development strategy (Zimmer-
mann, 2006; Burns and Dalrymple, 2008). The framework for assessing good 
governance in LASs mainly focuses on civil society, formal institutions and 
legislation and, to a lesser degree, the extent to which LASs recognise cus-
tomary laws. This study’s findings stress the need to look beyond formal 
institutions in the assessment of good governance in LA, particularly if LA is 
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to be decentralised to the local level. Thus, the principles of good governance 
need to be extended to all levels of land governance, including CTIs. Assess-
ing governance in CTIs presents an opportunity for a holistic diagnosis of and 
improvements to LA, which would not be possible if the assessments were 
limited to formal institutions and the legislation that underpins them. 
In recent decades, the use of IK to solve a multitude of problems in devel-
oping countries has attracted increasing attention, and has had a remarka-
ble impact on international research into natural resource management and 
planning (McCall, 2003; McCall and Minang, 2005; Rambaldi, Kyem et al., 
2006). The potential of IK for LA has received less attention, however. In LA, 
securing tenure – particularly in customary areas – involves recording his-
torical, social and cultural information, and therefore IK has to be part of 
the process. The study indicates that local communities have a rich body of 
knowledge about tenure systems, making IK vital for LA. IK should be recog-
nised as an important information source to complement scientific decision-
making processes in LA. 
 10.4 Future research
This study has analysed the dynamics of tenure and developed strategies that 
seek to adapt LASs to the institutional framework of customary tenure. The 
models developed are based on a flexible and intuitive methodology that is 
suited to dynamic environments, such as peri-urban areas. Nevertheless, as 
is the case with all research, this study has its limitations. These limitations 
raise a number of empirical and theoretical questions that require further in-
vestigation, and three recommendations for future research are highlighted 
below. 
First, the proposed strategies for designing and implementing LASs require-
ments are based on case studies of three peri-urban customary areas in Gha-
na. As in all case study research, the study is biased towards the cases stud-
ied, and it may not be representative of all customary areas. Customary prac-
tices are not homogenous in Ghana. Although the three study areas repre-
sent the country’s main tenure groups and are representative of institution-
al structures, possible capacity constraints, tenurial arrangements, and cus-
tomary practices relating to land differ across the country. Therefore, further 
investigations in other customary areas in Ghana would offer new data and 
provide an opportunity to strengthen the findings of this study. 
Second, in the proposed LAS strategy, the integration of land-use planning 
and enforcement, registration and surveying into customary tenure practic-
es requires the integration of customary and statutory laws. The land rights 
to record and secure outlined in the tenure models are based on local cus-
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tom. Land-use planning, mapping and registration are based on statuto-
ry laws. Operating in a pluralistic legal environment has always been a chal-
lenge in LA (Mulolwa, 2002; Larbi, 2006; Joireman, 2008). The question remains 
as to the extent to which statutory law should be integrated into the proposed 
model. Even for customary laws, a decision has to be made as to whether 
these laws should be codified and simplified. This is a complex issue, because 
the codification of customary law has the tendency to restrict its flexibility, 
whereas those laws that are not codified become susceptible to manipulation. 
Therefore, it would be advisable to undertake further research to improve the 
conceptual model regarding to the extent to which customary rules or statu-
tory laws are used. 
Third, peri-urban Tamale provided the main source of data for the analysis 
of the potential of IK for LA (Chapter 8). As explained in Section 5.6, although 
it was not possible to conduct p-mapping exercises in Gbawe and Japekrom, 
the multiple use of case evidence provided enough grounds for deriving our 
conclusion on the analysis of how PGIS tools can enhance local community 
capacity for LA. Further investigation to cover other customary areas would 
strengthen the conclusion drawn from this study. Furthermore, the PGIS pro-
cesses adopted in this study were limited to the identification of trends in 
tenure and the empowerment of the communities studied, but not the delin-
eation of external boundaries. Further investigations to exploit the poten-
tial of the PGIS for delineating customary boundaries and resolving bounda-
ry conflicts that have deep historical roots would provide an opportunity to 
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Lands Commission – Sunyani
Lands Commission – Tamale
Lands Commission – Accra
Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands – Tamale
Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands – Accra
Survey Department – Tamale
Survey Department – Sunyani
Survey Department – Accra
Town and Country Planning – Tamale
Town and Country Planning – Accra
Land Valuation Board – Accra
Land Title Registry – Accra
Land Administration Project
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 Appendix B   Questionnaires
  B.1 Dynamics of tenure
Interviews (Customary tenure and statutory institutions)
1. Who owns land in this customary area?
a. Is there any subgroup ownership in the customary area? 
b. Who makes up these subgroups?
c. What rights/interest do these subgroups have in the use of land in this 
area?
d. Do the state and other individuals own land in this customary area?
2. What rights of use to land do indigenes and settlers have in their land?
a. Are there any restrictions on such rights?
b. For how long can indigenes hold their rights?
c. For how long do you give land to settlers for building and for other develop-
ment?
d. To what extent has the right to use land for indigenes and settlers changed 
over the past 20 years? 
3. What arrangements exist for indigenes to acquire land? 
a. Is the arrangement the same for strangers/settlers?
b. Have these rules changed?
c. Under what circumstances can indigenes and settlers lose these rights?
d. To what extent have the rules governing land acquisition changed?
4. What are the modes of transferring interest in land?
a. Are there any conditions/restrictions for such transfers? 
b. Are land users (indigenes and settlers) obliged to seek the permission of the 
traditional authorities before making land transfers?
c. Have there been any changes in the mode of transferring land?
5. Describe the values indigenes attach to customary land? 
a. Have there been any changes in the ways indigenes value their land?
b. What are the major land uses in the customary area? 
c. How much has this land-use pattern changed over time? 
6. What customary institutional arrangements exist for: 
a. Allocating land for farming and residential purposes?
b. Managing and solving land-related conflicts?
c. Recording and tracing lands that have been allocated? 
d. Which aspects of these institutional arrangements have changed over the 
past 20 years?
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7. Do you have any role in the formal (modern) land management systems?
a. Do the statutory arrangements restrict/conflict with the customary tenure 
arrangements?
8. Extent of change in aspects of customary tenure?
a. To what extent have the following aspects of customary tenure and land 
management practice in this area changed?
- Land ownership
- Use rights
- Mode of transferring interest in land
- Land use pattern
- Customary laws
b. In your opinion, what are the underlying causes of these changes, if any?
c. To what extent do the changes in tenure affect the communal and social 
sustainability of the customary area?
Household survey (indigenes and settlers)
1. Community status: 
- Indigene 
- Settler
2. How long have you stayed in this community?    ................................................
3. How did you acquire your land?
- gift










5. How long did it take you to acquire the land?      ................................................
Has the land acquisition process changed?           Yes          No 
6. What rights do you hold in your land? 
- use rights under communal ownership             Yes         No
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- ownership?               Yes             No
7. How long are you allowed to hold this interest in land?
i. Is there any restriction on the size of the land you own?           Yes             No
ii. Is there any restriction on your acquired interest?..............................................
8. Do you have the right to transfer your interest in land through any of these 
mechanisms? 
- sale      Yes No
- inheritance (to own offspring)  Yes No
  gift      Yes No
- tenancy    Yes No
- customary mortgage    Yes No 
- land-pledging    Yes No
9. Is your land subjected to any of the following regulations?
- planning    Yes  No Don’t know
- land use    Yes  No Don’t know
- subdivisions    Yes  No Don’t know
- building    Yes  No Don’t know
10. Have you or any of your close relations been evicted from your land? 
Yes No
i. Under what circumstances did you or your relation evicted?
- compulsory acquisition by state  
- re-allocation to other people 
- re-zoning     
- forfeiture  
ii.  For which purpose were you using the land?  ...............................................
iii. Can you estimate the quantity of land you lost? .............................................
iv. Were you compensated?             Yes             No
v.  If yes, how were you compensated? 
11. Is the security on your acquired interest in land changed?      Yes             No 
12. Do you have any means of protecting your acquired interest in land?
13. In your opinion, do you agree that the tenure rules governing the use of 






14. Which aspects of the customary tenure rules have changed significantly?
- Access to land 
- Transfer of land rights 
- Land-use practices 
- Dispute resolution 
15. How do you value customary land today? 
- Spiritual or religious 
- Political 
- Social or communal 
- Economic 




- Don’t know 
17. Which of the following are the major factors underlying tenure changes in 
this area?
- Population growth 
- Increasing demand for land 
- Proximity to an urban setting (urbanisation) 
- Colonisation and statutory intervention
- Religion (Christianity and Islam) 
- Flexibility of customary law 
- Proliferation of educated chiefs 





  B.2: Good land governance assessment
Interviews (Customary tenure and statutory institutions) 
1. What constitutes the various arms of indigenous land management and 
governance?
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i.  How are the members on the members of the various arms of the land   
 governance appointed or elected?
ii.  How are the following groups represented in the land governance struc-  
 ture?
  - Subgroups
  - Men
  - Women
iii. What is the level of collaboration with the following institutions?
  - District Assemblies
  - Survey Department 
  - Land Valuation
  - Lands Commission 
  - Town and Country Planning 
  - Land Title Registry 
  - Office of Admministrator of Stool Lands
2. Are commuity members are involved in the following:
- Appointment and selection of community leaders
- Decisionmaking on the use of community resources
- Allocation of land
- Dispute resolution 
3. What measures are in place to allow community members contribute to the 
decision-making processes?
4. What measure are in place to ensure:
- Community members contribute to the decision-making processes?
- Equal access to land to all community members, men and women alike?
- Equal security of tenure for indigenes and settlers?
- Gurantee future generations equal access to their ancestral land?
5. How do you record or keep track of land information?
- What kind of land information is kept or stored?
- How do community members access this information and which informa-
 tion is accessible to them?
- Do you you publish land information?
- Is this information accessible to everybody?
- Is decision-making processs open to community members?
- What measures have you put in place to make customary laws on land
 delivery clear to community members?
6. Which types of land conflcict is predominant in this area?
-  How do you solve such conflcits?
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-  How many people are involved in the dispute resolution?
-  What is their educational background? 
-  What kind of special training have they received?
-  What are the guiding principles of dispute resolutions at the local levels?
-  How long does it take to resolve conflict (on average)?
-  What measures are in place to ensure that parties to the conflict are given 
equal treatment?
-  Can parties to land conflict appeal on the outcome of the resolution? 
7. Can a community member to loose his/her lands for a particular reason?
-  What happens to members of the family whose land is given away for resi-
dential use?
-  How do you compensate community members who loose their land?
8. Do indigenes and settlers pay for their acquired land?
-  Do you issue receipt on all land transactions
-  Do you have records or accounts of all payments related to the land trans-
action?
-  How often do you make information of land trasactions available to com-
munity members?
-  How often do you report on your stewardship to community members?
Household survey (indigenes and settlers)
1. Community status 
- Indigene 
- Settler 




4. How long have you lived in the community? …………………..............................
5. To what extent are community members involved in the selection of com-
munity leaders for the following positions?
-  Chiefs/Family Heads Significant involved (S) Partially involved (P) 
Not involved (N)
-  Council of Elders 
-  Land Committees 
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-  Local Council Members 
6. To what extent are community members involved in decision-making on 
the following?
- Use of community resources  Significant involved (S) Partially involved (P) 
Not involved (N)
-  Land allocation    
-  Dispute resolution 
7. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements:
-  Strongly agree 
-  Agree  
-  Neither agree nor disagree
-  Disagree
-  Strongly disagree 
a. All community members have equal access to land?
b. Women and men have equal access to land?
c. All community members and the general public have equal access to land 
information?
d. All land users given the same opportunity to present and defend their 
claims during dispute resolution?
e. CTIs provide equal tenure security for both indigenes and settlers?
8. What is your impression of the accessibility of land information from CTIs?
- Very good 
- Satisfactory  
- Bad  
- Very bad 
9. Is decision-making on the use of land open to all community members?
- Yes 
- No 
10. Are you familiar with the customary laws regulating land management in 




11. How often do chiefs and steering committees report on their stewardship 
to community members?
- Quarterly or less 
- Twice yearly 
- Once yearly 
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- Less than once per year 
- Not at all 








If ‘yes’, did the receipt reflect the amount you spent on the transaction?
- Yes
- No
13. Do you agree or disagree that all forms of revenue received from custom-
ary transactions should be accounted for? 
- Strongly agree   
- Agree   
- Neither agree nor disagree  
- Disagree 
- Strongly disagree 
14. How often do the customary authorities present financial statements on 
dividends that accrue from land allocations to community members?
- Quarterly or less 
- Twice yearly 
- Once yearly 
- Less than once per year 
- Not at all
15. How long did it take you to complete the land acquisition process?
Less than 1 month 
- 1-3 months 
- 3-6 months 
- 6-12 months 
- More than 12 months 
- Don’t know
16. How satisfied are you with the current customary land acquisition pro-
cess?
- Generally satisfied 
- Somewhat satisfied 
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- Dissatisfied 
17. How would you describe the effectiveness of the customary land dispute 
resolution mechanism?
- Very effective 
- Effective 
- Somewhat effective 
- Ineffective 
18. Which mechanism do you prefer to use for land dispute resolution: cus-
tomary or state courts?
- Customary mechanism
- State courts
19. How will you rate the extent to which customary laws are implemented in 
the land delivery process?
- Very good
- Good
- Satisfactory  
- Bad  
- Very Bad








  B.3 Participatory GIS
Community forum
1. Are the sketch maps representative of the changes in the tenure system 
you have observed in the community over the last ten years?
2. For which purposes could the sketch maps be used in the community?
3. What has the community learnt from the p-mapping exercise?
4. In what way could the p-mapping exercise benefit the community?
5. What difficulties did you encounter during the p-mapping exercise?
6. Can the community replicate the p-mapping exercise with little or no pro-
fessional support?
Validation workshop
1. Do the output maps from the p-mapping exercise meet the standards you 
require in your work?
2. In what ways can the sketch maps be used in land administration?
3. What are the strengths/weaknesses of the PGIS tool used?
4. Can the PGIS tool compromise the effectiveness of the output? 
5. Can the PGIS tool be reliable? 
6. Which aspects of the p-mapping process can be improved?
7. Can the tool be adapted for land administration processes in Ghana? 
8. Can the PGIS approach help local communities to collect and manage land 
information?
9. How will the PGIS tool help improve land administration in Ghana? 
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Figure C.1 Interface of a computerised recording system in Gbawe customary area
 Appendix C  Accessing land through 
the institutional frame-
work of customary ten-
ure
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This form must be returned to the Secretary, Land and Natural Resources Committee, Mpuasu-
Japekrom Traditional Council, P. O. Box 1, Japekrom, Brong-Ahafo, Ghana 
MPUASU-JAPEKROM TRADITIONAL COUNCIL 









Place of Residence:…………………………………… 
Occupation:……………………………………………... 




B: Information on Land 
Location of Land:……………………………………….. 
Quantity/Size of Land:…………………………………. 
Practical use of Land:…………………………………. 
Have you applied for any land in the Traditional Area? Yes/No 
If Yes, where?........................................................... 
 
I declare that the information supplied by me on this form is complete, true and correct in 
detail. I acknowledge that the committee may vary or reverse any decision made on the 
basis of incorrect or incomplete information supplied by me. 
 
Signature of Applicant: ……………………   Witness:…………………………. 
Name: ………………………………………   Name:……………………………. 
Date :……………………………. …………   Date:……………………………… 
 
OFFICIAL USE ONLY 
Is the applicant qualified for this acquisition? Yes/No 
Area allocated:………………………. ………………… Fee paid:…………………………. 
Lease Period:…………………………………………… 
Signature of Authorizing Officer:………………………. 





C-2 Application forms for accessing land for residential and 
commercial purposes
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  GBAWE KWATEI FAMILY 
CUSTOMARY LAND SECRETARIAT 
P. O. Box 2, Malam, Accra 
From RBF: GKF/CLS ………………………………………………………………………………….. 
LAND APPLICATION/DOCUMENT APPLICATION 
Particulars: 
(1) Applicant’s Full Name…………………………………………………………………………………..        
                                                                         (Surname First)  
(2) Postal Address ………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
(3) Residential Address …………………………………………………………………………………….. 
(4) Nationality ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
(5) District ………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
(6) Home Town …………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
(7) Age …………………………………………  Occupation …………………………………………….. 
(8) Purpose for which land is required 
(A) Residential (B) School (C) Clinic (D) Church (E) Commercial  
(9) Number of Plots required ………………………………………………………………………… 
(10)  I hereby undertake that within ….......... years of the execution of the lease, I shall commence the 
erection upon the demised land of the building or buildings for the purpose above indicated and shall 
complete same within …………..years of commencement. The building or buildings shall be constructed 
in a substantial workmanlike manner with the best materials of their several kinds and shall be, in every 
respect, in conformity within the building plans previously approved by or on behalf of the Town and 
Country Planning Department. The building or buildings shall also be enclosed in a wall or fence the plan 
of which shall have approved by the Town and Country Planning Department. 
It is agreed and understood by me that if I shall fail to develop the demised land in the manner undertaken 
above, the Family has the fullest right to re-enter the land and determine the lease. 
(11)  I ………………………………………………………………………………………… declare that 
the above particulars given are correct complete.  
     ……………………………………     ……………….   
      Signature/Thumbprint of Applicant            Date 
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 
Knocking fee  ₵……………………………………………….. 
Customary fee per plot  ₵……………………………………………….. 
Total amount payable ₵………………………………………………… 
Mode of payment ₵……………………………………………….. 
         (Fully Installment) 
        ………………….. …….   …………… 
                 Head of Family                  Date 
Signature of Committee Members 
1. ………………………………………………… 4.  ………………………………………………. 
2. ………………………………………………… 5.  ………………………………………………. 
3. ……………………………………………….. 6.  ………………………………………………. 
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  Summary 
Since pre-colonial times, a number of attempts have been made to formalise 
customary tenure systems. In general, the drive towards formalising custom-
ary tenure has been a feature of studies that are critical of indigenous ten-
ure institutions in land management. Several reasons have been given for for-
malisation, particularly by those who see customary tenure systems as a reci-
pe for underdevelopment and a major cause of rural poverty in customary ar-
eas. In many Sub-Saharan countries, a number of interventions – in the form 
of state-controlled institutions and mechanisms – based on these formalisa-
tion strategies have been adopted to administer customary land. Neverthe-
less, their effectiveness as regulatory institutions or as laws to deal with cus-
tomary tenure has yet to be realised. Land administration systems in many 
Sub-Saharan countries have been saddled with land conflicts, land grabbing, 
evictions, tenure insecurity, informal land transactions, haphazard and un-
regulated land development, and so forth.
During recent decades, a new paradigm for approaching the formalisation 
of rights and the administration of land in customary areas has emerged in 
policy and research. This new approach emphasises the need to give legal rec-
ognition to customary rights and to decentralise land administration func-
tions from national state-led agencies to local and community-based institu-
tions. The rationale is that the relationship between people and their land in 
customary tenure is grounded in the socio-economic importance of land, and 
that in order to achieve equitable land management in the context of pover-
ty reduction, formalisation should be gradual and tailored to local conditions. 
This study contributes to this new policy and research direction.
The central issue investigated in this study is how land administration sys-
tems in peri-urban areas can be adapted to the tenure forms and institution-
al frameworks of customary tenure systems. A systematic approach based 
on case study methodology, was applied to develop a strategy for designing 
and implementing LASs that can be adapted to the institutional framework of 
customary tenure. The research was based on an analysis of the literature and 
case studies. The former entailed an extensive literature analysis of the the-
ory of customary tenure systems, concepts of land administration and good 
governance, and theories and debates on formalisation. The literature anal-
ysis also looked at how the legal framework for administering land in Gha-
na has adapted to formalisation strategies in the administration of customary 
land rights. These theoretical insights were used to generate land administra-
tion system requirements for peri-urban areas. These requirements include 
adaptability, flexibility, upgradeability, affordability and pro-poor objectives, 
credibility and legitimacy, and good land governance. The requirements were 
appraised in a case study, conducted in three peri-urban customary areas in 
Ghana: Japekrom, Tamale and Gbawe. 
The case study analysis of the customary tenure systems focused on three 
issues: the dynamics of tenure, the level of land governance and indigenous 
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knowledge for local capacity enhancement. In the case study, a diverse set 
of qualitative and quantitative analysis tools were used, based on a multi-
ple case-study research design. In-depth interviews and focus group discus-
sions were used for the qualitative research. In the quantitative research, 
semi-structured interviews based on open-ended questionnaires were used 
to obtain information about interviewees’ perceptions and experiences with 
customary land delivery processes. The interviewees were selected from 
among all of the stakeholders in customary land delivery, including indi-
genes, settlers, chiefs, family heads, and land committees. Representatives 
from land sector agencies in Ghana were also interviewed. 
The analysis of the land policy documents, constitutional provisions, laws 
and the institutional framework for administering land indicates that Ghana 
has a comprehensive legal framework that recognises customary land tenure 
systems. Although a number of colonial and post-colonial policies have been 
developed to secure rights and make customary authorities more accountable 
to communities, land administration continues to be confronted by several 
problems relating to conflicting laws and overlapping regulatory institutions, 
which make tenure insecure in customary areas. Furthermore, the legisla-
tive interventions lack a clear pro-poor vision. In particular, the technocrat-
ic approaches adopted in the various land administration processes result in 
high transaction costs and are not concerned with protecting the land rights 
of vulnerable groups. The current land policy direction that has led to the 
establishment of customary land secretariats seems to support land admin-
istration at the local level. Yet, clear policy statements are lacking on whether 
these institutions should be public, private or quasi-public. 
The first field study analysed how Ghana’s customary tenure systems are 
adapting to the effects of urbanisation, demographic change, socio-econom-
ic pressure, and statutory interventions. The results from the three peri-
urban customary areas indicate that the needs of peri-urban dwellers are 
dynamic, as are their tenure systems. Although there are important differ-
ences between the tenure systems and the level of change across the three 
study areas, especially between northern and southern Ghana, some com-
mon changes were observed in ownership, land-use rights, modes of transfer-
ring interest in land, and land-use practices. There is a strong trend towards 
the individualisation and commercialisation of customary land rights. This 
has affected intra-family and social relations in these areas. The security of 
usufructuary rights has been significantly reduced. Nevertheless, institution-
al dynamics have enabled customary tenure institutions to introduce innova-
tions in the land delivery process, in response to these changes. These inno-
vations can help in the search for alternative arrangements to secure rights 
in peri-urban areas, where new forms of tenure relation need to be support-
ed by proactive measures that call for an enhanced range of institutions and 
skills. 
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The second field study aimed to assess the extent to which customary ten-
ure institutions meet good governance objectives in land administration. The 
assessment was based on indicators built on five governance dimensions that 
are considered crucial to any thorough assessment of good governance in 
customary tenure systems. These dimensions are: participation, equity, trans-
parency, accountability, and efficiency and effectiveness. The five dimensions 
were used to analyse and interpret the interactions between customary ten-
ure institutions and land-users in the three peri-urban areas studied. While 
the study shows local variations in land governance across the study areas, 
more importantly, drawing on the case evidence, one can identify a number 
of limited general observations. Comparing the five governance dimensions, 
one can conclude that participation and equity in customary land delivery 
appear to be good, transparency appears to be satisfactory, but accountabil-
ity and efficiency and effectiveness appear to be weak. Comparing land gov-
ernance across the three customary areas, it can generally be concluded that 
Tamale is weak, whereas land governance in Japekrom and Gbawe appears 
satisfactory, with Gbawe displaying elements of good governance. Neverthe-
less, it can be concluded that customary tenure institutions can potentially 
meet good governance objectives in land administration, if and when they are 
strengthened and supported in the right way.
In the third field study, the potential of participatory GIS (PGIS) to enhance 
indigenous knowledge and local capacity for land administration was inves-
tigated. An appraisal of PGIS in two peri-urban communities in Tamale cus-
tomary area shows that the locals are knowledgeable about the changes that 
have occurred in their land tenure systems. The scale maps produced during 
the participatory mapping exercises were also found to be reasonably use-
ful for land administration purposes. The maps clearly show the hierarchy 
of complex rights and interests associated with the ownership, control and 
use of customary land. These have evolved over time and had previously only 
been recorded in local collective memory. The maps can play an important 
role in the identification of underlying rights in customary land. The PGIS 
tools appeared to be readily accessible, understandable and usable – essen-
tial features, given the education and skill levels in peri-urban communities. 
The PGIS and the p-mapping processes also contributed – positively, although 
not comprehensively – to the empowerment of the community, by improv-
ing dialogue and the acquisition of skills. The locals demonstrated their abil-
ity to carry out the PGIS approach independently. The ability to use PGIS tools 
with little professional support clearly indicates that local communities can 
use such tools to carry out day-to-day tenure documentation activities, and 
are thus in a position to administer their own land with little support. On the 
whole, the PGIS proved to be a useful tool for uncovering such indigenous 
knowledge and creating empowerment. 
Reflecting on the study, it is clear that although there are differences in 
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the findings from the three case study areas, sophisticated rules, processes 
and institutions are not needed to provide security of tenure and an effective 
framework for administering tenure relations in customary areas. The adap-
tation paradigm can therefore be witnessed in peri-urban Ghana. Customary 
institutions are to some extent already coping with the dynamics of change, 
and if supported, could take the lead in an adapted, phased land administra-
tion strategy.
The framework for an adapted, phased land administration strategy is con-
ceptualised at two main levels: those of strategy and implementation. At the 
strategic level, land sector agencies, local government authorities and oth-
er professional institutions develop proactive policies to coordinate, monitor, 
evaluate and regulate the implementation of land administration activities at 
the local level. At the level of implementation, land administration activities 
are executed by customary tenure institutions. Three tenure models are pro-
posed that can be secured at different phases of tenure evolution. The ten-
ure models emphasise the security of group tenure in Phase I, which is appli-
cable in rural areas where customary tenure is stable. Phase II tenure aims at 
the issuing of certificates to individuals, and is applicable in peri-urban are-
as where there is economic pressure on land. Phase III tenure aims to provide 
titles for individual rights in land. The institutional arrangements required 
to implement the proposed land administration strategies at the local lev-
el emphasise the role played by innovative land tenure tools that can secure 
these different types of tenure at an affordable cost.
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  Samenvatting
  Aanpassing van grond-registratie-
systemen aan traditionele kaders 
van bezit van grond
  De casus peri-urbaan Ghana
  Anthony Arko-Adjei
Al vóór de koloniale tijd zijn er pogingen gedaan om traditionele inheemse 
systemen met betrekking tot rechten op grond te formaliseren. Veel studies 
zijn kritisch over dergelijke systemen van grondgebruik en hun bijbehorende 
instituties. Velen zien in traditionele systemen met betrekking tot rechten op 
grond een oorzaak van onderontwikkeling en armoede. In verschillende Sub-
Saharalanden zijn door overheidsinstellingen interventies gedaan om traditi-
onele systemen aangaande rechten op grond onder controle te krijgen. Maar 
de effectiviteit van regulerende instellingen en bijbehorende wetgeving is niet 
erg groot geweest. Grondregistratiesystemen in deze landen hebben thans te 
maken met conflicten over grondeigendom, ongeoorloofde inbezitneming, 
ontruimingen, rechtsonzekerheid, informele transacties, ongereguleerde ont-
wikkelingen en meer.
In beleid en onderzoek zijn de laatste decennia nieuwe paradigma’s 
ontstaan ten aanzien van het formaliseren van traditionele rechten op grond. 
Daarin wordt de noodzaak onderkend om deze rechten te erkennen, alsmede 
om de registratie van grond te decentraliseren tot op het niveau van lokale 
gemeenschappen. De reden daarvoor is dat de relatie tussen mens en grond 
in de traditionele systemen gebaseerd is op de sociaal-economische betekenis 
van grond. Formalisering dient geleidelijk uitgevoerd te worden om te komen 
tot een rechtvaardig beheer en tot armoedebestrijding die is toegespitst op 
de lokale omstandigheden. Dit onderzoek wil een bijdrage leveren aan deze 
nieuwe richting in beleid en onderzoek.
Het centrale thema in dit onderzoek is hoe grondregistratiesystemen in 
peri-urbane gebieden kunnen worden aangepast aan de daar gebruikelijke 
traditionele vormen van bezit van grond en aan de bijbehorende traditionele 
instituties. Er is gekozen voor een systematische benadering met gebruik-
making van casestudies om een ontwerp- en implementatiestrategie voor een 
dergelijk grondregistratiesysteem te maken. Er is allereerst een uitgebreide 
literatuurstudie gedaan naar theorieën omtrent traditionele grondrechtsys-
temen, concepten van grondregistratie en goed bestuur (governance), alsook 
naar theorieën en discussies rond formalisering van traditionele rechten.
Ook is gekeken naar de wijze waarop het juridisch kader voor grondreg-
istratie in Ghana al is toegerust voor strategieën van formalisering van tra-
ditionele rechten met betrekking tot grond. Met de theoretische inzichten 
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hieruit konden de vereisten voor een peri-urbaan grondregistratiesysteem 
worden geformuleerd, te weten aanpasbaarheid, flexibiliteit, verbeterbaar-
heid, toegankelijkheid voor armen, geloofwaardigheid, legitimiteit en aspect-
en van goed bestuur. De vereisten zijn getest in casestudies in drie verschillen 
peri-urbane gebieden in Ghana: Japekrom, Tamale en Gbawe.
In de casestudies is gericht gekeken naar drie aspecten: de dynamiek van 
het systeem van bezit van grond, de mate van goed bestuur met betrekking 
tot grond en de beschikbare kennis om de lokale capaciteit te vergroten. Een 
set van kwalitatieve en kwantitatieve analysemethoden is ontwikkeld voor 
een onderzoeksontwerp van multiple case studies. 
Het kwalitatieve onderzoek bestond uit diepte-interviews en focusgroep-
discussies. Voor het kwantitatieve onderzoek zijn semi-gestructureerde inter-
views met open vragen gebruikt om gegevens omtrent percepties en ervarin-
gen met de procedures van overdracht van traditionele rechten met betrek-
king tot grond te verkrijgen. Voor de interviews zijn personen geselecteerd 
uit alle geledingen, betrokken bij het verkrijgen van traditionele rechten met 
betrekking tot grond, zowel oorspronkelijke bewoners, nieuw gevestigden, 
lokale leiders, leiders van families en landcomités. Ook zijn vertegenwoordi-
gers van organisaties uit de grondsector in Ghana geïnterviewd.
Uit de analyse van beleidsdocumenten, grondwettelijke bepalingen, wetten 
en het institutionele kader blijkt dat Ghana een alomvattend juridisch kader 
hanteert dat traditionele rechten met betrekking tot grond erkent.
De grondregistratie heeft echter nog steeds te maken met problemen die 
ontstaan uit conflicterende wetgeving en overlappende bevoegdheden van 
organisaties. Daardoor ontstaat rechtsonzekerheid in gebieden met een sys-
teem van traditionele rechten met betrekking tot grond. Dit alles ondanks 
het feit dat al in de koloniale periode en daarna beleid gevoerd is waarb-
ij traditionele autoriteiten meer verantwoording dienden te geven aan lokale 
gemeenschappen. Vooral de technocratische benadering die in verschillende 
grondregistratieprocessen wordt gevolgd leidt tot hoge transactiekosten die 
geen rekening houden met het beschermen van de rechten van zwakkere 
groepen in de maatschappij.
Het huidige grondbeleid heeft geleid tot de instelling van traditionele sec-
retariaten en lijkt daarmee bij te dragen aan een betere grondregistratie op 
lokaal niveau. Of deze instellingen publiek, semi-publiek of wellicht privaat 
dienen te zijn, is echter nog niet gedefinieerd.
Het eerste veldonderzoek in Ghana was gericht op de aanpassing van de 
traditionele systemen met betrekking tot het bezit van grond aan verschijnse-
len als urbanisatie, demografische veranderingen, sociaaleconomische druk 
en wetgevende interventies. In de drie peri-urbane onderzoeksgebieden bleek 
dat de noden van de bewoners dynamisch zijn, evenals hun systemen met 
betrekking tot rechten op grond. Hoewel er grote verschillen zijn tussen de 
onderzochte gebieden en de mate van verandering daar (vooral tussen die in 
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het noorden en het zuiden), konden ook gelijksoortige veranderingen worden 
gevonden in eigendom, gebruiksrechten, de wijze van overdracht van grond, 
en andere rechten en in methoden van grondgebruik.
Er is een sterke tendens in de richting van individualisering en commer-
cialisering van traditionele rechten. Dit heeft een effect op relaties binnen de 
familie en op het sociale verkeer in deze gebieden. De zekerheid van rechten 
van gebruik en bewoning is sterk gedaald. Maar onder druk van deze veran-
dering hebben traditionele instellingen zich dynamisch kunnen aanpassen 
door middel van nieuwe procedures bij het verlenen van rechten.
Deze vernieuwingen kunnen bijdragen aan het formuleren van alternatieve 
wijzen om rechten met betrekking tot grond in peri-urbane gebieden te ver-
beteren. Nieuwe rechtsvormen dienen ondersteund te worden met proactieve 
maatregelen vanuit een versterkt institutioneel en vakmatig kader.
Het tweede veldwerk was gericht op het vaststellen van de mate waarin 
traditionele rechten en instituties voldoen aan de criteria van goed bestu-
ur. Daartoe werden criteria voor vijf dimensies van goed bestuur opgesteld. 
Deze zijn: participatie, gelijkheid, transparantie, verantwoording, efficiëntie 
en effectiviteit. In de drie peri-urbane gebieden is gekeken naar deze dimen-
sies om de interacties tussen traditionele instellingen en gebruikers te inter-
preteren en te analyseren. Hoewel er variatie bestaat tussen de gebieden kon 
een aantal meer algemeen geldende aspecten worden vastgesteld. Participa-
tie en het gelijkheidsbeginsel toegepast in traditionele grondtoewijzingsproc-
essen blijken in orde; de mate van transparantie is acceptabel maar de mate 
van verantwoording, efficiency en effectiviteit is zwak. Een vergelijking van de 
gebieden onderling toont aan dat de mate van goed bestuur ten aanzien van 
grond zwak is in Tamale en redelijk in Japekrom en Gbawe. De laatste regio 
vertoont elementen van goed bestuur.
Traditionele instituties met betrekking tot rechten op grond vertonen kara-
kteristieken die het mogelijk maken om met de juiste ondersteuning te kun-
nen voldoen aan alle criteria van goed bestuur.
Gedurende het derde veldwerk is onderzocht hoe met behulp van par-
ticipatory GIS (PGIS) plaatselijke kennis en capaciteit voor grondregistratie 
kan worden verbeterd. Uit de beoordeling van het gebruik van PGIS in twee 
gemeenschappen in Tamale blijkt dat de plaatselijke bevolking goed op de 
hoogte is van de veranderingen die zich in hun grondrechtensysteem heb-
ben voorgedaan. Ook voor reguliere grondregistratie bleken de kaarten die 
gemaakt zijn met participatieve karteringsmethoden goed bruikbaar. De 
kaarten geven een duidelijk beeld van de hiërarchie binnen de complexe 
rechten en belangen geassocieerd met eigendom, controle en gebruik van tra-
ditioneel land. De rechten zijn in de loop der tijd gewijzigd en werden uitslu-
itend in het collectief geheugen vastgelegd. De kaarten kunnen een grote rol 
spelen bij de identificatie van de onderliggende rechten in gebieden met tra-
ditionele grondrechten.
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De PGIS-gereedschappen bleken toegankelijk, bruikbaar en begrijpelijk te 
zijn in de peri-urbane gebieden, wat van groot belang is gegeven het opleid-
ingsniveau en de vaardigheden binnen de gemeenschappen. Het werken met 
PGIS en participatieve kartering had ook een positief effect op de versterking 
van de gemeenschap dankzij een verbeterde dialoog en het verwerven van 
vaardigheden. De plaatselijke bevolking toonde zich in staat om zelfstandig 
de PGIS-benadering te kunnen uitvoeren. Met een kleine professionele onder-
steuning kunnen plaatselijke gemeenschappen met behulp van PGIS-gereed-
schappen de dagelijkse gronddocumentatieprocessen uitvoeren en daarmee 
hun eigen grond administreren. PGIS bleek een goed middel om lokale kennis 
boven water te krijgen en daarmee de gemeenschap te versterken.
Ondanks verschillen in de onderzoeksgebieden is het duidelijk dat, als het 
geheel wordt beoordeeld, rechtszekerheid rond rechten aangaande grond kan 
worden verschaft in gebieden met traditionele rechten op grond zonder nieu-
we ingewikkelde regels, processen en instellingen te creëren.
Het aanpassingsparadigma kan in peri-urbane gebieden in Ghana al worden 
waargenomen. Traditionele instellingen kunnen de dynamiek van de verand-
eringen reeds in zekere mate hanteren en zouden met enige ondersteuning 
de weg kunnen wijzen in het bepalen van een aangepaste en gefaseerde gron-
dregistratiestrategie. Het kader voor een dergelijke strategie en zijn imple-
mentatie is op conceptueel niveau uitgewerkt. 
Grondsectororganisaties, lokaal bestuur en professionele organisaties 
dienen proactief beleid te ontwikkelen om de invoering van grondregistratie 
op lokaal niveau te kunnen coördineren, reguleren, monitoren en evalueren. 
Grondregistratieprocedures dienen geïmplementeerd te worden door tra-
ditionele instituties. Drie modellen van rechten met rechtszekerheid kunnen 
worden geformuleerd voor de verschillende fasen van ontwikkeling van rech-
ten met betrekking tot grond. In de eerste fase, die van rurale gebieden met 
stabiele traditionele rechten wordt de rechtszekerheid van de groep benadru-
kt. Het model voor de tweede fase, dat van peri-urbane gebieden met econ-
omische druk op het land, verschaft certificaten aan individuen. In de derde 
fase worden titels voor individuele rechten afgegeven. Nieuwe instrumenten 
om zekerheid te verschaffen tegen redelijke kosten zullen een grote rol spe-
len bij het implementeren van grondregistratiestrategieën binnen het tradi-
tionele institutionele kader.
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